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Abstract 
 
The regulation of food is a contested domain (Ansell and Vogel, 2006). Who should bear 
responsibility for manufacture, distribution, sale and supply and consumption of the food we 
consume is one of the overriding political questions of our time. The legal, moral and political 
authority for the regulation of food faces challenges and is subject to intense negotiation. This 
study sets out to explore one small part of this multifaceted and global debate.  
The regulation of nutrition and health claims represents a concentrated area of the broader 
treatise. Nutrition and health claims are common in commercial communications used in the 
promotion of food. The use of such claims is strictly controlled by the Nutrition and Health 
Claims (England) Regulation 2007 and much has been written about the rationale for the 
Regulation. By contrast, the study of the enforcement of the Regulation is relatively neglected. 
The original contribution to knowledge made by this work is the finding that the enforcement 
of the regulation relies on the application of the broad discretion allowed to local authority 
enforcers and this results in variances in enforcement style. Notwithstanding such differences 
in style, one clear theme emerged: that enforcers largely deploy an accommodative approach 
based on advice rather than a deterrent approach reliant on prosecution. The study adopts a 
qualitative methodology with semi-structured interviews of those responsible for the 
enforcement of the law, namely trading standards officers and environmental health officers 
to assess their views and attitudes. It was found that factors affecting the application of the 
discretion ranged from the local priorities of the authority and the availability of resources to 
effectively control the use of such claims. While the discretion allowed for authorities to 
respond to the particular needs of their community, it makes for a ‘postcode lottery’ in 
differences in the way in which the same claims that are used across multiple authorities are 
enforced. It was found that in common with other legislation where enforcement is ceded to 
local authorities, the system of enforcement would benefit from greater consistency of practice. 
5 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
For their skill, patience and advice I would like to thank the members of my supervisory team: 
Professor Chris Smith, Dr Tim Knowles, Dr Yin-Ling Lin, Dr Haruna Musa and Dr Adrian 
Morley. 
I would also acknowledge my debt to all those trading standards and environmental health 
officers who agreed to be interviewed about their professional practice. They took time out 
from their busy schedules to speak with me and allowed me to use their responses in my 
research. For that, I am extremely grateful. 
 
  
6 
 
Contents 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. 3 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................ 5 
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................................. 11 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 11 
1.1 Prosecutor or advisor? The role of a trading standards or environmental health officer ...... 11 
Chapter 2.0 .......................................................................................................................................... 13 
Literature review ................................................................................................................................ 13 
2.1 Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 13 
2.2 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 13 
2.3Aspects of food labelling other than nutrition and health claims ............................................. 14 
Mandatory food labelling: The Food Labelling Regulations 1996 .................................................. 14 
2.4 General labelling requirement ....................................................................................... 15 
2.4.1 Name ......................................................................................................................... 16 
2.4.2 Ingredients ................................................................................................................. 17 
2.4.3 Other information ...................................................................................................... 17 
2.4.4 Voluntary provision of nutrition information .............................................................. 17 
2.5 Consumer protection and food – from food safety to fraud to nutrition ................................ 19 
2.6 General rationales for intervention ........................................................................................... 22 
2.6.1 Making markets work ................................................................................................. 23 
2.6.2 Making markets work and consumer behaviour – the application of market theory to 
the market for nutritional properties of food ...................................................................... 24 
2.6.4 Regulation defined ..................................................................................................... 28 
2.6.5 Rationale for regulation .............................................................................................. 29 
2.7 Why regulate health and nutrition claims? ............................................................................... 30 
2.8 The link between diet and health .............................................................................................. 32 
2.9 The link between health claims and increased consumption of functional foods .................. 33 
2.10 Changing behaviour - aims and effectiveness of the Regulation compared with advertising 
and self-regulation ........................................................................................................................... 34 
2.11 Self-regulation .......................................................................................................................... 36 
2.12 Advertising ................................................................................................................................ 36 
2.13 The regulatory response: The European Commission’s regulation on nutrition and health 
claims (EC No 1924/2006) ................................................................................................................ 37 
2.14 The chain of causation ............................................................................................................. 41 
7 
 
2.15 The application and enforcement of nutrition and health claims .......................................... 42 
2.16 A brief history of the enforcement of claims relating to food generally ............................. 42 
2.17 Enforcement: the economic and socio legal perspectives compared .................................... 44 
2.17.1 The empirical evidence ......................................................................................................... 48 
2.17.2 Organisational factors ........................................................................................................... 49 
2.17.3 Political factors ...................................................................................................................... 49 
2.18 Trading standards or environmental health?.......................................................................... 50 
2.19 Risk based regulation ............................................................................................................... 51 
2.20 How regulated firms respond to regulation ............................................................................ 53 
2.21 The impact of health claims on consumer behaviour and innovation by producers ............ 56 
2.22 The Joint Health Claims Initiative 1997-2007 .......................................................................... 61 
2.22.1 Critique of the JHCI................................................................................................................ 63 
2.23 Architecture of enforcement of general food law in the UK .................................................. 65 
2.23.1 Enforcement and penalties under the Nutrition and Health Claims Regulations 2007 ..... 66 
2.24 The relationship between local and central government food law enforcement ................. 66 
2.24.1 Duties of local authorities ..................................................................................................... 67 
2.25 Enforcement options and the factors affecting enforcement choices ................................... 68 
2.26 Enforcement policy and enforcement action by UK trading standards ................................. 72 
2.27 Actual enforcement – cases and regulatory decisions............................................................ 77 
2.27.1 Enforcing health claims on food labels – the Australian experience ............................ 77 
2.27.2 Cases prior to the Regulation .................................................................................... 78 
2.27.3 Adjudications by the Advertising Standards Authority ............................................... 79 
2.28 The role of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and its impact on decisions by 
courts and the Advertising Standards Authority ............................................................................ 81 
2.29 Research questions .................................................................................................................. 84 
2.30 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 85 
Chapter 3 ............................................................................................................................................. 86 
Methodology ........................................................................................................................................ 86 
3.1 Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 86 
3.2 Review of the existing literature ............................................................................................... 86 
3.3 Research philosophy .................................................................................................................. 87 
3.4 Gap in literature and contribution to knowledge ..................................................................... 89 
3.5 A quantitative or qualitative approach to the research question? .......................................... 95 
3.6 Validity of the research .............................................................................................................. 97 
8 
 
3.7 Data collection instrument – semi structured interview ........................................................ 100 
3.8 Reflexivity and the role of the researcher ............................................................................... 108 
3.9 Sampling ................................................................................................................................... 110 
3.10 Sample size, selection and choice of subjects ....................................................................... 111 
3.11 Data saturation ....................................................................................................................... 114 
3.12 Access ..................................................................................................................................... 116 
3.12.1 Snowballing or chain referral of interviewees.......................................................... 116 
3.12.2 Difficulties in obtaining interviews - the effect of horsemeat 2013? ......................... 117 
3.13 Transcription .......................................................................................................................... 120 
3.14 Thematic analysis ................................................................................................................... 121 
3.15 Limitations .............................................................................................................................. 121 
3.16 Ethics ....................................................................................................................................... 122 
3.17 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 125 
Chapter 4 ........................................................................................................................................... 127 
Findings .............................................................................................................................................. 127 
4.1 Summary ................................................................................................................................... 127 
4.2 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 127 
4.3 Data analysis - emergent themes ............................................................................................ 130 
4.4 Enforcer or advisor? ................................................................................................................. 131 
4.5 The enforcer as advisor: the nature of the relationship and its defining characteristics ...... 134 
4.6 The limits of the advisory function .......................................................................................... 141 
4.7 Advice as a preliminary step to enforcement action .............................................................. 143 
4.8 The decision to prosecute ........................................................................................................ 145 
4.9 Factors involved in the decision to prosecute- the evidential and public interest test ........ 148 
4.10 Enforcement policy or code ................................................................................................... 150 
4.11 Risk .......................................................................................................................................... 152 
4.13 Resources ................................................................................................................................ 156 
4.14 Focus on matters other than food standards: agenda setting and conflicting priorities .... 159 
4.15 Lack of specialist skill and experience ................................................................................... 163 
4.16 Environmental health enforcement of food standards ........................................................ 163 
4.17 A proactive or reactive approach to the enforcement of nutrition and health claims ....... 165 
4.17.1 Proactive work and investigation ............................................................................ 166 
4.18 Victims: consumers or other business? ................................................................................. 168 
9 
 
4.19 The outcome of complaints ................................................................................................... 168 
4.20 The differences between the enforcement of nutrition and health claims and other food 
standards legislation ...................................................................................................................... 169 
4.21 Summary ................................................................................................................................. 170 
Findings – structural themes .............................................................................................................. 172 
4.22 Summary ................................................................................................................................. 172 
4.23 Local enforcement of EU law ................................................................................................. 172 
4.24 Differences in enforcement policy and practice – a postcode lottery? ............................... 173 
4.25 Relevant authority: home authority and primary authority ................................................ 174 
4.25.1 Primary authority – definition ................................................................................. 177 
4.25.2 Primary authority in practice .................................................................................. 177 
4.26 Technical barriers and complexity of the Regulation ........................................................... 180 
4.27 Central government involvement .......................................................................................... 182 
4.28 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 185 
Chapter 5 ........................................................................................................................................... 186 
Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................ 186 
5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 186 
5.2 The original aim of the study ................................................................................................... 186 
5.3 The rationale for the regulation of nutrition and health claims ............................................ 187 
5.4 The enforcer’s toolkit ............................................................................................................... 187 
5.5 Enforcement practice – deterrence or accommodation ......................................................... 188 
5.6 Enforcers as advisors ................................................................................................................ 189 
5.7 Enforcement by prosecution.................................................................................................... 190 
5.8 Deciding to prosecute – evidence and public interest ............................................................ 191 
5.9 The roles of risk and proportionality ....................................................................................... 191 
5.10 The limitation of resources .................................................................................................... 192 
5.11 The breadth of officers’ duties and the setting of priorities ................................................ 193 
5.12 Local enforcement of EU law ................................................................................................. 194 
5.13 Officers’ experience and expertise in enforcing the Regulation .......................................... 194 
5.14 Enforcement of the regulation and food law in general compared ..................................... 195 
5.15 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 195 
5.16 Limitations of the research .................................................................................................... 196 
References .......................................................................................................................................... 198 
Appendices ......................................................................................................................................... 218 
10 
 
A. Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of 20 December 2006 on nutrition and health claims made on 
foods. Vol. 1924. ...................................................................................................................................  
B. The Nutrition and Health Claims (England) Regulations 2007 ......................................................  
C. Patel, A., Smith, C., Knowles, T. and Lin, Y.-L. (2012) 'Nutrition and health claims: An 
enforcement perspective.' Trends in Food Science & Technology, 28(1) pp. 15-22. ............................  
D. 1. Patel, A. (2012) 'The regulation of health and nutrition claims for the promotion of food.' 
International Journal of Management Cases, 14(1) pp. 340-346; 2. Patel, A. (2012) ‘Regulation and 
enforcement of marketing of food by the application of health and nutrition claims’ International 
Journal of Sales, Retail and Marketing 1(2) pp70-77. ...........................................................................  
E. Copy text of email sent to trading standards and environmental health officers requesting 
interview ...............................................................................................................................................  
F. Poster presentation for Eurocereal 2011, Campden BRI, Chipping Campden, Gloucestershire 
6-7 December 2011...............................................................................................................................  
G. Sample interview transcripts ........................................................................................................  
 
  
11 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Prosecutor or advisor? The role of a trading standards or 
environmental health officer 
 
The function of the Regulation on Nutrition and Health claims (EC, 1924/2006 ) (the 
Regulation) is to provide information for consumers to be able to make informed food choices 
(Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). Consumers are not well placed to judge the nutritional and 
health characteristics of a food as such attributes are latent. Therefore the problem arises 
where more readily assessed attributes such as price and sensory qualities of a food dominate 
consumer decision-making (Akerlof, 1970) and the outcome may eventually be poorer health 
and obesity for consumers in the long term. 
The rationale of the Regulation (EC, 1924/2006 ) is to provide information in order to correct 
the quality signalling problem rather than to impose a restriction or limit or ban on the sale of 
poor quality foods (Patel et al., 2012). However, this is merely the means by which the 
Regulation seeks to achieve its more ambitious outcome of improved health and welfare of 
consumers. The efficacy of the Regulation may depend on how enforcers go about the 
operational task of enforcement. Therefore, the aim of this study is to investigate how trading 
standards or environmental health officers enforce the Regulation and understand how this 
relates to existing literature in economics, political science and socio-legal studies.  
The benefit of food law enforcement is an economic good like any other. In extrapolating the 
economic theory to enforcement, the key problem is that the benefits of enforcement are 
diffuse and are enjoyed by all. However as with ‘public’ goods generally, ‘no ‘market type’ 
solution exists to determine the level of expenditure on public goods’ (Tiebout, 1956). In this 
respect, the benefits of food law enforcement are allocated in a non-optimal way when 
compared to other goods. 
 
The application of the economic theory to the practice of enforcement provides that economic 
actors will comply with regulation if, and only if, the costs of compliance with regulation are 
exceeded by the benefits (Law, 2006). This means that the size of the sanction and the risk of 
apprehension and sanction must be such that together they amount to a sufficient deterrent 
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to make a rational business comply with the regulation (Becker, 1974; Stigler, 1974; Polinsky 
and Shavell, 1999). The socio-legal perspective is captured by Hawkins and Hutter who state 
that ‘the task of a regulatory bureaucracy is, by various means, to induce a potentially unwilling 
business organisation to bear costs which it would in many circumstances not wish to assume’ 
(Hawkins and Hutter, 1993). However, do either the economic or socio-legal perspectives 
adequately characterise the behaviour of businesses? Moreover, does it provide a sufficient 
basis to inform enforcement strategy? To what extent can behaviour be controlled or 
influenced by legal penalties?  
 
Rather than businesses who behave as economically rational actors, enforcers are faced with 
a more complex picture of a mixture of small and large businesses who may or may not be 
aware of the regulations which apply to their activities and differ in the extent to which they 
are willing to comply with regulations. 
 
Examining how enforcers enforce and the aims that they are seeking to achieve may provide 
an understanding of how the law, sanctions and enforcement strategies may be used to control 
business and thus inform regulatory design. This study identifies the common enforcement 
practices of environmental health and trading standards officers.  
 
One view is that enforcement of the law refers to legal action. This is known as the deterrence 
model (Reiss, 1984). In this model the methods of enforcement are penal and adversarial and 
prosecution plays an important role and there is greater reliance on imposing sanctions 
(Hutter, 1989). By contrast, the accommodative model of enforcement seeks to secure 
compliance by the remedying of existing problems and the prevention of others. In the 
accommodative model, compliance is achieved by cooperation and negotiation. The methods 
used to ensure compliance are persuasion, negotiation and education. The use of legal action, 
particularly prosecution, is regarded as a last resort to be used only in the event that everything 
else has failed (Hawkins, 1984). In this model; ‘the importance of legal methods lies in the 
mystique surrounding their threatened or possible use rather than their actual use’ (Hawkins, 
1984). 
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Chapter 2.0  
Literature review 
 
2.1 Summary 
 
This chapter provides the context of the regulation and enforcement of nutrition and health 
claims for food. It is divided into two sections: the first deals with regulation and the legal and 
economic rationales provided for it. The second examines the way in which enforcers work. It 
focuses on the way in which enforcers apply the significant discretion afforded to them and 
the impact that can have on the effectiveness of the regulation of nutrition and health claims. 
While the current literature on enforcement is derived from industries ranging from water 
pollution, railways and food hygiene, this chapter seeks to place the findings from it into the 
context of the regulation and enforcement of nutrition and health claims. 
 
2.2 Introduction  
 
The Regulation (EC) 1924/2006 relating to nutrition and health claims made for food (EC, 
1924/2006 ) presents many challenges for enforcers. Particular among these are the number 
of potentially false claims on commercial communications from advertising to labels that are 
not compliant and the limited resources available to enforcers. It is difficult to define what the 
outcome of the Regulation should be and how the effectiveness of enforcement should be 
measured. It is not inconceivable that many transgressions of the Regulation will be 
undiscovered and therefore it is impossible to measure with any accuracy the efficacy of 
enforcement.  
 
Previous studies have attempted to capture and illuminate the negotiation between enforcers 
and regulated firms (Braithwaite et al., 1987; Hawkins, 2002; Hutter, 1997). 
Theories of the ‘regulatory pyramid’ of a hierarchy of actions from negotiation to prosecution 
to risk based regulation, a more recent concept, aim to provide strategic level guidance on 
how enforcers should carry out their duties. 
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Such theories define non-compliance, but they do not provide a complete picture into how to 
design enforcement strategies. They do not say how a regulator should deal with ‘resource 
constraints, conflicting institutional pressures, unclear objectives, changes in the regulatory 
environment, or indeed how particular enforcement strategies might impact on other aspects 
of regulatory activity, including information gathering, and how regulators can or should assess 
the effectiveness of their particular strategies’ (Black and Baldwin, 2010) 
 
2.3Aspects of food labelling other than nutrition and health claims 
Mandatory food labelling: The Food Labelling Regulations 1996 
 
The law in relation to health and nutrition claims concerns the regulation of claims which are 
made by suppliers in order to promote the sale of foods. The law is voluntary in so far as where 
suppliers do not make claims relating to health and nutrition, the regulations will not be 
invoked. In this respect, the law is different from the information that food suppliers must 
provide, the mandatory food labelling rules. 
 
In the same way, the Regulation may be distinguished from regulations that involve notifying 
consumers about the matters that may affect their health and nutrition but which are not within 
the scope of the Regulation.  The application and scope of the Regulation is set out in Article 
1; ‘This Regulation shall apply to nutrition and health claims made in commercial 
communications, whether in the labelling, presentation or advertising of foods to be delivered 
as such to the final consumer’ (EC, 1924/2006 ).  The following types of information are not 
covered by the Regulation and they do not form part of the scope of this thesis: allergy 
information, genetically modified foods, notifications about hydrogenated fats and the use of 
cloned animal products. 
 
The mandatory rules relating to food labelling may be divided into two categories depending 
on their purpose. The first category is that set of rules that are aimed at providing consumers 
with a description of the food itself, therefore those which purport to answer the question; ‘what 
is it?’  This is concerned with identifying the food and communicating its name to consumers, 
for example, burger or pizza. The main rules relating to ensuring the accuracy of a description 
are contained in the Food Labelling Regulations (1996). 
A further set of rules relates to the content of food; in answer to the question; ‘what is in it?’ 
The rules are aimed at providing consumers with information about its composition. 
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It may be asserted that the purpose of the rules in both cases is to avoid misleading 
consumers. This allows consumers to exercise choice and to put into practice healthy eating 
based on the link between diet and health. (Hu, 2003). 
 
The 1996 Regulations, inter alia, impose a positive obligation on the supplier of food to provide 
specified information. The Regulations concern the mandatory information that must be 
provided. In contrast, the rules relating to the use of nutrition and health claims are negative 
in that they impose restrictions on the claims which may be made for the food where such 
claims are primarily a means of promoting its sale. The regulation governing health and 
nutrition claims concerns information that is provided at the discretion of the supplier. 
2.4 General labelling requirement 
There are certain names which are recognised under the 1996 Regulations as legal names, 
for example; jam, sugar or milk. In addition producers may add further words to make the 
description more precise, for example; strawberry jam, granulated sugar or skimmed milk. 
Where a recognised legal name is in existence, it must be used. 
 
In addition to the legal name, there may be a customary name which is widely accepted by 
UK consumers. This may be best illustrated by reference to an example: 
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Figure 1 Waitrose Lemon Meringue Pie 
 
    
Image from Food Labelling in the UK compiled by Dr David Jukes, www.reading.ac.uk  
2.4.1 Name 
The name of this product is given as; ‘Lemon Meringue Pie’.  The term ‘Meringue Pie’ is a 
customary name and is widely understood among UK consumers. The use of the term ‘Lemon’ 
indicates that the flavour of the product comes mainly from lemons. It is not however a literal 
name so that the product does not need to be made of or mainly from lemons and it is 
acceptable for other ingredients for example sugar, to constitute a larger ingredient. The 
supplier here might argue that the description ‘Lemon Meringue Pie’ is a customary name 
which is recognised by UK consumers however the Regulations require that a supplier should 
provide a description that is sufficiently precise to inform a purchaser of the true nature of the 
food. In this respect, the packet goes on to provide the words;  
‘A butter rich pastry case with lemon filling topped with meringue’ 
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2.4.2 Ingredients 
In addition to the description of the products, the packaging should specify the ingredients 
which go into its manufacture by listing them in order of quantity starting with the greatest first.  
In addition, the ingredients that form compound ingredients, for example, mayonnaise may be 
listed separately after reference to the compound ingredient or subsumed within the general 
list of ingredients. 
 
2.4.3 Other information 
Additional information that is required, is disclosure of ingredients, or a statement concerning 
certain ingredients, associated with allergies, the size or weight of the product, the country of 
origin, the name of the manufacturer and the use of additives such as ‘E’ numbers, storage 
instructions and date marking showing the ‘use by date’. In addition to this information 
suppliers will often voluntarily provide information about whether the product is suitable for 
vegetarians and environmental information for example whether the packaging is recyclable. 
There are many further labelling requirements some of which are specific to particular foods; 
for example chocolate, sugar, fruit juices. In addition, there are products which are exempt 
from the general regulations for example alcoholic drinks, fresh fruit and vegetables sold loose. 
 
2.4.4 Voluntary provision of nutrition information 
 
From December 2016 most pre-packed foods will be required to show nutritional information 
under the Food Information for Consumers Regulations (EU FIC). However, presently, there 
is no requirement for food suppliers to provide information about the nutrition content. 
Nevertheless it has become common practice with pre-packaged foods from large suppliers, 
particularly supermarket own label  products, for a detailed list of ingredients to be displayed. 
This is organised on a voluntary basis and is not done in the context of a health and nutrition 
claim. For example, there is no health claim made in relation to the protein content in the 
spinach and ricotta pizza shown below and therefore the Regulation 1924/2006 does not 
apply. 
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Figure 2 nutrition panel Sainsbury’s Spinach & ricotta pizza 
Since the passing of the Food Labelling Regulations 1996 the primary source of legislation 
dealing with misleading claims has been the EU. The original Directive 77/94/EEC established 
an EU wide framework for making nutrition claims for food. This was superseded by Council 
Directive 89/398/EEC as amended several times. However the most important regulation of 
health and nutrition claims has been the EC Regulation 1924/2006 on nutrition and health 
claims (EC 1924, 2006) 
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2.5 Consumer protection and food – from food safety to fraud to nutrition 
 
The history of consumer protection in general may be traced back to regulation of the sale of 
food in particular. The statute of the Assize of Bread and Ale 1266, is the earliest recorded 
piece of legislation dealing with the sale and content of food (Cartwright, 2003). The legislation 
was aimed at regulating the price, quantity and quality of bread and beer (Davis, 2004). It was 
‘intended as an instrument to protect consumers, especially the poor…but its aim was also to 
provide bakers with an adequate living whatever the price of grain.’ The legislation represents 
one of the earliest attempts to protect consumers from being deceived by supplies of 
adulterated food. Suppliers who were found to have breached the law could be fined, pilloried 
or flogged (Whetham, 1964).  
 
Religion has played a significant role in influencing behaviour of its adherents in determining 
the food that such followers may or may not consume. The restrictions may originate from 
religious edicts or holy texts that act as ancient codifications of good practice in relation to 
food and health. Restrictions or prohibitions on the consumption of certain, in particular, animal 
products may be founded in religious tradition and they may also be traced to practical social 
and health benefits. ‘Food taboos have an adaptive value; production of milk or eggs has the 
potential to feed far more people than the flesh of one individual cow or hen’(Shatenstein and 
Ghadirian, 1998). Historically, religious restrictions on particular foods were meant to prevent 
moral, psychological and physical harm (Qureshi, 1981). 
 
‘The development of meat hygiene is traced from its historical beginnings in ancient religious 
tradition to the veterinary-science-based organoleptic inspection systems of today.’(Bell, 
1993) There are several examples that come to mind from prohibitions against eating 
discovered carrion, not eating pork in very warm countries where trichinella infections might 
be prevalent or avoidance of the eating of a meat which degrades rapidly in heat. 
 
While governments have faced significant challenges in changing consumer behaviour in 
relation to food, religion has played a more influential and effective role, at least in delivering 
benefits that accrue from abstinence. A closer examination of the effectiveness of government 
in changing behaviour as framed by the emerging science of behavioural law and economics 
is provided later in this thesis.  
 
As for enforcement of the standard, this was difficult and even fraught with a notion of political 
control by association with feudal lordship. ‘At local level such control could cause 
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considerable resentment, for it could be seen by the lower orders as yet one more instrument 
of oligarchic or seigniorial oppression’(LeGoff, 1988). ‘Control over their [weights and 
measures] standards emerged as a sovereign attribute and developed in tandem with the 
establishment of political authority’(Wood, 2002).  
 
The deception of consumers was viewed as an example of one of the worst types of mercantile 
fraud and merchants and traders were viewed with the same suspicion as tricksters (LeGoff, 
1988). The following extract from Medieval Economic Thought by Diana Wood (Cambridge 
University Press 2002) highlights the types of mischief that the early regulation of food was 
designed to deal with:  
 
‘…butchers who painted the eyes of rotten sheep carcasses with blood to 
make them look fresh (Bromyard, 1484). A similar crime was highlighted in 
1475 when the gild of cooks in London petitioned that ‘no one of the craft 
shall bake roast, or boil flesh or fish two times to sell, under penalty [for 
thereby putrefying flesh might be passed off as fresh’ (Myers, 
1969)…Bakers too had their own brands of chicanery. They might bake 
loaves with ‘bad dough within and good dough without’, as a certain Alan 
de Lyndeseye did in London in 1316. The same year two bakers were 
pilloried for baking bread of ‘false, putrid and rotten materials through which 
persons who bought such bread were deceived and might be killed’ (Riley, 
1868). Sometimes the punishment really fitted the crime, as when a seller 
of unsound wine in London was made to drink a measure of it before the 
rest was poured over his head (Myers, 1969). Finally there were livestock 
traders, especially horse-dealers, who resembled shady second-hand car 
dealers in hiding the faults of the animal, or selling ‘a crokyd hors for a 
clene’(Bromyard, 1484).’ 
 
Throughout history, there have been shifts in emphasis of the rationale for consumer 
protection in food. It is clear from the above that early legislation was designed to deal with 
financial fraud arising from selling food which was inferior to that described. There is also 
concern for the health and safety of consumers and how they might be protected from the 
risks of contaminated and food that had gone bad through the passage of time. Often these 
concerns overlapped and were not distinguished as in the example of the pilloried bakers 
above. 
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With the exception of price controls, current food legislation adopts the rationale of the Assize 
of 1266. Price controls as a means of consumer protection have all but been abandoned as 
anti-competitive in the UK. However, as a general principle, suppliers should not be permitted 
to make false or misleading claims about food and consumers are entitled to receive food 
made from the ingredients or with the characteristics that are claimed for it. There are a 
number of reasons why this is important (Turner, 1995). First, fairness: consumers are entitled 
to receive what they pay for. If consumers are deceived into paying for a particular product 
and they actually receive a cheaper or inferior one, they will suffer a financial loss. False and 
misleading claims are also associated with market failure and the misallocation of resources 
and the loss of confidence in the truth of all seller claims (Ramsay, 1985). The second reason 
relates to competition; the supplier who flouts the law enjoys a price advantage over those 
who comply, which would allow it to sell for a lower price and therefore gain more sales  or 
alternatively it would enable it to make a larger profit. Finally, misleading information about the 
composition of food can lead to illness, allergic reaction or even death for example as a result 
of the failure to disclose the presence of a substance which may harm the consumer because 
he or she suffers from an allergy.  
 
The primary focus for modern food regulation and enforcement is food safety and hygiene. In 
this respect the Food Safety Act 1990 (Food Safety Act, 1990) represents the key consumer 
protection measure in the UK today. It provides the regulatory framework and the key statutory 
obligations for the UK food industry  (Atwood, 2009). Section 14 is concerned with, ‘selling to 
the purchaser’s prejudice any food which is not of the nature or substance or quality demanded 
by the purchaser.’ This apparently innocuous statement represents the key protection for 
consumers and risk for food businesses in UK domestic legislation. Of an altogether broader 
nature is the General Food Law Regulation (EC 178, 2002). Article 14 is concerned with food 
safety by providing that ‘food shall not be placed on the market if it is unsafe.’ 
 
The supporting provisions of the Regulation are concerned with restrictions on import and 
export, traceability and recall and withdrawal of unsafe food, reflecting the experience of the 
food scares of previous years, for example, the outbreak of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) in the 1990s. 
 
In relation to hygiene, the following EC Regulations of 2002 lay down the food hygiene rules 
for all food businesses in the EC: on the hygiene of foodstuffs (EC 852, 2004); the hygiene for 
food of animal origin (EC 853, 2004); and on the organisation of official controls on foods of 
animal origin (EC 854, 2004). 
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2.6 General rationales for intervention 
 
One rationale for intervention by modern law making in developed economies is that the effect 
will provide conditions which are closer to that of the perfectly functioning market than the 
current position. The 153 member countries of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) subscribe 
to the ideals of free trade and open markets, although food production and agriculture is of 
course beleaguered by protectionism (Anderson et al., 2013; Tyers and Anderson, 1992). 
 In the EU this is enshrined in the Treaty of Rome Article 2: 
 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and 
an economic and monetary union and by implementing the common policies 
or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, 
sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high 
degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level of 
employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and 
quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among 
Member States. (92/C191/01, 1992) 
 
The aim of market efficiency and competitiveness is made explicit in the Lisbon Strategy;  with 
its aim for the EU ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy 
in the world.’ (EC 2005, 2005). 
 
There are a number of examples of law and policy making where the aim of the legislation is 
not to deliver market efficiency by the optimum allocation of resources (Arrow, 1969) but to 
pursue an alternative goal. Other reasons for regulation may be justified in that; (i) it seeks to 
promote a socially desirable goal, such as protection of vulnerable or disadvantaged groups, 
(ii) redistribution of wealth, (iii) health promotion or (iv) that it delivers environmental protection. 
A description and an example of the application of each of these rationales is provided below. 
In relation to the protection of vulnerable groups, which may include the elderly, mentally or 
physically disabled or those from a low income household (i), an example of this may be found 
in the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (CPRs) (2008). The CPRs 
create a general standard of what might constitute unfair commercial practice by reference to 
the impact of the activity on the ‘average’ consumer. However where the activity is likely to 
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affect only an identifiable group of vulnerable consumers, then it is assessed by reference to 
the average member of that group. The CPRs represent a statutory implementation of a 
variation on the classic economic free market model of the consumer as rational and always 
acting in their own best interest. It acknowledges the potential for variety in the types of 
consumers, which again represents a break from the classic economic model. 
 
An example of laws that are aimed at the redistribution of wealth would be the normative 
approach of the income tax system, which has as its dual purpose the redistribution of 
resources while maintaining the incentives to ensure the maximisation of wealth. The creation 
of the system of taxation provides revenues for the collective goods for which there is 
invariably state provision, such as defence, and which cannot be provided by individuals. It 
also provides for education and health services which may benefit lower income households 
who are not resourced to purchase these goods in the private sector. 
 
In relation to health promotion, The Smoke-Free (Premises and Enforcement) Regulations 
2006 (Smoke-Free (Premises and Enforcement) Regulations, 2006) were introduced to 
protect employees and the public from the harmful effects of second hand smoke. They may 
be deemed to be fiscally and market neutral at best but may have financial consequences as 
an unintended effect and, at the time of their coming into force, businesses such as licensed 
premises were particularly concerned about their potential effect on their trade. 
 
The Environmental Protection Act 1990 (Environmental Protection Act, 1990) has as its policy 
objective the prevention of pollution to the air, land and water in an integrated fashion where 
such protection was provided previously in a piecemeal way. 
 
2.6.1 Making markets work 
Policy makers aspire to create perfect markets to ensure the efficient distribution of resources, 
provide optimal conditions for business, promote a high level of competition and therefore 
provide low prices for consumers (Sharpe, 1964). In a perfect market, consumer sovereignty 
is the natural result of competition between suppliers.  
 
The free market ethos has dominated economic and consumer policy making in the UK since 
1979 with the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister for the Conservative Party and 
it has remained so since notwithstanding the political, social and economic challenges it has 
faced and weathered. Evidence of this may be found in key consumer policy papers spanning 
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the period from 2000 with ‘Modern Markets: Confident Consumers’ (DTI, 1999) to 2010 with 
‘A Better Deal for Consumers: Delivering Real Help Now and Change for the Future’ 
(Department of Business Innovation and Skills, 2009) in which market theory is applied to 
deliver benefits for consumers. In the period 2010 to 2015 the Liberal Democrat and 
Conservative coalition consumer policy aimed to provide clearer information for consumers 
rather than stronger intervention, as enshrined in the Consumer Rights Act 2015. The 
characteristics of a true free market are worth revisiting as they provide such an important part 
of the creed that informs consumer protection, regulation and policy.  
The key features of a free market are the following: 
1. That there are many buyers and sellers, therefore there is no concentration of market 
power and that all suppliers are price takers and not price makers. 
2. That there are no barriers to entry to the market so that anyone willing to exchange at 
the market price may participate in the market. 
3. That everyone sells the same thing; that there is no product differentiation and that 
goods and services are commodities. 
4. That all the costs are borne by the seller and that all the benefits accrue to the 
consumer so that there are no externalities. 
5. Finally, and perhaps most importantly in relation to food, that buyers and sellers have 
the same information, that there is perfect information and there are no information 
asymmetries (Ramsay, 1985).  
 
Where markets bear the characteristics of a functioning free market the price of the goods or 
services will transmit all the necessary information and it is not necessary to for governments 
to intervene other than to maintain effective optimum market conditions. 
 
In classic market theory, consumers are able to make unfettered choices between price and 
quality. However, in relation to the nutritional content of food, the market does not work 
effectively because buyers (and possibly sellers too) do not have the information to be able to 
assess the quality of food as described in Ramsay’s fifth characteristic of a functioning market 
above. 
2.6.2 Making markets work and consumer behaviour – the application of market 
theory to the market for nutritional properties of food 
It is instructive to look at the key reasons put forward for the range of consumer protection 
measures and, in particular, the chief reasons for regulation in food law. The market for food 
quality, by which we mean its safety and nutritional value, is not perfect. The principal reasons 
25 
 
for justification of consumer protection are to correct recognised market failure; in relation to 
food this is to put right information gaps between buyers and sellers (Caswell and Mojduszka, 
1996). Sellers are, generally speaking, better informed than buyers and consumers may have 
misconceptions about the safety and quality of various foods. In choosing between different 
foods that form their diet consumers are making decisions based on their perceptions of the 
quality (e.g. risk or nutritional attributes) of the food that they buy. If consumers’ perception of 
these is incorrect then this will distort the marketplace by sending the incorrect signal to 
suppliers about which products and characteristics consumers value highly and wish to be 
supplied with. As a result of the distortion, the market may be over or undersupplied with food 
with characteristics at variance with those which consumers wish to buy. In this case 
regulatory intervention directed towards the provision of information will aim to correct such 
distortions and alleviate their effect by allowing accurate market information signals to be 
transmitted (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). 
 
2.6.3 Buyer behaviour - Search, experience and credence attributes 
Perhaps the most important insights into the role played by information on consumer 
behaviour are those evolved from the work of Phillip Nelson writing in the Journal of Political 
Economy in the 1970s, specifically, but not exclusively, ‘Information and Consumer Behaviour’ 
and ‘Advertising as Information’ (Nelson, 1970; Nelson, 1974). In applying these insights to 
food markets, it is helpful to distinguish between search, experience and credence goods 
(Karni, 1973). 
 
In relation to search attributes, consumers are able to ascertain the characteristics of a product 
before purchase. Generally, in relation to food, consumers have access to an abundance of 
information so that they may protect themselves. Consumers may directly examine the product 
by first hand inspection as in the case of face-to-face retail sales of food and by reference to 
the product description in the case of online sales. Alternatively, they may carry out a pre 
purchase enquiry. This is accomplished by investigation of the product by reference to 
independent research and product testing, critical review by journalists and public relations in 
media and increasingly, consumer feedback accessed quickly and at minimal marginal cost 
online. In relation to search attributes generally, advertising and marketing play the most 
important role and in relation to food, point of sale labelling will play a crucial role (Nelson, 
1974). In food markets, consumers make frequent purchases. Search attributes for food may 
include colour or packaging but not those related to safety or nutrition. The effect of the 
availability of information, frequent purchasing and the relatively low value of the products is 
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that the market may be relied upon to effectively provide information to suppliers about the 
qualities that consumers value.  
 
For experience attributes, ‘consumers cannot determine the quality of the product until they 
buy and use it’ (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). With respect to food, this would apply to its 
taste and other qualities which may only be determined by experience. Where products fall 
short of consumer expectations with reference to the price, information signals will be received 
by other consumers and will have the effect of deterring subsequent purchases and the market 
for food with its dependence on repeat purchasing will function effectively. 
 
Where quality cannot be signalled and consumers make purchases based only on price (which 
is readily signalled) problem of ‘lemons’ as identified by Akerlof in relation to second hand 
cars, arises (Akerlof, 1970). Just as it is difficult for the seller of a high quality used car to 
communicate the qualities of his car which are hidden and therefore obtain a premium price, 
the same analogy may be applied to food markets. In the absence of intervention that requires 
disclosure, only lower quality products are offered for sale. (This does not mean that there is 
no market for premium quality foods at higher prices. There has in fact been significant growth 
in the market for such produce and the organic food market is one example of this (Yiridoe et 
al., 2005). However, the concern here is for the market for nutritional properties of food 
(Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). The information asymmetry that exists because buyers are 
unable to assess the nutritional and health quality of the food provides sellers with the 
incentive to pass off lower quality food as high quality. Akerlof’s highly influential paper, The 
Market for Lemons, provided the rationale for the ‘Lemon Laws’ consumer protection 
legislation to deal with defective cars which repeatedly exhibited faults. However, the theory 
has met with the criticism that it fails to take into account the reputation of the seller in relation 
to repeat purchases. The rationale of the Regulation on Nutrition and Health claims (EC, 
1924/2006 ) is to provide information in order to correct the quality signalling problem rather 
than to impose a restriction or limit or ban on the sale of poor quality foods. This is done by 
the application of the Regulation to all commercial communications (Article 1) including 
advertising and labelling. The impact of the provision of information will depend on the extent 
to which consumers are responsive to such information and the transaction and search costs 
associated with finding the information. 
 
With credence attributes, consumers cannot determine the quality of a product even after 
purchase and consumption. In this respect nutritional value of food is a credence good in that 
consumers are unable to assess the worth of food from a single experience and even in the 
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case of long-term consumption, it would be impossible for a single consumer to be able to 
isolate the effect of a particular food.  For example, following consumption of a cholesterol 
lowering spread, an individual consumer will not be able to test the reduction in their risk of 
coronary heart disease claimed for it. The inability to isolate a cause and effect relationship 
between foods and their health or nutritional qualities and the latent effect of the consumption 
of foods makes ex post evaluation of quality  so difficult that; ‘informed consumer and 
reputational models of markets for quality do not apply here’ (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). 
This analysis presents a challenge for regulators.  In relation to nutritional content and health 
effects, the deficiency of information on the part of consumers and its effect on the market is 
apparent and therefore the argument for regulatory intervention is stronger. The nature of the 
informational failure will influence the regulation design. 
 
One regulatory response might be to stipulate the nutritional levels required for specific foods. 
It is possible to ban or restrict the availability of foods with particular nutritional characteristics. 
However economic analysis drives us towards regulation where sellers must provide 
information about the nature and characteristics of their products (Viscusi et al., 1987). A 
striking example of this may be seen in the regulation of financial services where sellers are 
obliged to provide specific information in a specified format at particular points in the 
transaction. The benefit of providing such information is to maintain incentives for sellers to 
continue to compete to provide their products and to innovate for new ones and for consumers 
to use information to exercise the choice to protect themselves against poorer quality or unsafe 
products. Information is provided in a twofold manner: first, by the requirement for disclosure 
of specified information, for example, nutritional values of food and second, by the control of 
promotional claims, for example health effect claims. Both of these forms of control are evident 
in the Regulation. 
 
Information requirements have the effect of transforming credence and experience attributes 
into search attributes. For example, mandatory nutrition labelling rules that require the fat  
content of the food to be displayed makes such a characteristic a search attribute and as such 
it may be verified by the consumer reading the label. The effect of this on the market is that it 
improves the quality signalling so that the market for quality attributes functions effectively and 
deals with the problem identified in Akerlof’s Lemons theory. 
 
The impact of labelling on the quality of food is difficult to quantify. Information and labelling is 
only one factor in the mix of influences on consumers in their choices between products and 
factors such as price, context and choice architecture may play significant parts (Jolls et al., 
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1998). Notwithstanding this, Ippolito and Mathios’ study of consumer behaviour in response 
to the information about the health benefits of cereal consumption found advertising to be of 
major importance (Ippolito and Mathios, 1990). 
 
Caswell and Mojduszka find evidence in their work that information can play a positive part in 
consumer decision making. In turn, this provides a confident outlook on informational labelling 
and a reason for optimism in relation to the Regulation’s ability to achieve its goals: 
‘Informational labelling requirements are likely to have a significant impact on demand patterns 
and the dynamics of markets for food quality. As information about quality and use 
characteristics improves, manufacturers will compete for market shares from sales to attribute 
conscious, label-using consumers. Products and industries with less desirable quality profiles 
may reformulate or redesign processes to avoid unfavourable comparisons with other 
products.’ (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). 
2.6.4 Regulation defined 
There is no universally agreed definition of the term ‘regulation’ and therefore this makes it 
difficult to arrive at a precise meaning for it. Indeed, as Ogus observes, regulation has a 
‘bewildering variety of meanings’ (Ogus, 1994).  Regulation denotes different things 
depending on the context. Even in this narrowed down legal and quasi-legal context, the term 
has several meanings. The traditional view of regulation is that it is an authoritative and 
mandatory rule or a set of rules or laws created by an administrative body. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines regulation as ‘a rule or principle governing behaviour or practice’ (OED, 
2015). The Cambridge dictionary defines regulation as ‘an official rule’ or the ‘act of controlling’ 
(Cambridge, 2005). The Better Regulation Task Force has a much broader definition; ‘any 
measure or intervention that seeks to change the behaviour of individuals or groups’ (BRDO, 
2015b).  
 
The idea of regulation as a rule may not provide the whole story and may therefore be 
misleading. It is more helpful to contemplate regulation as an ongoing process rather than in 
terms of a set of rules or even as a single desirable particular outcome (Feintuck, 2004).  
Notwithstanding the fact that the idea of a process is captured in this definition by Feintuck, it 
omits an essential element: that of the public nature of regulation. A potentially more valuable 
model for regulation for this research is Selznick’s definition of ‘a sustained and focused 
control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a community’ (Selznick, 
1985).  Of course, truthful commercial communications for food are valued by society. Perhaps 
they rank behind risks such as food safety but their potential impact on the health and 
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economic welfare of consumers is significant. The public element in relation to nutrition and 
health claims is provided by local and central government agencies. 
2.6.5 Rationale for regulation 
Having established a working definition for regulation the next question is when is regulation 
necessary or desirable? According to Tombs, regulation is necessary to protect us from the 
most dangerous behaviour and its consequences because without regulation there would be 
‘death, injury and illness…not to mention systemic cheating, lying and stealing’ (Tombs, 2002). 
One of the more commonly cited and prosaic reasons for regulatory intervention is that it is 
designed to protect consumers (Ogus, 1994). The protection of consumers is the justification 
for the regulation of health and nutrition claims. By restricting the claims which may be made 
for foods (the term ‘food’ includes drink throughout this thesis) the government is seeking to 
change the behaviour of food suppliers to only make claims for foods where they can be 
justified and for consumers to be better informed about the health and nutrition properties of 
the food that they consume. This may then in turn lead to the benefit of consumers being able 
to choose and consume healthier foods as a result. 
 
While the law provides for minimum standards for food safety with statutes such as the Food 
Safety Act 1990 (Food Safety Act, 1990) prohibiting the sale of unsafe food, classical 
economists view food safety as a commodity like any other with the interaction between supply 
and demand to decide a market ‘price’ for that safety. Government intervention in making food 
safe can be justified on the basis that consumers are not aware of and do not have the 
expertise to assess the risks associated with food that might be unsafe. The problem arises 
as a result of the latent nature of the risks and from the failure of the price mechanisms to 
reflect the full costs or benefits of changes in food safety (Henson and Caswell, 1999).  
 
The rationale behind the regulation of health and nutrition claims is to allow consumers to 
make informed choices in relation to their diet and health. As the risks involved are not as 
acute as those which arise in food safety, this may be argued to be a more paternalistic 
intercession by the state. It is one that is based on protecting consumers not from the risks of 
imminent illness or death from harmful food but to enable them to obtain the benefits of food 
which may have properties that have been demonstrated to profit their health (Brennan, 2008). 
Regulation as an intervention in markets for the purposes of consumer protection is a long 
established and widely used rationale for law making (Breyer, 2009). However, it is defining 
consumer protection and determining the form it should take which is arguably more 
problematic. As Ramsay (1985) states, ‘there are three fundamental questions in consumer 
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protection: ‘Why do consumers need protection? When ought governments to intervene to 
protect consumers? And finally – how ought governments to intervene?’. In terms of the 
objectives of consumer protection, there are, according to Ramsay, two central objectives for 
regulation of the consumer marketplace: ‘(a) the improvement of economic efficiency by 
remedying market failures; and (b) equity (Ramsay, 1985).  In the context of the regulation of 
health and nutrition claims, it is clear that only the former objective provides the basis of the 
law. In fact, experience suggests that better off consumers may benefit more from the 
regulation than poorer ones (Law, 2003).  
There exists, at least in theory, a difference between economic and social regulation with 
justifications for a regulation predominately based on economic grounds. In such cases, 
economic regulation is aimed at promoting competition and ensuring consumers enjoy the 
benefits of competition. Much of our understanding of the relationship between regulation and 
economics is based on the highly influential work of Stigler inter alia (Stigler, 1971). Social 
regulation is concerned primarily with consumer protection albeit often using economic tools 
in order to achieve its goals. In this respect, is impossible to isolate the two types of regulation 
as any attempt at social regulation will have an economic effect. An example in nutrition and 
health is the use of taxes or subsidies to discourage or promote the consumption of particular 
foods. In addition, the effect of mandating minimum standards of food safety or labelling 
requirements will affect the costs of production for the supplier and the final cost to the 
consumer. 
 
Commentators such as Cranston argue that the distinction between economic and social 
regulation is artificial because they both have in common the application of coercion at their 
core (Cranston, 1982). Similarly, Feintuck argues that economic and social regulation may be 
consolidated into the single concept of ‘the public interest’; a commonly used phrase in legal 
reasoning but one that faces similar problems of definition as regulation. However for those 
economists with a general presumption against state intervention, such as Posner, regulation 
is deemed a well-intentioned but futile attempt to promote the public interest (Posner, 1974).  
 
2.7 Why regulate health and nutrition claims? 
 
The regulation of nutrition and health claims is a qualitative measure aimed at protecting the 
public interest by ensuring that the information provided to sell foods is not misleading. It 
represents a further step along the line of intervention beyond mere safety. This progression 
is predicted by Richardson et al who claim that once the minimum safety standards for 
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regulation are met, it seeks to extend to matters which go beyond the original intentions and 
which seem removed from what is required in the public interest and safety (Richardson et al., 
1982). For example, requirements which depict the size of font to be used on labels. 
 
Regulation is frequently advanced as a solution to societal problems. What then is the problem 
which regulation on health and nutrition claims are trying to solve? The problem is the impact 
of poor diet on health and more particularly the potential for misleading consumers about the 
health and nutrition properties of particular foods. The problem, as is often the case with 
regulation, is that it has unintended consequences and sometimes it may even be argued to 
have the opposite of the effect that was originally intended for it. For example, where regulation 
is proposed to raise standards and protect consumers, such measures may be supported by 
incumbent suppliers as a way to  control market entry under the guise of maintaining standards 
(Stigler, 1971). The effect for consumers is therefore to maintain higher prices by curtailing 
competition and allowing inefficient suppliers to maintain profits. In relation to nutrition and 
health claims, the requirements of the Regulation may be represent a costly hurdle for smaller 
businesses and a barrier for potential new entrants.  
 
There is no doubt about the marketing potential for nutrition and health claims. The shelves of 
every supermarket are heavy with the weight of products that claim to defend against infection 
with friendly bacteria in a yoghurt drink, tea and coffee that is rich in antioxidants that will ward 
off cancer and the effects of aging and spreads that will reduce cholesterol. Consumers are 
not in a position to test these claims and the regulation is therefore aimed at ensuring that the 
claims are supported by scientific evidence (Economist, 2009a). 
 
The promotion of health is a vital and constant issue. As an illustration of this point, two brief 
but salutary examples of reports of health problems that may be linked to the consumption of 
food maybe found below: 
 
1. ‘Over the past 30 years, circulatory diseases including ischemic heart disease and 
stroke, have been the most common cause of death in the UK for both males and 
females.’ (Office for National Statistics 2008).  
2. Obesity alone costs the UK £6.6 to 7.4 billion per year (House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2004).  
 
While the picture of the growth of obesity has been variable in different areas, the prevalence 
of childhood obesity has risen worldwide in less than one generation (Lobstein et al., 2015). 
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The Global Burden of Disease 2010 study found that the major causes of death worldwide are 
non-communicable diseases: primarily heart disease and diabetes associated with obesity. In 
2013 some 32 million adults aged between 20-79 had diabetes. It is estimated at around 20% 
of the EU population or 150 million people are obese. The cost of treating diabetes is estimated 
at around 100 billion euros. Diet is considered to play a significant role in the risk factors for 
both heart disease and diabetes (Lim et al., 2013)  
 
Consumers are provided with more information about what they eat and they are interested in 
the relationship between diet and health. This interest is reflected in the volume of health 
journalism and ‘lifestyle’ advertising and by the proliferation of health and nutritional material 
in broadcast television. In relation to health and nutrition claims specifically, there is an 
increased tendency to promote food through advertising as a type of medicine with curative 
properties. A content analysis of magazine food advertising for the period 2000 – 2008 found 
there was an increase in health and nutrition claims among other health related food promotion 
(Zwier, 2009). 
 
Reliable nutrition and health claims will enable consumers, particularly those from vulnerable 
groups with particular nutritional requirements or with different genotypes to implement dietary 
advice. It could even allow for the application of ‘personalised nutrition’ plans linking 
genotyping with specific nutritional advice to reduce the risk of chronic diseases associated 
with diet  (Joost et al., 2007). 
 
Evidence based nutrition and health claims may promote ‘sustainable nutrition’. By 
successfully communicating reliable nutrition and health data relating to foods, consumers will 
be able to implement efficient nutrition plans and avoid environmental impacts of the wasted 
cost consumption based on false or unsubstantiated claims (Lettenmeier et al., 2012)  
 
2.8 The link between diet and health 
 
There is overwhelming evidence supporting a link between nutrition, diet and better health and 
the prevention of disease (Hu, 2003). Therefore, it would appear that there are real benefits 
to consumers from improved diet. The advent of functional foods, ‘foods that claim to improve 
well-being or health’ (Katan and de Roos, 2003) and the use of claims to promote such foods 
may lead to improved health as consumers may make better choices. Alternatively, the 
promotion of such foods may, in itself, be potentially misleading and dangerous to consumers 
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by giving consumers the impression that certain foods may provide a ‘silver bullet’ for good 
health and disease prevention (Dwyer, 2001). A third option is that food suppliers make 
fraudulent claims for health benefits for foods that in fact do not have such properties. 
 
 In truth a ‘fundamental public health nutrition principle is that it is the total diet, not individual 
food products that determine health’ and that ‘there is no such thing as good or bad food, only 
good or bad diets’ (Lawrence and Rayner, 1998). In the words of Sue Davies, Chief Policy 
Adviser at Which?; ‘people embrace food products offering health benefits because there’s a 
natural tendency to go for the quick fix rather than cut down on saturated fat, sugar or salt, or 
eat more fruit and vegetables.’(WHO, 2009). 
 
What are the main functional foods for which health and nutritional claims are made? The 
current market is made up principally of breakfast cereals fortified with vitamins, probiotic 
yoghurts containing ‘friendly’ bacteria and cholesterol lowering margarines containing plant 
stanols, but there are also breads, ready meals, fruit juices and bottled waters for which similar 
claims are made. What are the health benefits that are claimed for such foods? They are 
mainly problems associated with aging or with the development of children; including heart 
and digestive health and bone structure and growth. 
 
2.9 The link between health claims and increased consumption of 
functional foods 
 
The sale and promotion of such food by the food industry assumes that there is a link between 
the making of nutrition and health claims in advertising and marketing and the increased 
consumption of such foods. However, the success of this sales and promotion activity depends 
on consumers being aware of and having understood the health claims made for a particular 
food and their expectation that they will enjoy the benefits of consumption as promised by the 
supplier. On the other hand, proponents of restrictions on the promotion of food containing 
high fat, sugar and salt base their case on the presumption that there is a link between 
advertising of high fat, sugar and salt foods and their consumption. Many of these assumptions 
are untested and the evidence for them is patchy at best. 
 
There are difficulties with defining ‘healthy’ foods. A product such as milk or cheese may be 
high in a specific desirable nutrient, for example, calcium and at the same time contain high 
levels of an undesirable type of nutrient, in this case, fat. Some consumer groups, for example 
Which?, have argued that nutrition and health claims should not be permitted in the promotion 
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of such products as it may lead to their increased consumption especially among children. 
The US Food and Drug Administration approach is that if a food has high levels of fat or salt 
than this will automatically undermine any health claim. 
 
2.10 Changing behaviour - aims and effectiveness of the Regulation 
compared with advertising and self-regulation 
 
Types of regulation range from the economic, which includes the regulation of prices or sets 
conditions that are required to be met for entry to a market, to social regulation covering health.  
 
The normative theory of economic regulation places emphasis on the role of markets. The 
rationale underlying normative measures include the correction of market failure and 
encouraging of competition (Peltzman, 1977). Commentators in the area of economic 
regulation have been highly influential in setting the policy agenda. The same commentators 
often criticised the efforts of governments in attempting to achieve social purposes; for 
example improved health or environmental benefits where price controls and entry conditions 
were seen as inadequate(Stigler, 1961). 
 
Consumer protection law has largely adopted the market approach towards regulation. In line 
with economic theory, this involves the assumption that consumers act rationally and in their 
self-interest. Underpinning this is an economist’s respect for consumer sovereignty. That is, 
consumers are best placed to make choices for themselves and that where government has 
tried to influence those choices in order to deliver a policy goal, this has resulted in failure 
coupled with inefficient allocation of resources and protection of incumbent interests (Ramsay, 
1985). 
 
The presumption has been challenged by behavioural economists seeking to apply insights 
from psychology to understand consumer behaviour and the implications that has for 
policymaking and regulatory design. The manifesto for nudge theorists is the book by Richard 
Thaler and Carl Sunstein, Nudge (Thaler, 2008).The influence of behavioural economics in 
policy has been marked. In 2010 the UK coalition government set up a ‘nudge unit’ within 
Cabinet Office with the aim of improving consumer economic choices. The key area in which 
the policy will play a part is health (Wintour, 2010). Since 2014 the unit has been independent 
of government and is known as the Behavioural Insights Team. However nudge will also play 
a direct part in influencing consumer policy and there is an explicit reference to ‘nudge’ in the 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills consultation Empowering and Protecting 
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Consumers of June 2011, referred to as ‘light touch consumer empowerment – how we can 
‘nudge’ people to make better choices.’ (BIS, 2011a) 
 
According to nudge theory, our choices are inconsistent and depend on the context. The 
theorists construct the idea of ‘choice architecture’ to describe the way in which what we 
choose depends on the way that choice is framed and that the results can be arbitrary and 
unstable (Thaler, 2008). Its advocates argue that nudge represents a benign and innocuous 
way of helping consumers make the right choices which will make them healthier, wealthier 
and happier. The opponents of nudge argue that it represents paternalism under a different 
guise and undermines the respect for an individual’s right to make his own choices without 
unnecessary state intervention. They find that its apparent innocuousness is disingenuous 
and therefore dangerous (Bernheim and Rangel, 2009).  
 
In considering Nudge theory and the broader issues in behavioural economics the debate has 
a clear political dimension and the fundamental fault line of liberalism and paternalism is 
raised. 
 
In order to deal with the question of how, if at all, to restrict the promotion of foods, we need 
to ask what is the regulation seeking to achieve? Is it to improve the health of the population 
or is it merely to provide transparency and to provide better information to consumers so that 
they can make informed choices? Subject to the answer to that question, a further question 
arises; is regulation the best way to go about achieving the purpose?  
 
Free marketers would argue that intervention by government or regulators in markets is 
generally ineffective; ‘The history of government regulation vividly demonstrates the inability 
of the political process to cure a failure of the market process.’ (Seldon and Robinson, 2004).  
As Boddewyn observes ‘It is too readily assumed that if the market fails, only government 
regulation can correct its shortcomings.’ And that, ‘there are readily observable limits to what 
regulation, as a form of societal control, can achieve.’(Boddewyn, 1986)  
 
This criticism of law making may be considered as one based on pragmatism rather than 
principle; that whatever the case for intervention by reference to economic and behavioural 
models, it does not follow that such intervention will be successful in achieving the outcomes 
that it sets out to deliver. The real world turns out to be more complicated and confounds the 
theory. 
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The opposing view is that there is a market failure in the sale and promotion of food as a result 
of an information asymmetry and direct intervention is required beyond simply creating the 
right conditions for a competitive marketplace (Spence, 1975). Furthermore, the risks to 
consumers are such that market forces cannot be relied upon to achieve policy aims of 
improved health and the risks of the harm that may follow can justify intervention. What is the 
most effective way to promote health? Is banning or restricting the promotion of health claims 
the way to promote better health or should consumers be provided with the information to be 
able to make informed choices?  
 
The question of justification of intervention by the state is not just a political one. There is a 
practical dimension: the experiences of the curbs on smoking seem to indicate that 
marginalising harmful behaviour is as important as imposing restrictions.  ‘Nudge Theory’(Jolls 
et al., 1998) has its roots in libertarian free market ideals but the arguments for it are based in 
pragmatism, i.e. that it may work, rather than in ideology.  
2.11 Self-regulation 
 
Prior to the regulation from the EU, health claims were dealt with by industry self-regulation, 
in particular under the Joint Health Claims Initiative (2007, 2007). This is in keeping with the 
UK’s proclivity for self-regulation over legislation. As early as 1989 it was observed that ‘Britain 
appears to be something of a haven for self-regulation’ (Baggott, 1989). This observation 
continues to be true and in fact, Britain has influenced the EU in its regulatory design towards 
greater use of self-regulatory models. The role of self-regulation and the case for and against 
it is well established (Senden, 2005). For advocates, self-regulation, when compared to 
legislation, is flexible, quicker and cheaper. For its critics, self-regulation is ineffective because 
it is not taken seriously by industry and regulators are toothless because they lack real powers 
and an effective sanction (Ogus, 1995). 
 
2.12 Advertising 
 
In one view of advertising, it ‘can contribute to consumer dietary knowledge and subsequent 
behaviour’ (Brennan, 2008). There is evidence to suggest that commercial communications 
provide information in a form that is more readily accessible to consumers and especially to 
disadvantaged groups (Ippolito and Mathios, 1990). (The proposal is subject to scrutiny later 
by close examination of the models used by Ippolito and Mathios in relation to the cereal 
market.) The question of how such communications are regulated needs to be carefully 
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considered in the light of the possible unintended consequences of the restriction of 
information to consumers. This is not however an argument for misleading and spurious claims 
to be permitted. The removal of restrictions on the promotion of foods would result in the 
undermining of claims that can be justified and this may damage consumer confidence and 
contribute to consumer scepticism in nutrition and health claims made for industry as a whole. 
Whatever the evidence of the efficacy of the use of nutrition and health claims in the promotion 
of foods, such claims have been seized upon and put to use with gusto. Today you ‘can’t walk 
down the aisle of a supermarket in any developed country without seeing ads touting the 
benefits of additives, such as omega-3’s/DHA, lycopene or antioxidants. Even sugar-packed 
fizzy drinks proclaim their ‘electrolyte value’ and call themselves ‘sports drinks’’ (Patel, 2012). 
But does adding vitamins to sugar water make it any healthier? And what about adding extra 
bacteria to yoghurt?’ (WHO, 2009). Therein lies the problem; consumers are baffled by the 
sheer volume and questionable reliability of information and find it difficult to distinguish from 
those claims grounded in established research that are meaningful, claims that are 
controversial and yet unproven and the mere puff of sales gimmickry. ‘If the only real function 
behind such labels is to bolster profits, consumers and regulators will eventually see through 
the hype’ (Economist, 2009b) . This is notwithstanding the attempts at consumer education by 
government sponsored advertising campaigns to promote health such as ‘Change4life’ aimed 
at equipping consumers to be able to navigate and discriminate between the various types of 
claims. 
 
2.13 The regulatory response: The European Commission’s regulation on 
nutrition and health claims (EC No 1924/2006) 
 
The European Union has passed legislation on the control of nutrition and health claims to 
‘better inform consumers and to harmonise the market’(EC, 2003).  These aims appear to be 
modest claims for the benefits of the regulation and it is noteworthy that they stop well short 
of the more magnanimous aim to improve public health. In fact, there is no assumption that 
regulation of the claims made by advertisers and suppliers will lead to the goal of better health 
for consumers. Indeed to make any such claim would be unwise in the light of the unproven 
assumptions that need to be made to demonstrate a causal relationship between regulation 
of information and improvements in health. When placed in the context of the bold ambition of 
the potential improvement of consumer health and welfare, the aim to provide better 
information appears diffident.  
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In relation to harmonisation, the EU aims to remove the barriers to trade raised by the 
differences between country’s regulatory regimes: ‘differences between national provisions 
relating to such [health and nutrition] claims may impede the free movement of foods and 
create unequal conditions of competition. Thus they have a direct impact on the functioning of 
the internal market.’ (EC 1924, 2006). Of course, harmonisation of the market relates to the 
general EU aim of the free flow of goods and services, the internal market, and this is 
examined within this thesis. It should be noted however that this aim relates primarily to the 
functioning of the internal market and not to consumer protection. 
 
A recent study investigating the likely impact of the EU regulation on broadcast advertising, 
examined the potential impact on one entire week of free to air broadcast commercial 
television. In respect of the Regulation and its impact on advertising, the study found that, ‘little 
is likely to change in terms of claims currently being made…because most advertisers rely on 
nutrition content claims or comparative claims…which are fairly easy to substantiate; in the 
case of nutrition content claims, they generally do not make any direct health claim.’ (Brennan, 
2008).  
That there is a reluctance by promoters to compete on the basis of health claims may be a 
reason for disappointment. The promise seems to have been whittled down from the potential 
for the improvement of general health to one of minimal impact on the content of food 
advertising. Therefore this thesis is concerned as much with the role of regulation and its 
limitations as with the intended outcomes of a proposal. 
 
The Regulation takes a two pronged approach: firstly in relation to nutrition, and, secondly in 
dealing with health claims. Nutrition claims are concerned with the content of the food and 
may refer to what is or is not in it. For example, ‘low fat’ or ‘high fibre’. The Regulation is aimed 
at harmonising the use of such claims so that products claiming to be ‘high fibre’ have a 
defined minimum amount of fibre per a defined unit. It does this by the creation of nutrition 
profiles that set out the standards which foods must meet in order that defined nutrition claims 
may be made for them. 
 
Health claims refer to what a food or an element in a food does to the consumer. ‘Health claim 
means any representation that states, suggests or implies that a relationship exists between 
a food or a nutrient or other substances contained in a food and a disease or health-related 
condition’ Codex Alimentarious Third Edition 2006 (WHO, 1963). The rationale behind the 
legislation is that health claims must be backed up by scientific evidence. Some health claims 
are well established: such as the proposition that calcium is important in promoting healthy 
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teeth and bones. Other health claims are more controversial such as the alleged relationship 
between whole grain and the prevention of coronary heart disease. The Regulation prohibits 
health claims unless they can be substantiated. The Commission has produced a list of 
established health claims which may be used by producers to enable them to be able to make 
a meaningful claim. As a result, consumers should be able to rely on clear and verifiable 
claims. 
 
The response of the food industry to the Regulation has been cautious. The Confederation of 
Food and Drink Industries of the European Union (CIAA) fears that the higher standards in the 
Regulation may lead to reduced innovation in the production of food and less consumer choice 
and that it will not necessarily succeed in promoting better understanding of nutrition and 
health by consumers (WHO, 2009). Also the requirement for approval from the EU being 
contingent upon the submission of a full scientific dossier places small to medium sized 
enterprises at a competitive disadvantage when compared to better resourced multinationals. 
Only the largest concerns will have the reserves and access to expertise and resources to be 
able to compile the supporting evidence required for a claim to obtain approval.  
In the case of Probiotics, the industry claims that the evidential burden on producers is too 
high and that the effect of the regulation will be catastrophic; ‘the regulation is killing this 
industry and the job losses are already being felt’ Ioannis Misopoulos, director general of the 
International Probiotics Association (IPA). Notwithstanding such criticism, a review of the 
systematic review process applied by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) in 
assessing claims made for probiotics found that it was ‘reasonable’ to use this well-established 
method of assessment of the totality of the evidence (Glanville et al., 2015).  
 
By July 2009 the EFSA had received and assessed 70 claims of which 54 had been rejected. 
By 2012, there were 222 approved claims (EU Business, 2012).  In 2015 EFSA had published 
256 authorised claims out of the 44,000 that it had received (EFSA, 2015). The result of such 
apparent stringent application of standards may be that producers are deterred from applying 
for approval at all. Therefore an unintended consequence of the Regulation may be that the 
decision not to apply for approval  and rejection of unsuccessful claims will lead to consumers 
receiving less information about nutrition content and health properties of food.  
 
Even where claims are approved, the requirements imposed on suppliers by EFSA relating to 
their use are so ‘dull’ and unattractive to consumers that they were too difficult to use such 
wording deterred consumers from gaining the benefits from functional foods (Chen, 2015). 
This is a view held by some nutritionists including Dr Carrie Ruxton who claims that ‘EFSA-
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approved health claims make it hard for firms to create exciting wording on functional food 
products’. As a result, consumers did not notice healthy foods because the claims mean 
nothing to them. An example in support of this theory is how a product which benefits the 
immune system is required to be labelled as potentially able to; ‘play a role in the normal 
function of the immune system’. This was found to be uninspiring. The loss to the food industry 
attributed to restrictive health claims was estimated at £27 billion (Foodmanufacture.co.uk, 
2015). 
 
Health claims that are made for foods may begin to resemble the claims made in the promotion 
of drugs in their certitude. The analogy between the marketing of foods and drugs is 
instructive. The sale and promotion of drugs is strictly controlled. The licensing of drugs is 
subject to approval by the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) 
which is concerned with their safety and efficacy. The claims relating to the efficacy of drugs 
must be substantiated by evidence obtained as a result of clinical trials and drugs will not be 
licensed for distribution unless their benefits outweigh their risks. The approvals system set 
up under the EC Regulation 1924/2006 for health and nutrition claims for food and the 
requirement for substantiation of claims brings food closer in line with medicines. However, 
there are important differences between food and medicine and the requirement for evidence 
should not remove that distinction by ‘medicalising’ the supply of foods. It would be undesirable 
for the supply of food to be subject to a licence the terms of which required a prescription from 
a medical practitioner in response to a specified condition. (Lawrence and Rayner, 1998). On 
the other hand, consumer trust and confidence in the food industry relies upon evidence that 
the products can in fact provide the benefits claimed for them. ‘If food companies wish to make 
the sorts of claims about their products that pharmaceutical companies do, they must be 
prepared to submit to similar scrutiny. ‘Extraordinary claims, require extraordinary 
evidence.’(Economist, 2009b). In so far as it is possible, the rules should be ‘industry neutral 
‘ in that they do not create one regime for drugs in which say, a particular claim requires 
evidence and  a separate one for food where a similar claim may be made but which is not 
subject to the same scrutiny. To provide different levels of scrutiny depending on whether a 
product is classed as a medicine or a food but for which similar claims are made would create 
a regulatory loophole through which products may be passed resulting in distortion of markets 
and confusion among consumers. This could be said to exist under the current regime, where 
for example, the cholesterol lowering effects of oats or butter substitutes are treated differently 
to cholesterol lowering effects of drugs such as statins. The differences may lie in the degree 
rather than in the substance of the claim. 
 
41 
 
2.14 The chain of causation 
 
In creating a regulatory framework and enforcement policy for nutrition and health claims there 
are many assumptions which may not be proven. Health claims are required to be 
substantiated by evidence which is likely to be obtained by clinical trials. Such trials 
demonstrate the effect of the food or nutrient in individuals rather than populations therefore 
the findings of clinical research may be of limited relevance to public health policy and 
regulation. A further assumption is that the consumer has read and understood the health 
claim. This means that the claim is made in plain and intelligible language and that their level 
of nutritional education is sufficient for them to appreciate its content. It may follow from that 
the consumer was influenced by the health claim and acted upon it and purchased the food 
and consumed it in the context of a diet which would yield such a benefit. If the benefits are in 
fact realised, it will then follow that this will lead to improved health for the consumer and an 
increase in sales for the supplier. The flaws and possible breaks in the chain of causation are 
evident. 
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2.15 The application and enforcement of nutrition and health claims 
 
The importance of the Regulation cannot be overstated. The control of the marketing of foods 
affects all of us in the claims to which we are exposed and consequently our everyday choices 
about what foods we consume. An illustration of the extent of the part played by health and 
nutrition claims is provided by a survey of the Irish food market in 2007. The survey found that 
some 47% of packaged foods contained a nutrition claim and some 18% a health claim (Lalor 
et al., 2010). Similarly a study in Australia presented a widespread use of health claims (Ni 
Mhurchu et al., 2015). 
 
A nutrition or health claim has little effect unless consumers in fact read it. In this regard, 
several studies conducted in Australia or New Zealand have shown that up to 85% of people, 
particularly those most vulnerable groups with special health needs claim that they read 
nutrition and other health related information found on food labels (Worsley, 1996; Cowburn 
and Stockley, 2005; Mhurchu and Gorton, 2007; Harris et al., 2011). However an observational 
study actually shows this to be a much smaller percentage (Grunert et al., 2010). Prior to the 
Regulation, there was no harmonised legislation governing the use of health and nutrition 
claims. Member states of the EU were left to control such claims at national level and as 
described above there was no specific regulation in the UK but general legislative control of 
misleading advertising under the Control of Misleading Advertisements Regulations 1988 
(Control of Misleading Advertising Advertisements Regulations, 1988) and the self-regulatory 
codes of the ASA.  
 
Apart from the issue of legislation, there is the equally important question of how the law is to 
be enforced. Whereas the Regulation provides a universal approach to the regulation of health 
and nutrition claims, the same cannot be said for enforcement, which remains a matter for 
member states. Notwithstanding the comprehensive approach of the Regulation, the lack of 
effective enforcement or the differences in the approaches of the member states may yet 
jeopardise the aims of competition and consumer protection of the Regulation. 
   
2.16 A brief history of the enforcement of claims relating to food generally 
 
Historically, enforcement has been linked to oppression by the land owning wealthy of the 
working poor (LeGoff, 1988). Such a view of enforcement has all but disappeared to give way 
to a modern view of enforcement which is often justified as a way to protect the most 
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vulnerable consumers. An example may be found in the Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations 2008 (The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations, 2008). 
The regulations set a benchmark of the average consumer for assessing whether a practice 
is unfair and in addition it creates the standard of the vulnerable consumer in order to provide 
additional protection to consumers that might fall into this category.  
 
The history of consumer protection is in some ways the history of the enforcement of claims 
relating to food in that the earliest records of formal consumer protection concern the sale of 
short measures or adulterated food. The Assize of Bread and Ale of 1266 regulated the weight 
of the Farthing Loaf, and the quantity of a Penny of Ale according to the price of the ingredients 
(Patricia, 2006). The principle adopted by the assize of bread was straightforward; ‘a unit of 
loaf would be sold at a constant price (usually a farthing or halfpenny) while its weight would 
vary according to changes in the market price of grain. ‘As the price of corn increased, the 
size of the loaf would decrease and vice versa.’(Davis, 2004). This would ensure that the poor 
would be able to buy a loaf of bread costing a farthing (the smallest unit of currency in use at 
the time) even though they would receive less bread for the same money. 
 
The significance (as distinct from the efficacy) of the assize cannot be underestimated. The 
legislation remained on the statute books until the 19th Century and it was ‘one of the most 
widely enforced statutes in medieval England’ (Davis, 2004). The penalties that were imposed 
for the breach of the assize were severe: bakers or brewers who gave short measure could 
be fined, put in the pillory (denounced, humiliated) or flogged.  
 
The enforcement of the legislation was the remit of the Clerk of the King’s Market. This 
arrangement of laws or standards with a designated organisation for enforcement has 
provided the blueprint for today’s Trading Standards departments. The Assize represents not 
only the earliest attempts at UK food law but it also provides one of the first attempts at 
regulation of trading and commerce.  However it is the Food and Drink Act 1860 and the Public 
Health Act 1875 that have provided the framework of the existing law (Bradgate, 1991). These 
are general in their application to all foods but a study of the milk trade in London provides an 
illustration of the risks that it was designed to deal with, ranging from ill health and disease to 
adulteration.  According to Whetham (1964) ‘to discourage adulteration was the object of the 
first legislation dealing with milk; as ‘the germ theory’ of disease became generally accepted, 
public health authorities sought, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, to enforce minimum 
standards of cleanliness and hygiene in cowsheds, dairies and milk-shops.’  
 
44 
 
Unscrupulous producers and traders would add sawdust to bread dough, grease to coffee and 
even sulphuric acid to vinegar. Where adulteration resulted in widespread serious illness or 
even death, the tradesmen could be executed (Whetham, 1964). 
 
Modern food legislation is characterised by one of three aims: concern with adulteration, public 
health and quantity. Evidently, the Assize adopted a more holistic approach by dealing with all 
three in a single pronouncement. However the primary aim was to ensure that there was a 
reliable supply of bread, a vital foodstuff to the population, according to Davis (2004) ‘the 
assize of bread was not merely intended as an instrument to protect consumers, especially 
the poor, but that its aim was also to provide bakers with an adequate living whatever the price 
of grain’. This was a measure of price and income control, a financial distribution measure with 
a clear social aim, ensuring that suppliers of food were not able to exploit consumers by raising 
prices to a level which might risk upsetting the social order. 
 
Not surprisingly, the aims of the assize reflected the concerns of medieval. In the same way, 
modern food law can hold a mirror up to the concerns of modern consumers. And, in this 
respect, the law relating to health claims attempts to deal with the legislative aspect which is 
of most concern to consumers: the relationship between nutrition and health. Evidence of this 
may be found in a survey conducted by the International Food Information Council in 2009, 
where in response to the question, ‘How interested are you in learning more about foods that 
have health benefits beyond basic nutrition?’ 85% of American consumers said that they were 
somewhat or very interested. 
 
2.17 Enforcement: the economic and socio legal perspectives compared 
 
Along with similar market driven consumer protection, the aim of the Regulation on Nutrition 
and Health claims (EC, 1924/2006 ) is to provide adequate and reliable information for 
consumers to be able to make informed food choices (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). An 
information asymmetry exists between suppliers and consumers of food which cannot be 
resolved in the absence of regulatory intervention. This is because consumers are not well 
placed to judge the nutritional and health characteristics of a food as such attributes are latent 
and difficult to discover. Therefore the problem arises where more readily assessed attributes 
such as price and sensory qualities of a food dominate consumer decision-making (Akerlof, 
1970) and the outcome may be poorer health and obesity for consumers. The consequence 
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of this is that the general ambition of health policy of improved welfare for the population may 
be undermined by the ill-informed decisions of consumers.   
The economic analysis of enforcement is expressed in terms of the cost benefit equation: 
‘According to the economic approach to law enforcement, economic actors will comply with 
regulation if and only if the benefits of compliance with regulation exceeds the costs’ (Law, 
2006). Therefore, the focus of the literature in the economics of law enforcement is directed 
towards the question of how regulated businesses are affected by the penalty for breach of 
the regulations. This means that the size of the sanction and the risk of being caught combined 
must be such that together they amount to a sufficient deterrent to make a rational business 
comply with the regulation (Becker, 1974; Stigler, 1974; Polinsky and Shavell, 1999).  
 
Similarly, policy of ‘optimal deterrence’ where the enforcer ‘tries to establish how a trader is 
likely to behave in different circumstances, and takes the decision whether or not to prosecute 
accordingly’ is founded on the rationale that enforcers should minimise harm at the lowest 
cost. 
 
According to the economic theory, effective regulation is achieved by setting appropriate 
financial penalties and conducting the optimal level of monitoring. However, does this analysis 
actually explain the enforcement of food law in practice? Litigation, whether civil or criminal, 
plays an important role in this theory as providing the sanction; but the threat of legal action 
with the aim of deterring non-compliance is diminished when considering the financial costs 
and risks of using courts ‘ex post’ or after the event. This raises a question about the efficacy 
of such an approach, and whether it actually provides a sufficiently compelling account that 
describes the relationship between the enforcer and the regulated business. Moreover, does 
the economic theory adequately explain the behaviour of businesses? Furthermore, does it 
provide a sufficient basis to inform enforcement strategy? Finally, to what extent can behaviour 
be controlled or influenced by legal penalties based on a ‘command and control’ policy? 
 
An alternative analysis of enforcement maybe found in political science and socio-legal 
studies. In this analysis changing constituent or political feedback or changing costs of 
regulatory action, specifically resource constraints, are key determinants (Olson, 1996). 
Specifically, budget constraints and a deregulatory political agenda augment less resource 
intensive enforcement action away from multiple routine inspections and investigation with 
eventual litigation and towards fewer targeted inspections with education and cooperation 
playing a significant role.  
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The most influential depiction of the socio-legal perspective is provided in the work of Keith 
Hawkins and Bridget Hutter. Hawkins and Hutter capture the central difficulty thus; ‘the task 
of a regulatory bureaucracy is, by various means, to induce a potentially unwilling business 
organisation to bear costs which it would in many circumstances not wish to assume’ (Hawkins 
and Hutter, 1993).  
 
Examining how enforcers enforce and the aims that they seek to achieve may provide an 
understanding of how the law, sanctions and enforcement strategies may be used to control 
business and thus inform regulatory design. It is with this in mind that this study identifies the 
common enforcement practices of environmental health and trading standards officers.  
 
One view is that enforcement of the law refers to legal action. This is known as the deterrence 
model (Reiss, 1984). In this model the methods of enforcement are penal and adversarial and 
prosecution plays an important role and there is greater reliance on imposing sanctions 
(Hutter, 1989). By contrast, the accommodative model of enforcement seeks to secure 
compliance by the remedying of existing problems and the prevention of others. In the 
accommodative model, compliance is achieved by cooperation and negotiation. The methods 
used to ensure compliance are persuasion, negotiation and education. The use of legal action, 
particularly prosecution, is regarded as a last resort to be used only in the event that everything 
else has failed (Hawkins, 1984). In this model, according to Hawkins (1984) ‘the importance 
of legal methods lies in the mystique surrounding their threatened or possible use rather than 
their actual use’. 
In the accommodative model of enforcement officials ‘educate, persuade, coax and cajole’ 
(Hawkins, 2002). The strategy is underpinned by patience and understanding (Braithwaite et 
al., 1987). A further refinement of the accommodative approach is the insistent strategy where 
there is not an unlimited supply of patience and there are clear limits to the tolerance of 
enforcers. As Braithwaite, Walker and Grabosky  note, there is an important and empirically 
significant middle ground between the sanctioning and compliance models identified in the 
binary model of enforcement (Braithwaite et al., 1987). This insistent strategy forms part of 
that middle ground where enforcers are flexible both in their interpretation of the rules and in 
their readiness to use legal coercion (Bardach and Kagan, 1982). An example of the insistent 
model in practice is the use of improvement notices in food hygiene cases where a business 
is given a limited time to remedy a specified breach failing which legal proceedings will be 
issued. Such notices are not generally issued in food standards cases and therefore there is 
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no equivalent step available prior to the issue of proceedings in cases of the breach of the 
Regulation.   
 
Both the deterrence and the accommodative models of enforcement involve regulators or 
enforcers responding to cases of suspected non-compliance rather than initiating 
investigations based on intelligence gathering. Such a responsive approach to regulation is 
commonplace and involves regulators who enforce ‘in the first instance by compliance 
strategies, such as persuasion and education [but] apply more punitive deterrent responses 
(escalating up a pyramid of such responses) when the regulated firm fails to behave as 
desired’ (Black and Baldwin, 2010). The most influential and cohesive theory on responsive 
regulation is that promulgated by Ayres and Braithwaite in Responsive Regulation (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992). 
 
In the pyramid of responses, as one regulatory intervention fails, the regulator moves upward 
to the next more serious level and as the risk subsides, the regulator should move back down 
to a lower level. In this way, the pyramid provides a proportionate and reasonable exercise of 
power the justification of which is based on the failure of the less serious previous action. 
However, the model does not deal adequately with cases of where the risks are immediate 
and potentially catastrophic so that the most appropriate action would be to apply a higher-
level intervention urgently. In addition, it may prove difficult to move down the pyramid once 
stronger measures have been applied and consequently undermined the trust between 
enforcers and firms required for lower level actions. The mere threat of stronger sanctions 
such as prosecution may prejudice resolution by negotiation or other lower level action. 
Moreover, a responsive approach assumes that firms do change their behaviour as a result of 
regulatory action whereas in fact other forces, such as competition, may play a greater part in 
influencing business behaviour (Baldwin, 1990). 
 
A practical limitation to the pyramid approach is that it depends on an ongoing relationship 
between the regulator and enforcer. Enforcers may be influenced by matters beyond the case 
in hand so that factors such as resources or performance targets and practices within the 
workplace play a role as much as the evidence and legal merits of a case. 
 
There is also a matter of principle at stake in the application of responsive regulation based  
on consistency and rationality: responsive strategies may be justified on grounds of 
‘substantive rationality’ (Black and Baldwin, 2010) but, ‘they inevitably come up against 
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criticisms of lack of formalism and as undermining both the rule of law and broader 
constitutional values’ (Yeung, 2004). 
 
2.17.1 The empirical evidence 
 
Prosecution provides a very limited insight into the way in which enforcement is conducted. 
To provide an indication of the propensity to legal action we need to know the number actions 
as a proportion of the total cases of unauthorised claims. Such a quantitative exercise is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Such work has been carried out with reference to the work of 
environmental health departments to discover marked differences between departments in 
their propensity to initiate legal action (Hutter, 1989). 
 
In her interviews Hutter found differences between the enforcement officers’ attitudes where 
those who adopted a persuasive strategy would refer to sanctioning officers as ‘little Hitlers’ 
and who would themselves in turn be criticised for being ‘softies’. Similarly in their work on the 
factory inspectorate, Bartrip and Fenn found ‘within the inspectorate there were those who 
favoured an enforcement policy weighted towards conflict and prosecution, and those who 
were sympathetic towards an approach emphasizing co-operation and persuasion’ (Bartrip 
and Fenn, 1983). This is echoed in the report of the Health and Safety Executive which 
highlights, ‘[a]dvice, encouragement and enforcement as essential elements of the 
Inspectorate’s work’ (Executive, 1986).  
 
While prosecution is talked about often it forms only a small part of the work of enforcers and 
provides a ‘helpful but not normal tool of enforcement’ (Bartrip and Fenn, 1980). Several 
enforcers said they would prosecute if all else failed but that in having to consider prosecution 
they would consider they themselves had failed (Hutter, 1989). 
In her work, Hutter found that organisational controls where there are accepted procedures 
based on peer and hierarchical review will favour a persuasive approach by default as such 
review provides a further opportunity to explore alternatives to prosecution. Officers are 
discouraged from being overzealous in their enforcement of the law on the basis that their 
workload is unlikely to be able to accommodate any more than the occasional legal action. 
Hutter discovered that in the majority of cases facing legal action approval was required from 
the council’s elected committee thereby introducing an independent and political dimension to 
the process.  
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2.17.2 Organisational factors 
 
As well as variations in enforcement policy, which translates into variations in style, 
enforcement may also be affected by the department’s budget, numbers of staff available and 
the complexity of the cases under the Regulation. Where resources are tight this might lead 
enforcers to be more likely to take legal action as they lack the time necessary to devote to 
educating the businesses within their jurisdiction. In their study of the Office of Surface Mining 
in America, Shover et al. found this argument which was used to account for greater use of 
prosecution at the time (Shover et al., 1983).  
 
There is some evidence of the opposite view, where constrained resources will deter the issue 
of court proceedings as legal action is also resource intensive and legal costs rules mean that 
it presents a very high level of risk and this may mean that enforcers do not have the appetite 
for the considerable uncertainty involved in the process (Bartrip and Fenn, 1980). The cost of 
prosecution will rule it out in a large proportion of cases but it may not be the prime or even 
the most significant consideration. Prosecution action, even if it appears to be an expensive 
option in a particular case, may be justified by providing a deterrent effect and acting as a 
warning signal to others. Those studies showed that ‘it is not resources alone that determine 
policy’, but the ‘way in which they are used is determined by the interplay between their 
availability and other influences’ (Hutter, 1989).  
 
2.17.3 Political factors 
 
Enforcement practice will be sensitive to non-bureaucratic influences such as the level of 
public concern in relation to a specific issue. This may be expressed by elected councillors 
who represent the local population and who will take up matters raised by their constituents. 
In the UK, decisions to proceed with legal proceedings will be subject to the approval of the 
council’s environmental health committee composed of elected councillors as well as council 
employees. It would be rare for a case to proceed without such approval. In this way, the risks 
presented by food hygiene are likely to attract interest over false claims relating to nutrition 
and health. In her study of environmental health officers Hutter found that ‘each of the councils 
which controlled the departments [in my sample] played its part in determining policies and 
guiding strategy decisions’ (Hutter, 2008). To illustrate the point; a major outbreak of food 
poisoning from a food outlet is likely to be widely reported in the media and the response from 
local authority regulatory services will be carefully scrutinised.  
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One might hypothesise that councils under Conservative party control might present a different 
attitude to breaches of food law than Labour or Lib Dem councils. However, food law 
enforcement is not an obvious political issue. Research has failed to show that party political 
influence might account for differences in enforcement style with councils of a particular 
political complexion favouring a certain approach and being disinclined towards another 
(Hutter, 1988). 
 
2.18 Trading standards or environmental health? 
 
The boundary between environmental health and trading standards is central to the operation 
of food law enforcement. Broadly environmental health officers are concerned with risks to 
consumers’ health and they do this primarily by upholding standards of hygiene or food safety. 
Trading standards officers, meanwhile, focus on the protecting consumers’ financial interest 
by controlling unfair trading practices such as misleading food labels in relation to composition; 
also known as food standards. Therefore, strictly speaking, the enforcement of the Regulation 
is a food standards matter and ought to fall within the jurisdiction of trading standards (Harrison 
et al., 1997). However, the boundary between the two is fluid and it is not unusual to find 
environmental health officers concerned with food standards. There may also be an element 
of internal politics at play, particularly in an environment of severe cutbacks. Since around 
2000, councils have merged trading standards with environmental health into a single 
regulatory services department. This has provided a way to organise the regulation of food 
along thematic lines which might be more transparent for consumers and for businesses who 
are unlikely to appreciate the technical distinction between the regulation of food standards 
and food hygiene. The trend towards merging of departments was accelerated from 2008 
when council spending cutbacks encouraged the making of cost savings from such mergers. 
In such an environment, officers may worry that their particular department, for example, 
trading standards, may lose out by having its staff cut back and its duties being passed to the 
other regulatory team, in this case, environmental health.  
 
The trend has been towards takeover by environmental standards rather than a merger of 
equals. In such councils food standards has been transferred from trading standards to 
environmental health to provide a single point of regulation for food matters. In such an 
environment, officers may wish to undertake more prosecution work to demonstrate their 
worth. However it is extremely difficult to measure the effectiveness of any department by 
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reference to its impact on the local environment and the quality of life of the population when 
so many other factors play a part.  
 
Research into the work of environmental health officers has suggested that there was a 
greater tendency to use legal action in councils based in urban environments where there is 
less likely to be a close relationship between the regulated businesses and environmental 
health and trading standards departments (Hutter, 2008). 
 
That food law enforcement is not an issue ever likely to find itself into the manifesto of a 
political party does not mean that food law is without political repercussions. The food scares 
of the 1980s and 1990s from listeria, salmonella, BSE and then horsemeat in 2013 
demonstrate the potential for food regulation and enforcement as an attention-grabbing issue 
(Smith, 1991; Yamoah and Yawson, 2014). In each instance, regulatory matters moved 
overnight from being matters of public indifference to sources of outrage and in each case 
exacting a more stringent response from regulators (Hutter, 1988). The consequences of food 
being at the top of the political agenda were tangible and long term. In the case of the food 
safety scandals of the 1980s, the government passed the Food Safety Act 1990. In the case 
of the BSE crisis, the government created the Food Standards Authority.  
 
2.19 Risk based regulation 
 
Having descended in a ‘striking wave of regulatory homogenisation’ (Black and Baldwin, 2012) 
risk based regulation has become the prevailing mantra among policy makers across many 
sectors ranging from finance to food, safety and the environment. In his report, Reducing 
administrative burdens: effective inspections and enforcement Hampton advocates targeting 
resources based on an assessment of risks that a firm presents to the objectives of the 
regulator. In order to do this, the risk needs to be evaluated based on the evidence. It provides 
a systematic approach that allows regulators to relate their enforcement activities to their 
objectives and the basis for evaluating new risks. Unlike responsive regulation where the 
regulator uses the pyramid to escalate actions, a risk-based strategy emphasises analysis of 
the risk to determine the action. Risk based regulation has the most impact on inspections 
which move from routine visits to risk rating firms according to the possibility of non-
compliance and the potential impact of such breach. As with responsive regulation, a technical 
approach based on an administrative and technical procedures may lead to policy making 
becoming less accountable and open (Black, 2005).   
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The policy requires that regulators should prioritise higher risks by allocating greater resources 
to them. Inevitably, this means withdrawing resources from elsewhere. Risk based regulation 
will tend to ignore lower levels of risk even where the cumulative effect may be considerable 
(Black and Baldwin, 2012). In fact, it may lead to persistent non-enforcement in relation to 
certain activities, which once characterised as low risk, will cease to attract regulatory scrutiny. 
In considering the enforcement of the Regulation, given the relatively low risks associated with 
nutrition and health claims one might expect that the attention of enforcers might be drawn 
towards other higher risk areas such as food safety. 
 
However low risks cannot simply be ignored. The harm they are designed to prevent is latent 
and long term and, in the case of nutrition and health claims, political concerns about public 
health may require that they are attended to in some way or other. Ignoring low risks may 
potentially substitute the supervision of many widely spread low risk activities with fewer larger 
risks which may or may not reduce risk overall. When subjected to economic cost benefit 
analysis, risk based regulation may not lead to the most efficient use of resources. Large risks 
can lead to fewer very resource intensive actions which also may not lead to the greatest 
overall reduction in risk in return for the expenditure. 
 
There are particular challenges of dealing with low risks, including their identification and 
classification and ultimately the level of failure an enforcer is prepared to accept. There are 
many ways in which to quantify risk, usually by reference to probability and impact (Weber et 
al., 2002) but there is no single accepted method. Therefore, in practice ‘low risk’ is often 
defined by the relevant regulator itself as meaning low priority. Having identified health and 
nutrition claims as lower risk, the challenge for enforcers is to pick up the ‘accumulations of 
such risks when they become an issue without expending significant amounts of resources’ 
(Black and Baldwin, 2012).  
 
However, the level of risk associated with an activity is not fixed; it may change over time. For 
example, if there are more diet related diseases among the population or that particular foods 
are identified as causes for public health concern then this will raise the risk profile of nutrition 
and health claims. Risk has a context so that when considering nutrition and health claims a 
manufacturer who makes nutrition and health claims but who operates high standards of food 
safety would be considered high risk when compared with an unhygienic takeaway. Concerns 
raised by consumers, politicians and NGOs will affect the prioritisation of a risk so that it may 
be difficult to justify the categorisation of a risk as low priority if it has in fact materialised and 
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there is a public demand for something to be done. The opposite may also be true where it 
may prove difficult to tackle a common problem if it does not command the interest of media 
or the public. 
 
Whatever the level of risk, the regulatory activity is often the same: so that in all cases, there 
is inspection and monitoring. In practice, the difference between a low risk and high risk is in 
the frequency of inspections or the intensity of the monitoring. In deciding what action 
regulators should take and how often they should take it, enforcers may directly inspect 
premises or use proxy indicators such as compliance history or evidence of deviation by a 
business from their own systems. 
 
In the event of a low risk, where there appears to have been little harm, enforcers are faced 
with the dilemma as to what action to take. For example, if an unauthorised claim is made on 
the label of a product with low sales, should enforcers adopt a more conciliatory approach 
than if it had sold larger quantities? Or should they take a more principled approach where 
they treat contraventions of the law equally regardless of the harm or potential harm that 
ensues.  
 
2.20 How regulated firms respond to regulation 
 
Research into the effect of the regulator’s actions on the behaviour of firms can provide insight 
into the effectiveness of regulatory interventions. This is not unrelated to the costs imposed 
on business and the benefits offered to consumers. Lipsky (Lipsky, 2010) coined the term 
‘street level bureaucrats’ when referring to officers in the public sector with a high degree of 
independence in their work who also interact within the community. These workers rely on 
their professional judgement and discretion to enforce rules that are open to interpretation and 
which often have a high level policy goal that is ill defined in operational terms. 
According to Lipsky street level bureaucrats have responsibility for a range of matters and the 
demand for their services is difficult to predict or to control. They also face competing 
pressures from the limited resources available to them and the competing demands on their 
time and effort. Lipsky argued that street level bureaucrats develop strategies to cope with 
such demands including choosing to deliver sub-optimal policy delivery and selective non-
enforcement.  
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In England and Wales, regulators generally enjoy a high degree of autonomy and they 
exercise a significant discretion at field level. Environmental health officers are no exception 
where enforcement is marked, ‘on the one hand by an emphasis upon discretion rather than 
rule, and on the other by a corresponding emphasis upon conciliation and compromise, rather 
than coercion and compulsion’ (Hawkins and Hutter, 1993). The enforcement style is marked 
as ‘adaptable and variable in the demands it places on business’ (Hawkins and Hutter, 1993) 
and individual officers are ‘encouraged to make their own decisions about interpreting 
situations and how best to tackle them’ (Hutter, 1989).  In this way it may be argued that 
environmental health officers are an example of street level bureaucrats. This may result in 
significant differences in enforcement policy, style and outcomes for business and consumers 
depending on the particular local authority (Hutter, 1989).    
In highlighting the importance of environmental health officers in a similar piece of research 
into Australian environmental health officers, their role is described by one interviewee as 
‘huge, definitely huge. They are the first contact between community and public health and 
they’ve got a very, very, difficult job…’ (Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015) 
The variables in enforcement may range from the behaviour of the individual enforcer, the 
authority and the resources available to it and the regulatory climate in which it operates. In 
addition, the size and wealth of the business may provide some indication of the regulatory 
attention which they may attract. For example a supermarket or leading brand has a strong 
incentive to ensure that nutrition and health claims for which they are responsible are 
compliant because to be found to be otherwise would undermine the high level of trust 
demanded by consumers in food purchasing (Kumar, 1996). By comparison, small businesses 
such as independent takeaways or home based suppliers dependent on unskilled workers 
without the training of a larger organisation may be seen as more immediately risky. This may 
influence the way in which their activities are monitored by regulators. 
The nature of the activity may also influence the regulatory response so that hygiene breaches 
which pertain to food safety will be more likely to lead to legal action than false health claims. 
There may be variations between local authorities’ ratios of enforcement officers and the 
number of food businesses for which they are responsible which will affect the frequency and 
duration of inspections. A closer knowledge of a business and its personnel will permit 
enforcers to use persuasion and education to a much greater extent than in circumstances 
where those working in food businesses are largely unknown to them (Hawkins and Hutter, 
1993). 
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Galanter contrasts ‘repeat players’, the few firms who have a recurring relationship with 
regulators, with ‘one shotters’, the majority of firms which are rarely inspected (Galanter, 
1974). The repeat players become familiar with regulatory expectations as a result of more 
frequent contact with inspectors and this provides greater scope for education.  In contrast, 
smaller firms, who might expect to be inspected once every few years, may be uninformed 
about the law and ignorant about the expectations of the regulator. 
Enforcers come into contact with business as a result of routine inspection work or complaints 
(Hutter, 2011). Therefore, the frequency and the nature of the inspections are essential factors 
in determining the number and types of violations that come to light. Reactive responses 
involving third parties such as complainants are likely to be met with a stronger response than 
violations discovered from a routine inspection (Lloyd-Bostock and Hutter, 2008). 
Environmental health and trading standards officers will have perceptions about why 
businesses comply or fail to comply with the law, regardless of whether these are actually 
correct and enforcement strategies are built on them. From their studies of inspectors, Hutter 
et al show that enforcers believe compliance is the result of a variety of factors. Firstly, that 
compliance with the law is a matter of moral principle so that a firm believes that it should not 
deceive consumers whether or not this is required by law. In this way, businesses comply with 
the law out of deference to the authority of the law, whether or not they agree with it. Secondly, 
regulated firms believe that it is economically prudent to do so because the penalty which will 
be suffered if you are caught is such that the risks outweigh the benefits. Of course these 
theories of why businesses comply with the law are not necessarily mutually exclusive 
(Hawkins and Hutter, 1993). 
Businesses may fail to comply for financial or technical reasons or because they are negligent; 
whereas others act deliberately in choosing not to comply by calculating the risk and deciding 
they wish to avoid the cost of compliance. An example might be a factory that does not wish 
to re-label stock that has become non-compliant as a result of the coming into effect of the 
legislation. Alternatively, it may be due to a belligerent and irrational belief that their product 
does have the nutritional and health properties they claim, notwithstanding the lack of scientific 
evidence, and that the regulator has no right to tell them what to do. Many beliefs about the 
nutrition and health effects of foods are based in folklore even at an official level. As an 
illustration of this, it was found that claims submitted to EFSA and rejected by it were supported 
by evidence based on religious texts or similar non-scientific grounds (Gilsenan, 2011) and 
that these were supplied by senior ministry officials with approval from domestic regulators.    
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The applied theories of enforcers on firm compliance will present a picture of the moral 
character of that type of firm. Takeaways and back street supplement providers are examples 
of businesses who can have a vaguely disreputable quality and which may attract the 
suspicions of enforcers (Cranston, 1979). Where a claim originates from such a ‘bad’ firm this 
creates an expectation in the environmental health or trading standards officer’s mind that the 
claim is deliberate or negligent and that it should be met with a stronger response than if it had 
been made by a large reputable supermarket. That is not to suggest that supermarkets do not 
make false claims. The case files of the Advertising Standards Authority show that they do but 
such false claims are almost certainly viewed by enforcers as accidental and will be met with 
an investigation with an invitation to provide the evidence for the claim rather than criminal 
legal action. Instead ‘bargaining becomes central  in such a relationship’ (Hawkins, 1984).  
In summary, ‘regulatory enforcement in England and Wales is highly discretionary, and varies 
according to regulatory arena, legislation, bureaucracy, and agency policy. At field level the 
high degree of effective discretion may lead to enforcement that seems individualized, 
fragmented and ad hoc’ (Hawkins and Hutter, 1993). In Hawkins’s research, the arena was 
environmental and health and safety regulation. In this study, the field is local authority 
regulatory services’ enforcement of the regulation on nutrition and health claims. 
2.21 The impact of health claims on consumer behaviour and innovation by 
producers 
 
From the consumer perspective, the effectiveness of health claims depends upon the ability 
to access the information contained in the health claim and to act upon it. This raises questions 
about whether consumers understand health claims and whether they are prepared to act on 
them. In the article Information, advertising and health choices: a study of the cereal market 
(Ippolito and Mathios, 1990), the authors examine the effect of information on consumer and 
producer behaviour, in particular; how to disseminate known health information to consumers 
who might be able to act on it and benefit from it. 
 
Consumers are not generally well placed to assess the health claims made for foods, they rely 
on producers for information and if such information is not regulated effectively, there is little 
incentive for producers to be truthful in their claims. In addition, the risk of consumers being 
deceived by exaggerated claims for foods would lead to more harm. This was the justification 
for the ban on the making of health claims by food suppliers in the US.  
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The ban was lifted during the period of study and this enabled the Ippolito & Mathios to 
examine the impact of advertising on consumers’ consumption of fibre and on producers’ 
innovation of products. The authors found that ‘the evidence clearly demonstrates that fiber 
[sic] cereal consumption increased once the ban on health claims advertising was removed.’ 
This would seem to indicate that advertising represents a valuable source of health and dietary 
information for consumers and that where such information can be acted upon that consumers 
will do so. The authors of the study controlled for the potential increase in consumption as a 
result of advertising generally which was not related to health claims. The study was restricted 
to the impact of lifting the ban on cereals only and therefore the conclusions from it may not 
necessarily be applied to other products. The cereal market is dominated by a group of a few 
large suppliers who would find it relatively easy to provide consumers with the information 
through labelling and advertising while complying with the regulation. Markets where there are 
many smaller producers may respond differently to the removal of the restriction. 
 
The idea that advertising is a valuable source of information for consumers and that it plays a 
key role in the market and in competition between suppliers has been explored before (Stigler, 
1961). Studies which examined markets where advertising is prohibited or at least restricted 
so that suppliers are stopped from making claims in relation to their products or services have 
shown that in such markets, of which optical and legal services are two such examples, prices 
tend to be higher. (Benham, 1975). 
 
Individuals’ responses to information vary according to their level of education, how they value 
their health and their ability to absorb information and change behaviour. For example 
graduates were more likely to stop smoking following the Surgeon General’s Report on 
Smoking in 1964 (Ippolito and Ippolito, 1984). In addition, the costs of acquiring new 
information and transactional costs affect the different ways in which different consumers react 
differently to health information. 
 
In 1984 the cereal manufacturer Kellogg began to promote its products by reference to the 
link between the consumption of fibre and the reduction in the incidence of colon cancer. The 
study attempts to isolate the effect of the use of health claims from other possible factors, for 
example, increased awareness of colon cancer as a result of the publicity surrounding the 
then President Ronald Reagan’s diagnosis of colon cancer. 
 
In restricting health claims, the government through its regulators places itself in a position of 
responsibility for the dissemination of health information. In that position, it may be viewed as 
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a trusted source of information. However there is an alternative view of the role of government 
regulation, that it has a bureaucratic risk aversion and it is beholden to the influence of the 
lobbying of the food industry(Stigler, 1971). A further question posed by the research is who 
is the more effective provider of information to consumers? This is a question that should be 
seen in the context of the fact that advertisers have a strong incentive to reach a wider 
audience. Finally, would competitive forces lead to greater use of health claims related to the 
fibre content of cereals?  
 
In critically assessing this position, one might argue that governments also have incentives to 
seek improvements to the health of their populations by enhanced nutrition, as healthier 
people are more productive and require less healthcare. However, the nature of the incentive 
is different in that a food business has the more specific goal of selling more of its particular 
product. In addition, although improved nutrition may not be the primary purpose of a food 
business that competition based on health claims for food is more effective in providing better 
health outcomes.  
 
Professor Michael Porter of Harvard Business School develops this idea further in his work  
The Competitive Advantage of Social Philanthropy (Porter and Kramer, 2002). Porter posits 
that there is little advantage in corporations seeking to harm their consumers. In fact, there is 
every incentive for companies to seek to actively promote the welfare of their consumers. He 
goes further in his criticism of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). For many organisations, 
CSR is used as a form of public relations to promote the business in a positive light. However, 
according to Porter:  
 
there is a more truly strategic way to think about philanthropy. Corporations 
can use their charitable efforts to improve their competitive context--the 
quality of the business environment in the locations where they operate. 
Using philanthropy to enhance competitive context aligns social and 
economic goals and improves a company’s long-term business prospects. 
(Porter and Kramer, 2002) 
 
Porter’s ideas are concerned with broad corporate strategy but they may enlighten the 
underlying argument in food claims between government regulatory intervention on the one 
hand and allowing business to exploit the competitive advantage that might be obtained from 
a liberal approach to health claims. 
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In this regard, a further study by Levy and others, contemporaneous with that of Ippolito and 
Mathios, examined consumers’ knowledge of the cancer prevention potential of fibre bran or 
whole grains. It showed an increase in consumer awareness about the benefits of fibre. In that 
survey consumers were asked, ‘what things that people eat and drink might make them less 
likely to get cancer?’ In 1984 only 9% mentioned fibre, bran or whole grains but in 1986 that 
figure increased to 32% (Levy, 1989). 
 
The studies appear to provide support for a permissive approach to health claims. In isolating 
the effect of the lifting of the preceding ban on health claims on consumer behaviour the 
authors found ‘fiber [sic] cereal consumption increased significantly once advertising of the 
health benefits was allowed.’ 
 
Lifting the ban on health claims allowed food businesses to compete on the basis of the 
increased fibre content of their cereals. Food suppliers were able to make claims for the higher 
fibre content of their products. As a consequence, the lifting of the ban seemed also to promote 
the innovation of cereal with higher fibre content with the average fibre increasing from 1.56 
grams per ounce in 1984 to 2.59 grams per ounce in 1987. The study did not however take 
into account the popularity of a product. In relation to one of the justifications for the ban on 
health claims, that it would cause consumers to ignore some of the harmful nutrients in a food 
and that consumption of these would therefore increase, the study seemed to show the 
opposite, that newer high fibre cereals also contained less sodium and that average sodium 
levels decreased. There may have been an accompanying increase in sugar content but this 
is not recorded. 
 
One of the arguments against the use of health and nutrition claims promulgated by consumer 
groups such as Which? is that consumers would respond by over reliance on the health 
benefits while ignoring the possible negative effects in other areas of their diets. Concerning 
this, Ippolito and Mathios measured the consumption of salt and fat in cereals before and after 
the lifting of the ban and found no evidence to support this theory. Of course the study does 
not measure the effect of the health claims on other aspects of consumers’ diets, for example, 
an increase in salt and fat from sources other than cereal consumption. There may still be an 
overall negative impact on the diet of the consumer as a result of the misuse of health claims 
as a ‘magic bullet’. 
 
Ippolito and Mathios examined the question of whether producers would voluntarily disclose 
health information, that is, fibre content, which might be valued by consumers. The existence 
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of a credible and low cost means of disclosure of a feature that is valued by consumers 
combined with the effect of competition should lead to the voluntary labelling of health 
information from all but the lowest quality producers (Grossman, 1981). The result of this 
finding seems to point to the benefits of liberal regulation. The EC Regulation on nutrition and 
health claims (EC, 1924/2006 ) may be reconciled with such a permissive approach. It 
provides for the food business to be able to make health claims but this is restrained by the 
requirement of evidence. In this way, a food supplier may make a choice about whether to 
provide nutrition and health information as opposed to a regulation based on mandatory 
disclosure. 
 
Ippolito and Mathios considered the question of what, if any, differences there are in the 
responses of different groups of consumers to the information on health benefits of fibre 
consumption from cereal. The study found that consumers who placed a greater value on 
health are more likely to eat high fibre cereals. Such consumers were identified as non-
smokers and/or those who took vitamin supplements. The study also examined factors like 
race, income and education and found that they were relevant in determining consumer 
response to the use of health claims in advertising. Non-white, lower income and less 
educated consumers are less responsive to health messages from sources such as 
government health education campaigns. By contrast the study appears to show that 
advertising may have a greater impact on groups that are not well reached by other available 
information sources. 
 
Ippolito and Mathios conclude that the improved understanding of the relationship between 
diet and health will only lead to benefits for consumers if they can access the necessary 
information and act on it. In relation to the cereal market, the lifting of the ban on health claims 
advertising appears to have increased the consumption of fibre without any corresponding 
negative effects. The study seems to provide some evidence that the prohibition on health 
claims across the board may have come at a cost to consumers’ ability to exercise choice 
based on health information. However, it does not then follow that producers should enjoy the 
right to make claims without any restrictions. There is a clear information asymmetry between 
consumers and producers and potential for deception by producers. The challenge for the 
regulation of claims is to allow producers to find a low cost and credible way of disseminating 
the information (Grossman, 1981). One way to do this would be the implementation of an 
evidence-based system of claims approval. It should be emphasised that this study is 
restricted to the manufactured breakfast cereal market and that the results are therefore 
subject to the features of this market, for example, that there are a few large producers that 
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dominate the market, cereals are purchased in large boxes with labelling from supermarkets, 
cereals are eaten in the same way for breakfast – such uniformity of consumption patterns are 
not necessarily found with other foods and this may restrict the ability to extrapolate the 
conclusions of the study by Ippolito and Mathios to other food products and markets. 
 
. 
2.22 The Joint Health Claims Initiative 1997-2007 
 
Prior to the passing of the Regulation the UK adopted a voluntary approach to nutrition and 
health claims in which suppliers were encouraged to comply with a set of agreed standards 
known as the Joint Health Claims Initiative (JHCI). The JHCI was composed of industry, 
consumer and enforcement representatives who administered its code and whose main 
activity was to provide approval to specified claims. The system was aimed at ensuring that 
claims were; ‘scientifically true, legal,… and meaningful and not misleading to 
consumers’(2007, 2007). During its time the JHCI approved five claims related to saturated 
fats, whole grains, soya protein, oats, and omega 3 all of which are associated with blood 
cholesterol and/or heart health for the period from 2001-2005. 
 
The Code of Practice applied to all traders, suppliers, manufacturers, caterers, agencies, 
retailers and importers involved in the supply, advertising, promotion and/or labelling of food 
when making claims that state or imply that consumption of a particular product carries a 
specific health benefit (JHCI Code of Practice on Health Claims on Foods, the ‘Code’). The 
Code has the objectives of protecting and promoting health, providing accurate information 
relating to food and promoting fair trade in the food industry ss.1.2.  
 
The JHCI code Administration Body adopted a practical and proactive approach to health and 
nutrition claims in contrast to the aims traditionally associated with legal controls. The practical 
guidance it would provide would be to provide pre-market advice to companies including copy 
clearance in a similar way to the Advertising Standards Association does with advertising 
generally. Of course only a court can provide a final interpretation of the law and the voluntary 
code of the JHCI cannot decide on a health claim in the final instance. However adherence to 
the code would potentially provide a defendant with a defence of due diligence if prosecuted 
for making a false or unsubstantiated health claim. Therefore the advantage of the JHCI 
approach for a supplier was its pro-active approach geared towards providing a solution rather 
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than finding an instance of a breach to form the basis of a potential legal action. The 
disadvantage was its voluntary nature and the limited legal security that it would provide. 
 
Under the Code a health claim (as opposed to a nutrition claim) is a ‘direct, indirect or implied 
claim in food labelling, advertising and promotion that consumption of a food carries a specific 
health benefit or avoids a specific health detriment.’ ( s3.1 of the Code). Under the Code a 
health claim is distinguished from a ‘generic health claim’ which is ‘based on well established, 
generally accepted knowledge from evidence in the scientific literature’ (s.3.2 of the Code). 
The Code goes on to draw a distinction between food and medicines and makes clear that it 
only applies to food and food supplements;  
 
 ‘This Code applies to the use of health claims in labelling, advertising and 
promotion of all foods as marketed to the general public whether foods, 
drinks or food supplements. It does not apply to products which are 
medicinal products subject to medicines laws.’ (s.4.1 of the Code) 
 
In seeking to regulate health claims the JHCI adopts a clearly defined position and this is 
demonstrated by the fact that the Code examines the health claim from the consumer’s point 
of view. Therefore, under the Code; ‘the overriding principle is that the consumer perception 
of the health claim is paramount. In other words what the consumer thinks the health claims 
means.’  
 
Unlike legislation which is generally subject to narrow interpretation, the Code should be 
applied ‘in the spirit as well as in the letter’ s.6.1.1 of the Code). This allows for greater flexibility 
in its application.  As is characteristic with self-regulatory measures, the Code seeks to take 
advantage of the flexibility afforded by its relatively informal nature. In adopting the consumer 
point of view, an important specified factor is whether there is a direct or indirect or implied 
claim. A direct claim is for the food rather than its ingredients and an implied claim may be 
assessed from the overall impression given, for example, a picture of a heart may give the 
impression that the food will reduce the risk factors associated with coronary heart disease. 
 
In accordance with the Legal and Nutritional Principles of the Code; ‘health claims must be 
truthful and must not deceive directly or by implication.’ (s.6 of the Code).  They should be 
consistent with the evidence, and, if the benefits have been shown to apply following tests on 
only a specific section of the population, then the claim should only refer to a benefit for this 
group and not for the population as a whole. The Code allows claims that might refer to the 
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maintenance of good health in general or of a specific part, for example, heart. A health claim 
must not encourage excessive consumption of a food. The benefit must be attained within the 
context of a healthy diet and lifestyle. A claim should not denigrate other foods or imply that 
normal foods cannot provide a healthy diet. 
 
The core of the Code relates to the substantiation of claims which is dealt with in section 8 of 
the Code. In the case of generic health claims no specific substantiation is required and such 
claims are already approved by the Code Administration Body in the light of international 
scientific consensus. Health claims must be based on a review of all the scientific evidence 
relating to its validity and this review must include the totality of the evidence and not just data 
which support the claim. The studies should be based on experimental studies in humans and 
should establish an improvement in well-being or the lessening of disease. The code 
acknowledges that gathering full clinical evidence on foods can be difficult and expensive and 
therefore allows for evidence of the effects of foods on markers where there is a strong 
correlation between markers and well-being. For example, research showing that a food 
reduces levels of serum cholesterol would be acceptable to support a claim for maintaining a 
healthy heart. 
 
In cases where an innovative health claim is made this claim must be supported by scientific 
evidence following a systematic evaluation of all the data. Although it is possible to market a 
food without it, companies are advised by the JHCI to seek pre-market advice from the Code 
Administration Body. 
 
The following are examples of acceptable words and phrases that may be used in health 
claims: 
 Is beneficial to the health of the stomach and digestive system 
 Helps maintain normal blood flow to the brain which is particularly important in old age 
 Folic acid contributes to the normal growth of the foetus in the womb 
 Helps maintain normal cholesterol levels. Healthy cholesterol levels are known to play 
a part in maintaining a healthy heart. 
 
2.22.1 Critique of the JHCI 
 
The JHCI provided a flexible and practical approach which served the needs of the food 
industry while attracting the support of consumer and enforcement groups.  Much has been 
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said to promote co-regulation as a potential way forward for greater involvement in delivering 
the aims of regulation by business (Senden, 2005). The concept of co-regulation has been 
promoted by governments at a national and EU level (BIS, 2011b; EC 139, 2006). 
 
The JHCI represented an example of co-regulation in practice. It did not offer a long-term 
solution and it was not comprehensive in its application and of course it was weakened by its 
voluntary nature. Since the passing of the Regulation, the JHCI has become redundant. This 
thesis will go on to consider the difference between the approaches of the JHCI and the 
Regulation and their difference in impact and in particular their outcome, that is, the type and 
nature of the claims that are permitted.  
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2.23 Architecture of enforcement of general food law in the UK 
 
While the responsibility for the making of policy and law remains with central government the 
responsibility for enforcement is largely ceded to local authorities and specific central 
agencies. There are over 400 local authorities in the UK and primary responsibility for 
enforcement of food law lies with their trading standards and environmental health 
departments, sometimes combined into a single Regulatory Services department. 
 
In considering food law, the single most important piece of legislation is the Food Safety Act 
1990. The content of the Act has been extensively and authoritatively analysed by Howells et 
al. (Howells et al., 1990). The impact of this legislation upon the enforcement activities of 
environmental health officers was examined by Harrison et al (1997). That research examined 
the nature of local authority food regulation to understand how enforcement officers implement 
national legislation and reviewed the implementation of the regulatory doctrines of the home 
authority principle and the application of codes of practice on enforcement (Harrison et al., 
1997). This research, on the other hand, overlays the Regulation on nutrition and health claims 
onto that same enforcement infrastructure as it has evolved by reform and practice, some 20 
years later.  
 
Although general responsibility for food law rests with local authorities, there are cases of 
reserved duties held by central agencies. The most important one of these is the Food 
Standards Agency (FSA) which acts as the enforcement authority in relation to 1700 licensed 
premises in the UK producing meat for human consumption including slaughterhouses, cutting 
plants and cold stores (Authority, 2010). The FSA is charged with investigation, prosecution 
in order to maintain public confidence in the meat industry. The food scandals of the 1990s 
including BSE which led to the creation of the FSA may have influenced this decision. The 
FSA also has responsibility for the enforcement of EC regulations relating to wine. 
 
Other agencies of central government which have responsibilities for enforcement for specific 
areas of food law include the Pesticides Safety Directorate (PSD), the Veterinary Medicines 
Directorate (VMD) and the Egg Marketing Inspectorate (EMI); all within the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) with responsibilities that are in accordance with 
their titles. 
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2.23.1 Enforcement and penalties under the Nutrition and Health Claims 
Regulations 2007 
 
Section 4 of the Nutrition and Health Claims Regulations (Regulations, 2007) makes the 
following provision for enforcement; ‘each port health authority within its district and each food 
authority within its area shall execute and enforce the provisions of these Regulations and of 
the Regulation’. The competent authorities are identified in the Regulations as the Food 
Standards Agency, the port authority and the food authority  in section 3 (Regulations, 2007). 
A breach of the provisions of the Regulation is a criminal offence triable either way, either in 
the magistrates’ or crown court. The penalty on summary conviction is a fine up to the statutory 
maximum and or three months’ imprisonment. The penalty on indictment is up to two years 
imprisonment and/or a fine of up to the statutory maximum. 
 
2.24 The relationship between local and central government food law 
enforcement 
 
The FSA retains an overarching monitoring and supervisory role over the local authorities in 
relation to enforcement: 
 
‘Under the Food Standards Act 1999 the Agency has a package of statutory powers to 
strengthen enforcement of food standards, and to ensure national objectives are delivered. 
The Act gives the Agency powers to: 
 Set standards of performance in relation to enforcement of food law 
 Monitor the performance of enforcement authorities 
 Require information from local authorities relating to food law enforcement and inspect 
any records 
 Enter local authority premises, to inspect records and take samples 
 Publish information on the performance of enforcement authorities 
 Make reports to individual authorities, including guidance on improving performance 
 Require enforcement authorities to publish these reports and state what action they 
propose in response’ (Authority, 2010) 
 
There is an important footnote with regard to the enforcement and regulatory structure that 
relates to food. Since the Comprehensive Spending Review of 2010 the government has 
announced its intention to dismantle the FSA and to divide its responsibilities between the 
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Department of Health (DoH) and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(Defra). Presently the FSA is still functioning but with some of its duties passed to DoH and 
Defra. A further important reform is the creation of Local Government Regulation (LGA), 
previously Local Authorities Coordinators of Regulatory Services (LACORS). LGA is the 
coordinating body in relation to various consumer protection functions including food safety. It 
gives advice and guidance to local authorities and the FSA on enforcement issues. 
 
2.24.1 Duties of local authorities 
 
The orthodox model for law making and regulation is concerned with the relationship between 
government and citizens at a national level. This model fails to take into account the level 
above: the European Union and below: local authorities. This theory is articulated by Harrison 
et al:  ‘Regulationist analysis is at its strongest in dealing with the nation-state but less 
confident in its conceptualisation of local modes of regulation and of central-local state 
relations. We argue that, at least in the case of food policy, the interconnectedness of different 
tiers of the state must be addressed’ (Harrison et al., 1997).  
 
The ongoing harmonisation of European Union legislation with the aim of promoting 
competition in the internal market and specifically in promoting food standards relies on local 
enforcement. It raises a crucial question: ‘how can the diversity of local regulatory practices 
be integrated at the national level and beyond?’ (Harrison et al., 1997). Such integration is 
essential to the consistency of enforcement and therefore success of the legislation. The key 
actors, here, environmental health officers and trading standards officers are not passive 
recipients of regulatory practices; rather, they enjoy a significant discretion which they use to 
shape enforcement. 
 
Enforcement of food law in the UK has been traditionally focussed on safety. This is not 
surprising in the light of the immediate and serious risks that the issue of safety presents. As 
such, enforcement of food safety law has rested with Environmental Health whereas 
enforcement of the Regulation will fall to Trading Standards as the nature of the risk is primarily 
economic. 
 
Inspection of food premises forms an important part of the strategy of food law enforcement 
by local authorities. In this respect, the Food Standards Act 1999 provides local authorities 
with wide powers to inspect any stage of the production or sale of food and to take samples. 
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Although local authority responsibility for enforcement of food law is often expressed as a duty; 
for example, a local authority must investigate every consumer complaint about food, 
enforcement action may include a range of measures from warnings, improvement notices, 
prosecutions and closure of a business. Also local authorities’ food safety officers will take a 
risk based approach to inspection and enforcement taking a more frequent and interventionist 
approach in proportion to the risk presented by the food producer/supplier.    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Generally the failure to enforce the law leads to the potential for abuse and consequent loss 
of confidence in legal rules (Landes and Posner, 1974). Specific rules that are not enforced 
may do harm by leading subjects to lose respect for legal rules in general. Although passing 
of legislation with the lack of enforcement may have a symbolic value and deterrent effect, the 
lack of rigorous enforcement will have a wearying effect on the regulation (Polinsky and 
Shavell, 1999). 
 
From the initial proposal on nutrition and health claims in 2003, the European Commission 
acknowledged that such claims ‘are often not properly enforced.’ As a result, ‘consumers can 
therefore be misled by claims that have not been properly substantiated. The proposed 
Regulation will give legal security and address these issues by specifying the conditions for 
the use of nutrition and health claims.’ (EC, 2003). There is an implicit acknowledgement that 
the failure to enforce nutrition claims may be the result of the lack of clarity in the law. The 
subsequent legislation, that is Regulation 1924/2006, aims to provide sufficient clarity in order 
to promote enforcement. Whether this has happened or whether the lack of enforcement may 
be attributed to other causes, for example, by having different priorities, is one of the questions 
for this thesis. The thesis will examine the policy framework, to the extent that it exists and is 
applied, that underlies the enforcement of health claims. 
 
 
2.25 Enforcement options and the factors affecting enforcement choices 
 
Various studies have examined the relationship between the economic, political and social 
forces in understanding the regulation of businesses (Gunningham et al., 2005). In 
determining the enforcement actions of a local authority, these studies provide some general 
insights into the enforcement of food law by trading standards officers. But this thesis seeks 
to develop this work by examining the factors and applying the general insights into regulation 
to food in particular.  
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One of the notable trends in regulation across a range of sectors from financial services to 
food safety has been towards a risk-based approach. The approach has touched food law 
enforcement as well. A risk based approach may be defined as, ‘systemised decision making 
frameworks and procedures to prioritise regulatory activities and deploy resources principally 
relating to inspection and enforcement based on an assessment of the risks that regulated 
firms pose to the regulator’s objectives’ (Black, 2002). The risk based approach is promoted 
as a transparent and coherent approach to regulation and by focussing on the areas which 
present the greatest risks it may provide an efficient allocation of resources. The risk based 
approach was put into practice following Sir Phillip Hampton’s 2005 review Reducing 
administrative burdens: effective inspections and enforcement. In the final report the review 
adopts the principle that; ‘regulators, and the regulatory system as a whole, should use 
comprehensive risk assessment to concentrate resources on the areas that need them most’ 
(Hampton, 2005). The attraction of a risk based approach where responses are determined 
by the logic of risk analysis is obvious but there are potential shortcomings of the approach, 
in particular that of, ‘the challenges of regulation to which regulators have to respond vary 
across the different regulatory tasks of detection, response development, enforcement, 
assessment, and modification’(Black and Baldwin, 2010). 
 
In relation to food claims, one of the factors which may have led to a significant level of 
unsubstantiated food claims prior to the passing of the Regulation may be uncertainty about 
the legal position. The greater the latitude in relation to the precise legal position the more 
scope there is for interpretation by providers to their own full advantage. On a more generous 
and less misanthropic interpretation, they may genuinely be unaware of their legal duties or 
be mistaken as to the existence and application to their own enterprise (Hutter, 2001).  
 
The food industry comprises a large variety of different types of businesses ranging from the 
multinational conglomerate encompassing complex distribution and licensing arrangements 
to the small direct producer (sometimes farmer)/seller. Smaller businesses can find 
compliance with their regulatory obligations more difficult; through a lack of resources or the 
failure to understand what is required from them (Yapp and Fairman, 2006). Whereas large 
businesses such as supermarkets are expected to be aware of legislative requirements, 
independent traders are thought to need more education regarding their regulatory 
responsibilities and place greater reliance on advice and assistance from enforcers, 
particularly during inspections (Harrison et al., 1997). 
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Trading Standards Officers represent the first line of response to the enforcement of the 
Regulation. They are the people who interpret the law in statutes, cases and procedure and 
translate it into action on the frontline(Hutter, 2008). Trading Standards Officers enjoy a high 
level of discretion about how to implement the law in relation to individual businesses. The 
evidence shows that regulators generally deploy this discretion flexibly (Hawkins, 2002). 
Regulators including Trading Standards Officers make use of a range or ‘menu’ of 
enforcement options available to them. These may range from education and advice, 
agreement on a course of action or undertakings as well as court action. The main objective 
of enforcement action is for securing compliance ‘both through the remedy of existing 
problems and, above all, the prevention of others’ (Hutter, 2008). The possibility of the use of 
a range of options raises questions about the nature of enforcement, its purpose and at what 
point that purpose is achieved: 
 
 The preferred methods to achieve these ends are co-operative and 
conciliatory. So where compliance is less than complete, and there is good 
reason for it being incomplete, persuasion, negotiation and education are 
the primary enforcement methods. Accordingly, compliance is not 
necessarily regarded as being immediately achievable; rather it may be seen 
as a long term aim. The use of formal legal methods, especially prosecution, 
is regarded as a last resort, something to be avoided unless all else fails to 
secure compliance. Indeed, the importance of legal methods lies in the 
mystique surrounding their threatened or possible use rather than their 
actual use. 
 (Hutter, 2008) 
 
There are a number of reasons why action on enforcement does not necessarily mean taking 
legal action. The general way in which regulations and law, particularly European regulations, 
are drafted can make taking legal action difficult for enforcers (Baldwin and Sunkin, 1995; 
Kagan and Scholz, 1984). Enforcers may consider that informal action such as advice and 
guidance may be more effective and a provide a more efficient way to utilise their resources 
than prosecution or other legal action (Hawkins, 2002). 
 
The local level at which trading standards operate and the discretion that is afforded to trading 
standards officers within a local authority will lead to differences in the way in which the same 
law is enforced by different departments. A key factor in this variation will be the availability of 
resources, particularly the department’s budget and staff numbers (Hampton, 2005). The 
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question of what resources are available for enforcement of health and nutrition claims may 
be affected not only by the resources available to the department as a whole but also to the 
allocation of those resources to various aspects of the many responsibilities of trading 
standards officers. That is a question of allocation of resources within the priorities of the 
department.   
 
Notwithstanding risk analysis and a scientific approach, in deciding what action to take, a 
trading standards officer will also be affected by their own personal and intuitive assessment 
about the nature of the breach and its potential impact (Tebbutt et al., 2007). Formal action 
may only follow where an incident is viewed as so serious as to warrant legal action or that 
the trading standards officer feels that informal action will not lead to a positive response from 
the business involved.  
 
While the local aspect of Trading Standards enforcement is seen by many as one of its great 
strengths in providing regional accountability, the structural organisation of local authorities 
with the incorporation of elected councillors opens up the system to political interference.  In 
this respect, the concept of representational democracy and ideologically driven support for a 
particular policy represent contrasting facets of the same issue. 
 
The range of matters that fall within the duties of trading standards officers to enforce is 
extremely wide. The broad areas covered are; ‘economic recovery, environmental protection, 
improved health, community safety’ (Trading Standards Institute, 2011). The day-to-day work 
may include policing of; age restricted sales, counterfeit goods, overloaded vehicles, weights 
and measures and food related inspections. The expertise required to effectively monitor such 
a broad variety of activity is increasingly technical and more demanding. This leads to a trading 
standards officer, like their environmental health officer cousins, having to become a ‘Jack of 
all trades’ and inevitably ‘a master of none’ (Hutter, 2008). Condon-Paoloni also use this 
phrase with reference to the fact that officers are required to adapt and find ways to get things 
done with a wide range of duties. In addition they describe the ‘difficulties  environmental 
health officers faced in trying to maintain a working knowledge of a large amount of legislation 
and applying it to different situations.’ (Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015). The extent of this feature 
as a problem will vary between authorities. Large metropolitan authorities will be able employ 
and develop specialist teams but in smaller authorities where there are fewer employees, they 
will need to adopt several functions and provide a more generalised approach to their role.  
The Food Standards Authority has a role in establishing the policy for enforcement of food law 
and setting the statutory duties for enforcers. In this way, trading standards policy on 
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enforcement priorities for food has been influenced by guidance from the FSA. However since 
the FSA has been partially dispersed and its functions devolved between DEFRA and the 
Department of Health this factor will have become less important; although its influence may 
still remain.  
 
Businesses play an increasing role in influencing the regulation of enforcement of law in 
general and this also applies to the activities of trading standards.  There has been a shift in 
focus from the traditional role of the state regulator as a strict legal enforcer and prosecutor to 
that of educator and advisor. In making this shift, trading standards officers have needed to 
become more attuned to the needs of the businesses that they oversee. This is evidenced in 
the consultation process sanctioned and even required by central government, sometimes as 
part and parcel of a broader deregulation agenda. Such an agenda is frequently the focus of 
lobbying activities by industry groups and public relations firms. In relation to the influence of 
one business on another, large businesses, particularly supermarkets, can exert considerable 
influence on those smaller food businesses for whom the supermarket represents their 
distribution channel (Balsevich et al., 2003).  
 
Smaller businesses generally speaking have lower levels of awareness of the law and the way 
in which is it enforced (Fairman and Yapp, 2004; Henson and Heasman, 1998). Having fewer 
resources smaller businesses are less likely to have access to lawyers, consultants and other 
professional advisers and correspondingly rely more on trading standards for advice and 
guidance on compliance (Genn, 1993). Large businesses are also more likely to have 
insurance against liabilities arising from negligence or contractual breaches that may also be 
regulatory infringements. In addition, such businesses, through their strict compliance 
procedures, may require higher standards than that imposed by law and in doing so they act 
like quasi regulators in relation to their own operations and to those with whom they deal.  
 
2.26 Enforcement policy and enforcement action by UK trading standards 
 
The way in which trading standards officers seek to carry out their enforcement duties is a 
matter of public record for the purposes of openness, consistency, accountability and 
transparency for decision making that affects those who are being regulated; specifically food 
businesses and the public. Some local authorities publish the details of the enforcement policy 
on their web sites and such policies are collated on the web site of the Trading Standards 
Institute, which oversees standards for the profession. The policy provides guidance about the 
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way in which trading standards officers approach the enforcement of health and nutrition 
claims. An analysis of a representative policy from Gloucestershire Trading Standards (GTS) 
is provided below as an illustration of practice. Local authorities are required to conform to 
mandatory reforms aimed at removing unjustified differences in enforcement approaches 
between regions. Therefore the enforcement policy of one authority will be representative of 
the strategy across others. 
 
The legal underpinning for enforcement policy is provided by the Legislative and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2006 and further guidance is bestowed by the principles in the Enforcement 
Concordat and the Regulator’s Compliance Code. Enforcement is defined as ‘any action taken 
by officers aimed at ensuring that businesses comply with the law and this may include offering 
advice, issuing warnings, issuing cautions and initiating legal proceedings including 
prosecution’ Gloucestershire Trading Standards Enforcement Policy (Gloucestershire Trading 
Standards, 2015). 
 
The purpose of the policy is to provide an equitable and consistent framework for trading 
standards and to ensure that enforcement is practical.  At the outset the policy makes it clear 
that it will be applied objectively and in compliance with discrimination laws and therefore 
without regard to the ‘ethnicity, gender, religious beliefs, political views or the sexual 
orientation of the suspect or the victim, or witness or offender’(Gloucestershire Trading 
Standards, 2015). The breadth of the scope of the work is set out in the statement, ‘We enforce 
a wide range of business and consumer protection legislation relating to quality, quantity, 
safety, description and price of goods and services.’(Gloucestershire Trading Standards, 
2015). 
 
The policy makes clear the preference for alternatives to prosecution aimed at prevention of 
breaches of law and that prosecution will only be brought if there is a realistic prospect of 
conviction and it is in the public interest to do so (thereby adopting key elements of the Crown 
Prosecution Service test for instigating prosecution proceedings). 
 
Part 2 of the policy sets out the principles of inspection and enforcement with an explanation 
of what they mean by the terms. Briefly, the principles are; targeting, proportionality, 
accountability, fairness and consistency, openness and transparency. Interestingly 
‘[s]upporting the local economy’ is cited as a further ‘principle’ but one might contend that it is 
in fact an aim of the policy. The policy also states that where there is an overlap with another 
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agency, for example, the police, there will be a coordinated approach to reduce the 
enforcement burden on the businesses affected and maximise the effectiveness of the action. 
The Home Authority Principle means that a business based in a single authority that has 
outlets and carries out business outside that authority is subject to the jurisdiction of its home 
authority rather than that of another authority where the branch resides or where the business 
is transacted:  
 
The Home/Lead Authority Partnerships help councils work together 
effectively and avoid duplication of effort when regulating businesses who 
trade across local council boundaries, and support them by providing contact 
points for advice and guidance in order to maintain high standards of public 
protection and develop a consistent approach to enforcement.  
Local councils help businesses operating in the UK to comply with legislation 
by providing advice, guidance and information. Businesses will generally 
build up a relationship with, and receive advice and information from, one 
particular council. This is usually the local council where the business is 
based, but not exclusively. 
Local Government Regulation (formerly LACORS) (Regulation, 2011) 
 
The creation of the home authority principle was a response to complaints from 
businesses with multiple branches, about varying treatment by food officials. While each 
individual store can be inspected by enforcement officials from its local authority, any 
complaints are required to be channelled to the home authority (Harrison et al., 1997).  
Clearly, the aim of the Home or Lead Authority Principle is to facilitate the relationship 
between it and the most pertinent authority rather than to simply determine the question 
of jurisdiction. This was felt to be a way to diffuse tensions between the authority and 
business and between different authorities. 
 
The Lead Authority principle is a variation of the Home authority principle which aims to 
remove some of the anomalies of the latter where, for example, a business has a 
registered office in one area but in fact carries out most of its business outside of that 
area. A report by the National Audit Office found that 73% of consumer detriment from 
unfair or rogue practices arises as a result of threats that span more than one local 
authority area notwithstanding that Trading Standards are overwhelmingly funded by one 
local authority (National Audit Office, 2011). This is in fact the case with many large food 
businesses and all of the large supermarket chains. In such cases the business may 
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nominate the Lead or Primary Authority which may be more relevant and overcome what 
may be a mere technical connection with the home authority.  In 2011 the government put 
forward proposals seeking to expand the Primary Authority scheme to include more 
businesses and to include more policy areas which currently fall outside the scope of the 
service, see The future of the Local Better Regulation Office and extending the benefits 
of the Primary Authority scheme (BIS, 2011c). The benefits claimed for the Primary 
Authority scheme are that it, ‘reduces risk, reduces the cost of compliance and reduces 
the cost of failure’(BIS, 2011c). However, the government’s reforms form part of its plans 
to tackle regulatory burdens which include such measures as the Red Tape Challenge 
and the One in One out process aimed at identifying those regulations which may be 
removed. The agenda of the consultation the Transforming Regulatory Enforcement: 
Freeing up business growth (BIS, 2011b) is explicit but the prospects for the enforcement 
of the regulation of health and nutrition claims are unclear. 
 
In its consultation Empowering and Protection Consumers Consultation on institutional 
changes for provision of consumer information, advice, education, advocacy and 
enforcement  (BIS, 2011a) the government sought views on the proposal aimed at 
‘clarifying its responsibility to tackle cross-boundary threats’. The consultation recognises 
the limitations of the Home Authority Principle and the problems of the risks of taking legal 
action for enforcement and the lack of expertise. The consultation acknowledges the need 
to reduce the disincentive for individual authorities to take on more complex or risky cases, 
(of which enforcement of nutrition and health claims regulations might be an example), 
say by creating an indemnity fund. It goes on to discuss how an individual trading 
standards department might become a designated lead authority with expertise in a 
particular sector, for example the enforcement of nutrition and health claims regulations.  
In attempting to understand the decision-making process underpinning the choices of 
trading standards officers it is helpful to examine the aims of the actions. The aims are 
described as: 
 
 To change behaviour of the offender; 
 To eliminate any financial gain or benefit from non-compliance; 
 To be responsive and to consider what is the most appropriate sanction for the 
particular offender and the regulatory issue concerned; 
 For the action to be proportionate to the harm/potential harm caused by regulatory 
non-compliance; 
 To restore the harm caused by regulatory non-compliance, where appropriate; 
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 To deter future non-compliance; (Gloucestershire Trading Standards, 2015) 
 
In the transposition of these aims to health and nutrition claims for food, it is suggested 
that reducing the amount of potential harm and proportionality would be the most 
important criteria. The application of the criteria will inform the action that would be most 
suitable to take. For example, taking no action may be justified where the impact on 
consumers may be judged to be small. In relation to health and nutrition claims the impact 
of financial loss may be significant and measurable, that is, the additional premium paid 
for a product by consumers as a result of the health claim made for it. However, the health 
effect is latent and more difficult to attribute and measure. 
 
The authority may take indirect action by referring the issue to another authority that may 
be the home or lead authority. A further option for a trading standards officer is to issue a 
verbal or a written warning where an offence has been committed but it is not appropriate 
to take further action (Gloucestershire Trading Standards, 2015). Other enforcement 
options that may be relevant to health and nutrition claims might be fixed penalty notices 
recognised as a low-level enforcement tool or penalty charge notices if provided for in the 
legislation. In addition, statutory notices are similar to injunctions in that they are used 
where offenders are required to act in a specific way or to cease to do so. The seizure 
and forfeiture of goods may be appropriate in health and nutrition claims. Finally, the 
trading standards officer may seek undertakings and injunctive action under the Enterprise 
Act  2002 (Enterprise Act, 2002). The range of actions under the Enterprise Act include; 
informal undertakings, formal undertakings, interim orders, court orders and contempt 
proceedings. 
 
The most important action that may be taken by a trading standards officer in response to 
a health and nutrition claim would be a prosecution. The decision to take such action 
would need to pass the dual test of evidence and public interest (Gloucestershire Trading 
Standards, 2015).  
 
Other options which are available to trading standards but which are unlikely to be suitable 
for health and nutrition claims include; anti-social behaviour orders, taking animals into 
protection or a caution in accordance with the Home Office guidelines. 
 
Prosecution is the ultimate enforcement tool available for trading standards officers. In 
deciding whether to prosecute a case, Trading Standards adopts the dual test used by the 
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Crown Prosecution Service. The first limb of the test is the evidential test; is there a 
‘realistic prospect of conviction?’ If the answer to this question is positive, the second part 
of the test is applied; the question of whether it is in the public interest to prosecute; 
including a consideration as to whether there is another more appropriate measure 
available (Gloucestershire Trading Standards, 2015; Service, 2011). At the investigation 
stage trading standards officers are required to take account of the relevant legislation 
including the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Human 
Rights Act 1998. Investigating officers are also required to follow codes of practice dealing 
with interviewing witnesses and disclosing evidence. The nature of Trading Standards 
prosecution work would suggest that it is concerned with the criminal process and while 
the Nutrition and Health Claims Regulations 2007 (Regulations, 2007)create offences for 
breaches, one might enquire as to the suitability of dealing with breaches by invoking 
criminal proceedings.  
 
2.27 Actual enforcement – cases and regulatory decisions 
 
The Regulation allows member states to implement their own enforcement regimes. It is 
instructive to examine the decisions made under the Regulation where these are 
available. Where cases have been determined by courts, these will provide a guide to the 
way in which the Regulation is enforced. In the absence of common law precedents, the 
decisions of self-regulatory bodies such as the Advertising Standards Authority provide 
useful guidance on enforcement (Gilsenan, 2011). 
 
2.27.1 Enforcing health claims on food labels – the Australian experience 
In a recent study of the role of environmental health officers in the enforcement of health 
claims in Australia the authors supported Lipsky’s theory of street level bureaucrats 
accountable to their employers, industry and the public (Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015). The 
tensions which arise from competing accountabilities may influence their prioritization of 
their duties and their approach to enforcing regulations. When applied to nutrition and 
health claims the result may be incomplete enforcement and ‘variable veracity and 
promulgation of claims on food labels.’ (Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015). The dominance of 
such information on a food label may influence consumers’ decision-making and 
undermine health policy initiatives based on consumer education.  
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2.27.2 Cases prior to the Regulation 
Prior to the Regulation coming into force, the legislation relevant to the regulation of health 
claims was the Food Safety Act 1990 and the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 (since repealed 
by the Consumer Protection Regulations 2008 (The Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations, 2008). The control of health and nutrition claims was of a broad 
nature and not specific to food. It required simply that consumers were not misled (Ruffell, 
2003). This was therefore a negative obligation rather than a positive one allowing the use 
of only authorised claims. 
 
There are only two English cases where courts have considered health claims. Both cases 
are unreported in official court reports and the records of them are secondary reports from 
press articles. Both cases involve cereal manufacturers.  
 
The first case Cheshire County Council v Mornflake Oats Limited 1993 involves 
Mornflakes Oats’ claims made for heart health on the packaging for porridge oats. The 
claim made was that eating porridge oats as part of a low calorie diet could reduce blood 
cholesterol and therefore reduce the risks from heart disease. In that case, the High Court 
held the information on the box had to be taken as a whole and that the claim was in effect 
a medicinal claim for Mornflake Oats. The claim that porridge oats could ‘treat, help 
prevent or cure a disease’ was a precise claim which may only be used for medicines and 
not foods unless they have been proven to deliver such benefits. As such, the claim was 
made in contravention of the then regulation. The legal position and therefore the outcome 
may be different under the permitted claims passed by EFSA under the Regulation 
(Guardian, 1999). However, the basis of the decision requiring scientific substantiation for 
the claim is consistent with the Regulation.  
 
In the second case, Shropshire Trading Standards v Nestle UK Limited 2000, Nestle was 
prosecuted for claims made for its Shredded Wheat breakfast cereal. The wording on the 
packaging of Shredded Wheat stated:  
 
Coronary heart disease…it’s the UK’s single biggest killer…the British Heart 
Foundation suggests the following to reduce the risks of CHD; cut down on 
fat and salt; eat more fibre…take part in a healthy heart campaign and start 
along the way to a healthier heart…cut down on fat…Shredded Wheat is 
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98% fat free with no added sugar…cut down on salt…Shredded Wheat has 
no added salt…eat more fibre…Shredded Wheat is a great source of bran 
fibre. 
The magistrate commented that it was ‘clear beyond doubt that the statements about 
Shredded Wheat attached to each of the campaign steps invite an irresistible inference 
that eating Shredded Wheat will reduce the risk of coronary heart disease’ (Benjamin, 
2000). 
 
Nestle was found guilty and fined £2,500 and ordered to pay costs of £13,601 for 
contravening the Food Safety Act 1990 and the Food Labelling Regulations.  It pleaded 
not guilty by claiming that the food could in fact prevent, treat or cure a human disease 
but it was unable to adduce evidence to satisfy the court (Food Law Monthly, 2000). 
 
The case was brought by Shropshire Trading Standards which is noteworthy. It would 
seem that there was a particular interest in food law enforcement in that Authority and 
although he has since retired, that interest was associated with a particular individual. The 
case was decided at magistrates’ court level; therefore, in spite of the potential 
implications for the regulation of food, it does not provide a binding precedent for future 
courts. 
 
2.27.3 Adjudications by the Advertising Standards Authority 
Notwithstanding the significance of the above court cases the reports of the decisions 
provide little in the way of guidance about the courts’ approach to health and nutrition 
claims as there are no published judgements. Perhaps more enlightening are the 
decisions of the Advertising Standards Authority, in particular the ASA decision on Danone 
Actimel. The ASA has upheld four complaints about health claims by Danone in the period 
2006-2009. The decision on which the ASA provided the most comprehensive account of 
its investigation and on its rationale was in 2009.  
 
In 2009 the ASA received a complaint about a television advertisement for Danone ‘Actimel’ 
which made the claim; ‘Actimel. Scientifically proven to help support your kids’ defences’. The 
claim was challenged by a complaint that questioned whether such a claim could be 
substantiated under the British Code of Advertising Practice section 8.3.1: 
 
8.3.1 Accuracy in food advertising 
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Nutrition claims (e.g. ‘high in vitamin C’) or health claims (e.g. ‘aids a healthy 
digestion’) must be supported by sound scientific evidence. Advertising must 
not give a misleading impression of the nutritional or health benefits of the 
product as a whole and factual nutrition statements should not imply a 
nutritional or health claim that cannot be supported. Ambiguous wording that 
could be understood as a health claim must be avoided. For example, 
‘goodness’ should not be used as a synonym for ‘wholesomeness’ and, if a 
claim relates to taste, that should be made clear, e.g. ‘It tastes good’, not ‘It 
is good’. The scientific meaning of the word ‘energy’, i.e. calorific value, 
should not be confused with its colloquial meaning of physical vigour 
 8.3.1(b) 
Nutritional claims and health claims should relate to benefits that are 
significant. Claims should be presented clearly and without exaggeration 
 8.3.1(c) 
No nutritional or health claim may be used in HFSS product advertisements 
targeted directly at pre-school or primary school children 
 8.3.1(d) 
The fact that a food product is a good source of certain nutrients does not 
justify generalised claims of a wider nutritional benefit 
 
Danone claimed Actimel would support the human body’s natural defence system against 
common infections. Danone provided the ASA with the body of scientific evidence on which it 
relied. The studies, it claimed, showed a positive effect for Actimel overall. 
 
The ASA, in consultation with a nutrition expert, considered the scientific studies. The first, by 
Guerin-Danan et al, did not consider health effects and therefore it was discounted (Guerin-
Danan et al., 1998). Two further studies were deemed unsuitable as evidence for the benefits 
of Actimel for the general population as they were carried out on hospitalised children in India. 
Two studies by Pedone et al, were examined. The 1999 study, used a sample size that was 
too small to show the effect on the incidence of diarrhoea in the subjects.(Carosella et al., 
1999). In both of the studies the mean ages of the children was 6 and 15.5 months and this 
was considered by the ASA to be ‘lower than the target group of school age children suggested 
by the ad.’ The portion sizes of the children in the study were larger than the recommended 
serving of one 100g pot of Actimel per day. Further observations by the ASA on the evidence 
included the inconsistency between the findings of the studies and where research was carried 
out on children who suffered from allergic conditions, this meant that the results of the study 
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could not necessarily be extrapolated to apply to normal, healthy children’(Giovanani et al., 
2007). Where there were apparent benefits among those who consumed Actimel these were 
not statistically significant when compared to the control groups. 
 
In conclusion, the ASA found that ‘the evidence did not support the claim made in the ad that 
a serving of Actimel was scientifically proven to support the defences of normal, healthy school 
aged children against common, everyday childhood infections.’ And finally ‘[w]e therefore 
concluded that the ad was misleading.’ 
 
In a further more recent case of alleged false health claims by ‘Protein World’ a food 
supplement supplier, the trading standards department of Northamptonshire County Council 
referred the matter to the ASA. There are a range of enforcement options across the diverse 
areas of responsibility available to trading standards. However it is perhaps only in relation to 
nutrition and health claims with the legal and technical interpretation required that it is 
conceivable that the response might be for a public body with a statutory duty to enforce to 
refer the matter to a lay body (Advertising Standards Authority, 2015). 
 
 
2.28 The role of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and its impact 
on decisions by courts and the Advertising Standards Authority 
 
Under the Regulation, a claim which is permitted under Article 13.1 and which therefore 
appears on the list of approved claims may be used in the promotion of food. For a claim to 
be permitted under Article 13.1 it must be underpinned by generally accepted scientific 
evidence. The approval is provided by the European Commission but based on the 
recommendations of EFSA as to whether the claim is substantiated.  
 
Since the Regulation came into force in 2007, some of the responsibility which previously 
rested with the ASA has been made simpler by the creation of the approved claims list. 
Therefore the question of whether to uphold a complaint may be determined by reference to 
the list of approved claims rather than by a fresh inquiry into the evidence.  
 
The Dietetic Products, Nutrition and Allergies (NDA) panel of EFSA has assessed some 1000 
health claims (at March 2011) and the vast majority of these have been rejected (Gilsenan, 
2011). By 2015, EFSA had received some 44,000 applications and approved 256. In carrying 
out this assessment EFSA has adopted a quasi-judicial function. EFSA bears responsibility 
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for deciding whether a health claim is permitted across the entire sector. The outcome is 
similar to that of a decision of a court or the ASA by determining whether a prospective 
promotional communication will be used by a food business. In this way, it provides guidance 
and influences future behaviour. A decision by EFSA carries with it the authority of a scientific 
assessment that is unassailable and which removes the responsibility of the administrators 
and courts for difficult decisions. However, governments and the EU need to define the 
responsibilities of EFSA and it cannot be left to it to determine its own responsibilities. 
(Meisterernst, 2010)  
 
The individual member states of the EU were invited to submit their claims for EFSA approval 
for development of the list. Some 44,000 claims were submitted and this unwieldy list was 
whittled down to 4637 by removing inevitable duplications. It was originally planned to have a 
final list of claims by January 2010 but the volume of claims has meant that they have been 
tackled in batches. A fifth batch was published on 30 June 2011 (EU FoodLawWeekly, 2011). 
By 2015, 256 claims had been approved. 
 
When considering the evidence, EFSA decides if a cause and effect relationship is 
established, according to Gilsenan (2011) this is ‘a scientific assessment to the highest 
standard’(Gilsenan, 2011). But before this can be determined there are three key preliminary 
questions that need to be addressed: 
i) Is the food on which the claim is made sufficiently defined and characterised? 
ii) Is the claimed effect sufficiently defined and is it a beneficial physiological effect? 
iii) have pertinent human studies been used to substantiate the claim? 
In each case there must be a positive answer to all three questions. In line with the ASA 
approach shown in the Actimel ruling ‘well conducted human studies are central to the claim 
substantiation. Human studies must be well designed, be of high quality and must be 
representative of the target population to which the claim is intended. They must be sufficiently 
powered, address confounding factors and use valid biomarkers for the claimed 
effect’(Gilsenan, 2011). 
 
Some 80% of article 13.1 proposed claims have been rejected by the Panel. The quality of the 
evidence provided in support of claims has been variable, ranging from the Bible and 
Wikipedia to peer reviewed scientific journals. Of those claims which have been rejected they 
include those relating to probiotic, antioxidant and glycaemic response. All joint health claims 
have been rejected as the evidence has involved studies carried out using patients with 
osteoarthritis and their conclusions could not be applied to the general healthy 
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population(Gilsenan, 2011). In contrast, claims relating to the consumption of calcium and 
child bone growth have been approved. 
 
Notwithstanding the question of scientific evaluation, there are five general principles which 
must be followed in relation to all health and nutrition claims. The claim must not: 
i) be false or ambiguous 
ii) give rise to doubt about the safety and or the nutritional adequacy of other foods 
iii) encourage excess consumption 
iv) state, suggest or imply that a balanced and varied diet cannot provide appropriate 
quantities of nutrients in general 
v) refer to changes in bodily functions which could give rise to fear in consumers 
           
          (EC, 
1924/2006 ) 
 
The decision making of the Panel differs from adjudication by a self-regulatory body like the 
ASA or a court in some important respects. The process has very much been a case of 
‘learning by doing’, not something that regulators or courts typically do, or at least admit to 
doing. The guidance for substantiation is evolving and EFSA has also committed to more 
dialogue with stakeholders by consultation. In fact, there is a thirty-day period from the issue 
of an opinion by EFSA when anyone may comment on the proposal and further comments 
are invited on the draft legislation following an opinion. 
 
Court cases often arise as a result of ambiguity in the law. The result of the Article 13.1 
procedure of adopting permitted claims or a ‘white list’ may be that there is less ambiguity and 
that consequently there will be even fewer cases. This will have implications for enforcement 
which should also involve a preliminary check by authorities to enquire whether a claim is 
among the permitted claims. On one view, this should be a more straightforward exercise and 
remove the ambiguity and judgement that may then need to be made. In spite of this, recent 
court decisions seem to indicate a less than supine attitude of the courts;  
 
In two decisions dated 12 March 2008 (MD2008,p 533) and 11 September 
2008 (MD2008 p 1344), the Higher Court of Schleswig addressed the issue 
of prior effect of the Community list. The court held that the inclusion of a 
health claim on the list had no legal effect and that the list merely contained 
proposals.  
84 
 
(Meisterernst, 2010). 
 
Challenges under the Regulation, where they are made, may involve a challenge of the 
procedure used by EFSA for approval and about other parts of the Regulation. 
However it is ‘imperative that the Commission and the Member States, as the responsible risk 
managers and the institutions entitled to decide on the authorisation of health claims, regain 
control over the interpretation and application of the Regulation’(Meisterernst, 2010).  
 
 
2.29 Research questions 
 
A number of research questions arise from the literature which aim to seek to account for 
differences in enforcement style from members of a single profession: regulatory enforcement, 
who are tasked with enforcing the same legislation but who work in different areas and are 
subject to varying political control.  
The research questions might be: 
What is the level of awareness in the business of the Regulation and how they might expect 
it to be enforced?  If there is widespread ignorance how has this come about and are there 
some types of firms who are more aware than others? To what extent is this due to the 
complexity of the law and Regulations? Are larger food businesses more knowledgeable than 
smaller independent ones or are they better equipped to deal with investigation and are they 
treated differently based on enforcers’ preconceived notions of their character? Do businesses 
make a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of compliance versus non-compliance 
and deliberately decide to breach the law in the hope of a financial benefit? Alternatively, do 
they comply with legislation as a matter of moral principle? This question affects our view of 
an effective enforcement strategy, as to what reliance may be placed on deterrence measures 
such as criminal penalties and how much compliance might happen in any event, 
independently of any sanction. Where firms comply with law as a matter of respect for the 
authority of the law, how is the way in which some firms observe stricter standards than those 
required by law explained? Is this simply a matter of cautionary practice or zealous protection 
of their reputation driven by self-interest? Finally, in a political environment of deregulation, is 
extensive enforcement of regulation employing a command and control instrument possible 
where there have been severe cuts to funding? What role does the provision of advice play in 
the relationship between enforcers and business? Does this point towards a future of greater 
85 
 
reliance on self-regulation given the coincidence of interests between businesses and 
consumers as envisaged by some business strategists, for example Porter and Kramer? 
(Porter and Kramer, 2002). 
 
2.30 Conclusion 
 
The literature review above has examined the justifications for regulatory intervention in 
food markets for the provision of information regarding nutrition and health claims. The 
latter part of the chapter reviewed enforcement theory and practice by reference to the 
policies and operations of regulatory enforcement agents and the broader theoretical 
studies of enforcement. The multi-disciplinary nature of the research question of how do 
enforcers enforce the Regulation on Nutrition and Health Claims means that literature 
draws from economics, law, political science and consumer behaviour. 
 
This chapter provides the basis and context for the methodology proposed and justified in 
the next chapter of conducting in depth semi structured interviews with enforcement 
officers.  
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Chapter 3  
Methodology  
 
3.1 Summary 
 
This chapter explains the methodology adopted in the research. The research was conducted 
in two distinct stages. The first stage of the research was the review of the existing literature 
on regulation and enforcement in general and in particular in relation to nutrition and health 
claims, as set out in Chapter 2. The second stage gives an account of the research based on 
primary data providing a detailed description of the work done along with justification for the 
approach taken including an explanation of the ontological position or the philosophical basis 
underpinning the research.  Primary data collection was carried out by semi-structured 
interviews of the key actors in enforcement: local authority enforcement officers employed in 
trading standards or environmental health.  A qualitative approach was adopted in an attempt 
to gain insight into the norms and behaviour of enforcers and to explore the overarching 
research question; how are nutrition and health claims enforced? The question demands an 
explanatory approach rather than an empirical one that seeks to find causal links. There is a 
justification of the purposeful sampling strategy employed and an account of the process 
involved in structuring and conducting interviews including the transcription of speech to text. 
The data were collected from in depth interviews with 18 enforcement professionals with data 
saturation being reached at an early stage. Finally, the ethical issues arising from, and 
limitations of the research are acknowledged, including the reflexivity of the researcher.  
3.2 Review of the existing literature 
 
The first step in the study was a review of the literature relating to regulation and enforcement 
followed by a review of the literature specific to health and nutrition claims. The review 
identified the models of how regulation in general seeks to achieve its aims and of how the 
Regulation of nutrition and health claims seeks to achieve its related aims of a functioning 
market and consumer protection. The literature enabled the identification of two broad 
approaches: that which draws from economics and particularly, behavioural economics and 
that which is drawn from political science. The literature review was a means to ‘identify 
language and phrases that would be meaningful to those involved in regulatory enforcement’ 
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(Hutter, 1988). However the writer’s experience of legal practice specialising in consumer law 
in the past and presently of academia as a lecturer in consumer law for students on trading 
standards and environmental health programmes meant that he was already familiar with the 
discourse.  The review was carried out using the library of Manchester Metropolitan University 
which provides registered students with access to a broad range of materials including 
relevant journals and texts as well as to online subscription services such as Reuters 
LexisNexis. The library has its own search service, ‘Find It’ and provides access to 
consolidated services such as Science Direct, JStor and individual institutional libraries. An 
exhaustive selection of search terms was created with the assistance of the librarian and key 
papers were identified based on their summaries. There were multiple terms and phrases 
used in searches but the key ones which recurred were: ‘nutrition’, ‘ health’, ‘claims’, 
‘regulation’, ‘enforcement’. These were combined with modifiers such as: ‘behavioural 
economics’, ‘law’, ‘food’, ‘theory’, ‘practice’, ‘reform’ etc. 
In additional to the academic literature, the discussions between enforcement officers on the 
Local Government Knowledge Hub is a forum for enforcers to raise questions about their 
practice. The forum is not accessible to the public and membership is closed and by invitation 
only. The researcher was successful in being nominated for membership of the Food 
Standards and Labelling area of the Knowledge Hub which gave an indication into the key 
concerns around the Regulations. The discussions informed the research about the issues 
arising from the Regulations; for example, members shared their exasperation about the 
delays in the issue of the list of authorised claims by the European Union. The researcher did 
not contribute to the discussions as it was felt that it was more important to hear the 
unprompted and uninhibited views of those involved in enforcement practice (The Knowledge 
Hub, 2014). There are no quotes used in the study that are drawn from the discussion as the 
researcher had not obtained the permission of any of the participants.  
3.3 Research philosophy 
 
The ontological position suggests that enforcers’ knowledge, views, understandings, 
experiences, interpretations are meaningful properties of the social reality which the research 
questions are designed to explore. The epistemological position provides that speaking 
interactively with enforcers and asking questions and gaining access to their accounts is a 
meaningful and legitimate way to generate data, while bearing in mind and acknowledging 
that interviews rely heavily on the interviewee’s capacity to verbalise, interact, conceptualise 
and remember their experiences and thoughts on enforcement of the Regulations. The 
interview process is understood and acknowledged as subjective and that as knowledge may 
88 
 
not be separated from the knower, that subjectivity is an integral part of understanding the 
work. Consequently the researcher’s values are inherent to all phases of the inquiry process 
(Creswell, 2012). Interpretivism relies on the phenomenological understanding of reality 
gained intrasubjectively from sensory experience expressed  linguistically from moment to 
moment and day to day and that without interpretation there can be no understanding (Mishler, 
1990). In the words of Angen (2000) ‘what we can know of reality is socially constructed 
through our intersubjective experiences within the lived world, which results in a form of truth 
that is negotiated through dialogue’. (Angen, 2000). In relation to the interpretation of data 
from enforcers, ‘valid knowledge claims emerge as conflicting interpretations and action 
possibilities are discussed and negotiated among the members of a community’ (Kvale, 1996). 
Objectivity from an interpretative perspective is provided not by measurement of results or 
isolation of causative factors but from a faithfulness to the phenomena (Colaizzi, 1978). In 
doing so, the research question is carefully framed and the inquiry is carried out respectfully 
with due reverence to processes designed to ensure its integrity.  
It is integral to the chosen methodology that the ontological perspective of the work is 
established early in the process as it forms the logical underpinning to the study. The 
ontological perspective of the research is determined by interrogating the nature of the 
phenomena under investigation. It involves asking what is regarded as the very nature and 
essence of things in the social world (Mason, 2002).The ontological properties in this work 
include: people (enforcers), practices (their professional practice in relation to the NHCRs), 
experiences (how they have enforced the Regulations) interpretations of their duties as 
enforcers, legal and administrative structures and social processes. 
This is a social science study based on the idea of empiricism, i.e. that knowledge is gained 
from experience or observation of the world rather than theory (Aspin, 1995). Therefore the 
question of how enforcers enforce the law is approached by obtaining direct observable 
information about the world or data. The data collected was used to answer the research 
question posed by this study and to test the ideas or theories found in the related literature. 
Empiricism is one of several possible approaches used in social science research. Other 
examples are theoretical, conceptual or analytical research. This is a study on the enforcement 
of law rather than a legal study that might be expected to be found in, say, a doctorate of laws. 
This is an important distinction that needs to be made at this early juncture as legal research 
traditionally relies on the analysis of rules.  Moreover, legal research rarely makes use of 
primary data and research methods, in the sense that the subject is understood by social 
scientists, is not ordinarily taught to law students who do not generally undertake dissertations. 
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Therefore, research methods do not occupy the position in law that they enjoy in social 
science. Instead legal research, and, indeed, practice is driven by the application of deductive 
reasoning and drawing from analogy aimed at answering the question ‘what is the law?’ when 
faced with what Hart & Hart describe as the ‘open texture of rules’ (Hart and Hart, 2012). The 
collection of data has nothing to offer in respect of this question.   
Generally, lawyers are not concerned with why people behave in a particular way. Legal 
academics and practitioners are concerned with predicting the outcome of ‘hard cases’ based 
on recognised patterns of reasoning. It is not, as academics from other disciplines, unfairly 
claim, ‘a series of intellectual puzzles scattered among large areas of description’ practised 
by the ‘vociferous, untrustworthy, immoral, narrow and arrogant’ (Becher, 1981).   
The theory of law or, jurisprudence, finds that lawyers approach questions with certain 
assumptions about the nature of law. Legal theorists are further divided between natural 
lawyers  who hold that there is a connection between law and morality and those who believe 
that law is founded on human reason: positivists. The distinctions are illustrated by the 
difference in which the key concept of evidence is viewed by lawyers and by scientists. For 
lawyers, evidence is anything, which is probative of an assertion regulated by set of man-
made rules created to determine the admissibility and weight of information; whether that is 
oral testimony, real evidence or other information. For a scientist and social scientist evidence 
is data collected in accordance with scientific method, which may support or refute a theory. 
3.4 Gap in literature and contribution to knowledge 
 
The efficacy of a regulation in delivering the outcomes that were intended depends to a 
significant extent on how regulators enforce legislation. The outcomes are often described in 
economic terms of markets, effective competition and efficiency and regulatory intervention is 
justified by seeking to correct market failure (Posner, 1974) and to deliver consumer protection 
considered to be socially desirable (Ramsay, 1985).  
The question of how regulators actually behave in the real world has been approached from 
distinctly divergent disciplinary slants: as informed by political science (Weingast and Moran, 
1983), economics (Stigler, 1971) and behavioural theory and regulatory design (Thaler, 2008). 
The literature contains few studies based on how local government officials carry out their 
duties in obtaining compliance with their regulatory objectives. The apparent discretion that 
enforcers enjoy presents interesting but difficult choices about what action, if any, to take in 
particular cases. Save for the notable contributions that have focussed on the political factors 
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(Weingast and Moran, 1983; Olson, 1995) on regulatory actions, enforcers’ actions have come 
under relatively little scrutiny. However, a study by Harrison et al which explored the regulatory 
contentions of the 1990s in food policy and the nature of food regulation did so by observing 
the nature of food law implementation at a local level and the basis of the discretionary 
enforcement decisions made by trading standards and environmental health officers in their 
everyday working lives. ‘The intention was to get as close as possible to those involved in 
local-level food regulation to see how they give meaning to regulatory processes or ‘live them 
out’.’ The study involved interviewing local officers at a single London borough (Harrison et 
al., 1997). 
The methodological approaches in the literature have ranged from experimental and 
theoretical work in political science to the application of complex modelling techniques in 
economics. There are no studies that are based on the qualitative analysis of interviews with 
trading standards and environmental health officers. This study focusses on the enforcement 
of the Regulation EC 1924/2006 on Nutrition and Health Claims based on interviews with 
practising enforcement officers. As such, it represents a contribution to knowledge and a 
refinement and development of the current literature.  
The research question for this project may be ‘an investigation into the factors influencing the 
enforcement of health and nutrition claims under the NHCR 2007’. The overarching research 
question from which subsequent questions flow is: 
 How are nutrition and health claims made for food enforced? 
The subsequent, or sub-questions which flow from this are: 
 What kinds of ideas, norms and practices operate concerning the enforcement of 
health claims? 
 How are matters related to the decision to enforce negotiated and how do these link 
with other responsibilities of enforcers? 
 What is the interface between enforcement of food safety and health claims 
legislation? 
 Is there an underlying tension between the duties on enforcers to take action and the 
complexity of the issues, the size and resources of the food co and the application of 
the home authority principle? 
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The research questions are aligned with the chosen methodology and specific research 
methods and techniques by considering what data sources and methods are available and 
how they might address the questions. This is illustrated in the table below: 
  
92 
 
 
Table linking research questions and methods 
Research questions Data sources and 
methods 
Justification 
1. How are nutrition and 
health claims made for 
food enforced? 
 Trading 
standards 
officers 
(TSO): 
interviews 
Also possibly: 
 Case reports: 
analysis of 
reported 
cases 
 Industry: 
compliance 
managers in 
food 
businesses: 
interviews 
 Solicitors and 
other 
professional 
advisors: 
interviews 
 Interviews will provide 
TSO accounts of how they 
have handled 
enforcement based on 
their own experiences 
 Analysis of cases will 
reveal how cases are 
dealt with by the courts 
 Interviews with 
compliance managers 
and solicitors and other 
professional advisors will 
provide their accounts of 
how enforcers handle 
nutrition and health claims 
2. What kinds of ideas, 
norms and practices 
operate concerning the 
enforcement of health 
claims?  
 TSO: 
interviews 
Also possibly:  
 Industry: 
compliance 
managers in 
 Interviews providing TSO 
accounts and reported 
experiences and their 
judgements will reveal 
something of the kinds of 
ideas, norms and 
practices they operate in 
relation to enforcement. 
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food 
businesses 
 Solicitors and 
other 
professional 
advisors: 
interviews 
 
From this we should be 
able to discern whether 
enforcers have ideas 
about appropriate 
behaviour 
 Interviews with 
compliance managers 
and solicitors and other 
professionals may provide 
data on these issues as 
they will have experiences 
of representing their 
clients as defendants in 
enforcement action 
3. How are matters 
related to the decision 
to enforce negotiated 
and how do these link 
with other 
responsibilities of 
enforcers? 
 TSO: 
interviews 
 The accounts and 
experiences reported by 
TSO will reveal something 
of how they negotiate their 
own enforcement 
experiences in the context 
of their other duties 
4. What is the interface 
between enforcement 
of food safety and 
health claims 
legislation? 
 TSOs: 
interviews 
 Secondary 
sources: 
reports of 
cases of food 
safety actions 
 Interviews with TSOs will 
tell us something about 
their experience in dealing 
with and about the 
allocation of their 
resources between the 
two types of cases and the 
extent to which food safety 
may take precedence 
over nutrition and health 
claims enforcement 
 Case reports may yield 
data on the focus on such 
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cases by comparing and 
distinguishing between 
enforcement action 
related to safety and that 
related to nutrition and 
health claims 
5. Is there an underlying 
tension between the 
duties on enforcers to 
take action and the 
complexity of the 
issues, the size and 
resources of the food 
co and the application 
of the home authority 
principle? 
 All methods 
used in the 
study 
 A comparison of 
similarities and 
differences between the 
data yielded from the 
different sources will help 
to build a picture of 
whether there is a fit 
between the intended 
policy outcomes of the 
regulation and the 
enforcement 
infrastructure and practice  
 
 
Factors that influence the actions of enforcers may range from awareness of the regulation 
and the potential breach of the same. Regulators need to know about, understand, assess 
and act on the cases in relation to which they have powers. There is a cognitive process which 
takes place where a person is exposed to information, forms an assessment or evaluation that 
may or may not result in a behavioural response. The response may be systematic or heuristic 
(Chaiken and Maheswaran, 1994). Models of choice take into account how much thinking 
individuals are likely to do before making choices (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Examples of 
the factors that may be found to influence the enforcement decision making process include; 
awareness, motivation, time, financial resources, confidence, experience, attitude to risk or 
whether such action fits with managerial targets or alignment with departmental goals. These 
requirements are cumulative so that all of them are required to be in place before any action 
might be taken. 
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The term ‘enforcement’ is used to refer to all activities that a regulatory agency engages in to 
promote compliance with regulatory objectives (Law, 2006). This is broader than the economic 
approach to enforcement which adopts a cost benefit analysis approach where economic 
actors will comply with regulation if, and only if, the benefits of compliance exceed the costs 
(Mishan and Quah, 2007; Becker, 1974; Stigler, 1971). Enforcement in the economic view 
entails the setting of the optimal levels of monitoring and fine so ensure the desired level of 
compliance. However, this does not adequately characterise the enforcement practice of most 
regulators. Enforcers rely on the deterrent effect of the threat of prosecution in the courts. 
However, this is generally disproportionately expensive and necessarily only takes place ex 
post and therefore raises questions about its efficacy as an enforcement strategy. If enforcers 
such as trading standards or environmental health can offer benefits to business by helping 
firms achieve compliance than market failures may be overcome ex ante and court action may 
be avoided (Scholz, 1984). 
Having defined enforcement, and demarcated the issues arising from this study, it was 
necessary to determine the basis of the research in order so that the data may be classified 
and anchored in the scheme of knowledge epistemologically. This concerns the principles and 
rules by which it is decided that social phenomena under investigation here can be known. A 
study of enforcement of the NHCRs suggests an ontological position which says that 
individuals (enforcers) make decisions and hold attitudes and that those decisions and 
attitudes are meaningful components of the social world. This represents the ontological 
position in this research and encompasses the epistemology that individuals’ decision-making 
and attitudes are knowable.  
Determining the choice between paradigms of say, positivist and interpretive thought affected 
the choice of research method and data collection and in doing so articulated the purpose of 
the research (Van-Maanan, 1989). The purpose of the research was to examine the basis of 
enforcement of the law relating to health and nutrition claims and to establish what influencing 
factors and potential constraints exist on the enforcement of the law. 
This study is concerned with examining how enforcers act when faced with cases of non-
compliance and the theoretical aspects such as, the contrast between deciding between 
enforcement action designed to provide a deterrent or taking an advisory approach, derive 
from the data. As such, an inductive research strategy linking data and theory as associated 
with qualitative work is implemented. 
3.5 A quantitative or qualitative approach to the research question? 
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Empirical data may be characterised as quantitative or qualitative; in simple terms, the former 
is numbers and the latter words (Punch, 2013).  A qualitative or quantitative approach might 
have been adopted in relation to this research question. A quantitative approach to the 
question might have involved, for example, a survey of enforcers to measure the levels of 
enforcement action. Such measurement would claim robustness and this ‘hard’ data would be 
unambiguous (Bryman, 2012). A common quantitative approach in social science research of 
this nature would be the use of questionnaires administered by a trained researcher. If a 
quantitative approach was taken, the questions for enforcers would be related to actions taken 
to enforce nutrition and health claims with the specific goal of measuring the action taken. 
Quantitative research aims for objectivity by maintaining a distance between the researcher 
and participants which allows it to be replicable. In doing so it claims reliability and with careful 
representative sampling it allows the results to be generalizable. Therefore, a quantitative 
approach would allow broader conclusions about enforcement across England and Wales to 
be drawn based on the behaviour of enforcers in the sample.  
The generalizable nature of a quantitative approach may, at first sight, seem attractive; 
however, such a methodology carries with it some inherent weaknesses and risks when 
applied to the research question here. For example, a simple tally of the number of 
prosecutions that appeared to show an increase in the number of actions would not 
necessarily allow any useful conclusions about enforcement to be drawn as it may show that 
there are more nutrition and health claims made or on the other hand, it may show higher 
levels of breach. 
In the light of this, a qualitative approach was adopted. The potency of the qualitative approach 
is that it provides insights into the beliefs of enforcers and the logic they use when considering 
the enforcement of a nutrition and health claim. In comparing the responses of the various 
enforcers across a range of local authorities, it may be possible to assess the behaviours, 
perceptions and rationales that are specific to a particular culture, individual, department or 
organisation against those which appear to be more widely held. This is particularly relevant 
in the context of legislation implemented at a European level but enforced locally within a small 
area. In this way a qualitative approach provides contextual understanding derived from the 
rich data derived from the prolonged exposure to the participants in an unstructured natural 
environment (Bryman, 2012). 
The overarching research question; how are nutrition and health claims enforced demands an 
explanatory approach rather than an empirical one that seeks to find causal links or correlation 
in support of a theory which might go on to predict analogous or future behaviour. The concern 
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here is to understand social interaction rather than large scale trends; a ‘micro’ rather than a 
‘macro’ picture (Bryman, 2012). This does not exclude a quantitative analysis. Indeed, it is 
possible to conceive of how a quantitative approach might be applied as described above. But 
as stated by Mason (2006) ‘[t]he particular strengths of qualitative research lie in the 
knowledge it provides of the dynamics of social processes, and in its ability to answer the 
“how” and “why” questions’. The research questions and the data generated is concerned with 
the significance of context, in this case the professional working practices of enforcers. A 
distinctive strength of qualitative research lies in its intimate and habitual concern with context, 
with ‘the particular’, and with understanding of the situatedness of social experience, 
processes and change (Gillies and Edwards, 2005). The explanatory potency of a qualitative 
approach to the research questions here is furnished by ‘placing explanation at the centre of 
enquiry reflect[ing] an interest in the complexities of how and why things change and work as 
they do in certain contexts and circumstances (rather than, for example, what causes what)’ 
(Mason, 2006). Moreover the rationale of qualitative inquiry is based on the understanding 
that not all aspects of human experience may be understood through the reductionist 
measures of quantitative research (Giorgi, 1992).  
Interpretive inquiry may claim legitimacy including rigour and validity without bowing to the 
authority of positivism (Angen, 2000). ‘Instead, what we require is an interpretive approach to 
social enquiry that will enlarge and deepen our understanding’ (Angen, 2000). In this regard, 
the use of causal explanation is inappropriate to the goal of understanding and interpretation 
required for the study of human experience. The goal here is to understand the choices and 
decision making process of enforcers.  
3.6 Validity of the research 
 
While the systems of determining validity in quantitative analysis are well established, the 
questions about the scientific value of qualitative research and challenges to its legitimacy at 
least, until relatively lately, remained open and controversial (Bailey, 1997).   
In establishing validity, some qualitative researchers refuse to adopt quantitative measures or 
terminology claiming that it is a more creative process than the statistical analysis found in 
quantitative work. However, this is not to say that it is antithetical to creativity, insight and 
depth to address issues of validity and reliability. Qualitative researchers instead seek 
‘qualitative equivalents that parallel quantitative approaches to validity’ (Creswell, 2012). 
Creswell suggests a number of criteria and techniques for validity in a qualitative study. Of 
those criteria, the ones applied here are prolonged engagement i.e. the significant time spent 
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with each subject, and, triangulation, testing rival explanations and thick description. These 
criteria were applied in the course of the interview process and subsequent data handling and 
analysis. 
In the case of the first of these, the prolonged engagement and triangulation, the researcher 
spent between 45 minutes to one and a half hours with interviewees. In the course of this time, 
the interview discussion was concerned with the key research question related to the 
enforcement of NHCRs. In raising questions about the respondent’s professional practice, the 
researcher would approach the same questions from different angles and thus provide 
triangulation. For example, respondents would often say that the enforcement of NHCRs was 
not a high priority for their authority because non-compliance did not present an immediate 
risk to health. A further question was then raised about the resource allocated to such work 
and interviewees would admit that there was no specific agenda to carry out such enforcement 
and no resource attached to such work. 
The ideal of triangulation is that the same phenomenon is explored when using different data 
instruments. Here the problems associated with interviews such as biased or leading 
questions or partisan responses might be tested by reference to the actual behaviour of the 
subjects, for example by exploring the reports of cases and actions taken by enforcers. It is 
serendipitous that the work of food law enforcement is public and it is therefore widely reported 
in news media, by consumer groups and in legal reports. This observational data when 
compared with interview data provided a way to cross check the consistency of the data. 
The online forum for enforcers to exchange ideas of professional practice and to raise 
technical questions, The Food Standards and Labelling Section of the Knowledge Hub, (The 
Knowledge Hub, 2014) was also reviewed for consistency. Some of the respondents in the 
research are regular participants in this active forum. Therefore, reference to the data on the 
forum provided a direct way to triangulate the individual responses to specific questions with 
the way in which that particular individual had dealt with the same issue in the forum. It 
provided a way of comparing what the respondents say online when in discussion with their 
peers with what they said to the researcher in the privacy of a one-to-one interview. It is not 
possible to provide an example of this without revealing the identity of the subject. However, 
this anonymous example serves to illustrate the principle. A respondent is asked about the 
extent, if any, latitude is provided in relation to goods which are already labelled and are being 
sold and which have some time remaining before their use by date. The response in interview 
was that a pragmatic approach would be taken so that the supplier would not be required to 
withdraw and re-label or destroy all products with a non-compliant label. Equally, the period of 
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grace would not automatically be extended to the expiry of the shelf life simply because it was 
in the financial interests of the supplier and that it was inconvenient to recall the product. This 
was a matter which was discussed in the forum and the same issues and responses were 
found. Another example of such triangulation in practice is the issue of the scope of home and 
primary authority. When considering a claim for a beef product the prospective primary 
authority was prepared to allow another authority who was investigating the matter to proceed 
and merely asked to be kept informed about the outcome. This appears to contradict interview 
data where it was found that general practice was to defer to the primary authority. This does 
not weaken the credibility of the data but it rather offers the opportunity to understand the issue 
more deeply. It also acknowledges that ‘different kinds of data yield somewhat different results 
because different types of inquiry are sensitive to different real world nuances’ (Patton, 1999). 
Overall it was found that there was a high level of congruence between the accounts of the 
respondents so that material which might at first sight appear impressionistic is in fact 
grounded in the lived reality of the enforcement community. 
The most germane opportunity for triangulation arose during the course of this research in 
2012 with the publication of Spurious Claims for Health-care Products: An Experimental 
Approach to Evaluating Current UK Legislation and its Implementation   in the Medico Legal 
Journal Volume 80 p.1 (Rose et al., 2012). In this study, twelve volunteers submitted 39 
complaints about products which appeared to have health claims for which there was no 
evidence. The complaints were submitted to Consumer Direct, the government funded online 
consumer advice service which closed in 2012, and the responses of the various trading 
standards departments to which they were referred were followed. The study concluded from 
the varying outcomes, ranging from no response to amendment or withdrawal of the claim, 
that the regulation was ineffective. In fact, it is possible to draw entirely different conclusions 
from the study; for example, that the referral system between Consumer Direct and individual 
trading standards departments was flawed. Nevertheless, the study provides a different 
approach to the question; how do enforcers discharge their duties in relation to the NHCRs? 
The Rose study provides an opportunity to compare observational data with interview data. 
The findings of the study were not inconsistent with the findings in this research but it is 
interesting to note the differences in approach: where the Rose study with its focus solely on 
outcome was critical of enforcers’ responses to complaints, the interview approach provided 
an opportunity to probe in depth the decision making process of the enforcers and gave voice 
to their explanations for their actions which the Rose study did not do. As noted above, 
different kinds of data will yield different results as they reflect the complexities and nuances 
of the methodologies employed in each instance. 
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3.7 Data collection instrument – semi structured interview 
 
The focus of the study was to explore the attitudes, values and practices of enforcers when 
faced with the problem of non-compliance with the Regulation. Therefore, it was decided to 
interview those engaged in the day-to-day enforcement of the Regulation: namely trading 
standards and environmental health officers. It might be apposite to seek to interview those 
who are subject to enforcement action: namely food businesses. This would provide 
corroboration or contradiction of the enforcers’ accounts particularly in relation to questions of 
reasonableness and proportionality. Such a proposal presents challenges of identification of 
willing participants who are likely to be sensitive about discussing matters in which they are 
involved and where there has been enforcement action. However, it would provide an 
interesting alternative perspective on the question of the enforcement of the Regulation. 
The interview process used open-ended questions which were aimed at allowing respondents 
to engage in wide ranging discussions. A semi-structured interview of enforcers was employed 
as the key method of data collection to provide respondents with the latitude to articulate fully 
their responses to complex issues. The interviews were arranged by email and by telephone 
and they took place mainly at the respondents’ offices. However, in one case the respondent 
visited the researcher at home as this was the most convenient arrangement available. In two 
other cases, the respondents were working away from their offices and meetings were 
arranged in hotels. Therefore, in most cases the interviews took place in council offices that 
were familiar to the respondent. And where the interviews took place in other locations, this 
was at the specific request of the interviewee. In all cases the interview was carried out in an 
informal but professional style with a view to showing an appreciation for the interviewee’s 
cooperation and respect for their time. The atmosphere for all of the interviews was convivial 
and comfortable and therefore the respondents were open and honest rather than guarded 
and circumspect. In fact, this gave rise to the problem of respondents speaking about matters 
that were not strictly relevant to the research question. Where this happened, the researcher, 
allowed them to finish their point before lightly bringing the focus back to the matter in hand 
by putting a new question to them. 
All of the interviews were recorded using a digital recorder after obtaining the express consent 
from each interviewee. By recording the interview, the researcher was able to focus on the 
conversation rather than have to concern themselves with making notes.  
An interview guide was created for the interviews so to ensure a consistency of approach and 
to ensure that all the key areas were covered in all of the interviews. The interview guide was 
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not a list of fixed questions to be asked in a predefined order as this would be inflexible and 
could result in an artificial and stifled exchange. However, each interview was different in 
reflecting the differences in the experiences, language, articulacy, candour and values of the 
respondent. It was important to explore the contextual nuances of a response by following up 
initial responses. In all of the interviews, the respondent is allowed to speak for most of the 
time, only being directed towards a general area with open questions. The interviewer listened 
carefully to the response and affirmed it by summing up the point made. This often led 
automatically to a second more revelatory response from the interviewee who felt more 
comfortable and confident in sharing their views. The interview guide is reproduced below. It 
should be noted that the interviewer learned the structure and questions to allow the smooth 
flow of the conversation rather than allow it to be interrupted by referring to the guide during 
the interview process. 
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Table 2 The interview guide 
Loose structure/format of interview 
 
Introductory explanation 
↓ 
Brief personal characteristics, work history 
↓ 
Experience of NH claims enforcement 
↓ 
Specific questions (if not covered elsewhere) 
↓ 
Questions about decision making, priorities, resources, skills 
 
 
  
[Type a quote 
from the 
document or 
the summary of 
an interesting 
point. You can 
position the text 
box anywhere in 
the document. 
Use the Drawing 
Tools tab to 
change the 
formatting of 
the pull quote 
text box.] 
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Specific topics and issues 
 
Experience of enforcement: as a trading standards officer; advising business, dealing with 
complaints, prosecutions, routine inspections 
NH claims enforcement and other aspects of TSO duties; enforcement of NH claims, 
application of home authority and primary authority principles 
Barriers to enforcement: Risk, large business and small businesses , confidence, skills, 
resources, support  
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Interview Guide with questions 
Enforcement of the Nutrition and Health Claims Regulations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this interview is to get information that will help me to understand how the NH claims 
are enforced. As a TSO you are in a unique position to describe how the NHCRs are enforced from your 
point of view. And that’s what the interview is about. I’d like to know about your experiences and your 
thoughts about your experiences. 
The answers from all of the people we interview will be combined for the report. Nothing you say will 
be identified with you personally. As we go through the interview, if you have any questions about 
why I am asking about something, please feel free to ask. Or if there is something you don’t want to 
answer, just say so. The purpose of the interview is to get your insights about how the enforcement 
of the regulation is working. 
I’d like to record the interview so that I don’t miss any of it. Is that ok with you? 
Any questions before we begin? 
 
Brief personal characteristics of interviewee 
Section 1 
What is your job title? 
Describe your main duties 
How long have you been involved in the enforcement of food law? 
Are you involved in the enforcement of food law generally? 
What other areas of food law enforcement are you involved in? E.g. food safety 
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Section 2 
Research questions to which this part of the interview relates 
 How are nutrition and health claims made for food enforced? 
 What is the interface between enforcement of food safety and health claims legislation? 
 
The next questions are about your experience of enforcement of NH claims… 
What experience do you have of enforcement of NH claims? 
Have you been involved in the prosecution of a NH claim? Please describe your experience in relation 
to the case(s) you have been involved with.  
How does the home authority principle affect your enforcement of the regulations? 
Suppose you received a complaint about a NH claim. How would you respond to such a complaint? 
Have you felt unable to act in response to a breach?  
What are the constraints on your being able to take enforcement action if there are any? 
What can be improved… 
Resources? 
Time? 
Risk? 
Support? 
Expertise? 
 
 
Section 3 
Research question to which this part of the interview relates 
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 What kinds of ideas, norms and practices operate concerning the enforcement of health 
claims? 
 Is there an underlying tension between the duties on enforcers to take action and the 
complexity of the issues, the size and resources of the food co and the application of the home 
authority principle? 
 
The next questions are purposefully vague so you can respond in a way that makes sense to you. They 
are aimed at getting your perspective…  
You say that you are familiar with the regulation… 
What do you think about the enforcement of the regulation of health and nutrition claims? 
Based on your experience, if none, your opinion, what problems are there with enforcement? 
The regulations came into force in 2007. What difference have the regulations made? For example, 
are you more or less likely to take action for NH claims since the regulations came into force. 
 
 
 
Probes for getting the interviewee to elaborate… 
 Would you elaborate on that? 
 Could you say more about that? 
 That’s helpful. I’d appreciate it if you could give me more detail 
 I’m beginning to get the picture. 
 I think I’m beginning to understand. 
 Let me make sure I’ve got down exactly what you said, then I’d like to ask you to say some 
more on that. 
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The interviews had a more informal conversational style than would be found in a highly 
structured process. As a result, the precise wording and order of the questions in each 
encounter varied depending on the direction of the conversation. The differences in the order 
and wording were felt to be costs worth paying in return for the conversational flow, openness 
and in-depth reflections of the interviewees. 
A further advantage of open-ended questions is that such an approach paid due respect to 
interviewees’ opinions and their professional experience. As Aberbach & Rockman (2002) 
note ‘elites especially – but other highly educated people as well – do not like being put in the 
straight [sic] jacket of close-ended questions. They prefer to articulate their views, explaining 
why they think what they think.’ (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). Moreover, open-ended 
questions allowed respondents to organise their answers within their own frameworks and 
thereby enhancing the validity of the responses. 
There was a sharp learning curve for the researcher in the interviewing process whereby the 
later interviews were more fluent when compared to the more self-conscious efforts at the start 
of the process. After the first few interviews, the interviewer had grown in confidence and had 
honed in a style that was informal but focussed. As such, the later interviews were more 
efficient and focussed but equally thorough. As the interviewees are all busy enforcers who 
were interviewed on their work time, it was important that the duration of the interview was 
kept to a minimum necessary and that the interviewees were able to appreciate the relevance 
of the questions that were put to them. 
It should be acknowledged that interviewing subjects carries inherent challenges in that the 
data cannot be easily measured and assessed. Such a qualitative approach leans towards an 
interpretive method (Van-Maanan, 1989). The aim of interviews would be to illuminate and 
grasp the logic of enforcers’ decisions in relation to the enforcement of the NHCRs. This would 
be a step towards measuring the effectiveness of the regulation by an improved understanding 
of the appropriateness of the enforcement regime for nutrition and health claims. 
The interview has been described as a ‘conversation with a purpose’ (Burgess, 1988). The 
purpose being ‘to allow us to enter into the other person’s perspective’(Patton, 1990). A 
qualitative approach to the choices of the enforcers examines those choices from the 
enforcer’s point of view using a range of approaches which might include observation as a 
measure of what action is taken by enforcers. ‘The issue is not whether observational data is 
more desirable, valid, or meaningful than self-report data. The fact of the matter is that we 
cannot observe everything. We cannot observe feelings, thoughts, and intention’(Patton, 
1990). Such a method may be impractical and limited. Observing the actions of the enforcers 
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may prove haphazard in that there would be a high risk of not seeing anything that added to 
the picture and as a result it would yield a poor return for the investment of a large amount of 
time.  
The semi-structured interview provides an organised but informal approach to data collection 
and attempts to distinguish between what individuals think, what they say, and what they do. 
It tries to unravel the normative responses where respondents tell researchers that which they 
feel the interviewer wishes to hear and what they ought to say to present the desired image of 
themselves or their organisation. The approach is aimed at uncovering actual behaviour and 
the reasons for it. 
A pragmatic justification of the use of the use of semi-structured interviews is that the research 
question; how are nutrition and health claims made for food enforced? , can only be answered 
by interviewing enforcers. Although other methods shown in the table may provide 
corroboration, the core data sought may not be available by any means other than interviewing 
enforcers. Therefore, as shown in the table, interviewing enforcers is a necessary but not 
exclusive means by which the research questions may be answered. 
Most studies based on self-report data collected as a result of interviews acknowledge 
artificiality of the forced response in the interview (Becker and Geer, 1957). In this case, this 
may be the difference between what enforcers claim in interview and what they actually do in 
practice. The responses of interviewees may be based on their own experiences or a 
professional view that is reinforced by perpetuation and repetition filtered through managers 
and colleagues. Finally there is a risk that the answers from respondents may be entirely 
capricious, a view that is not reflected on or considered and at all and provided spontaneously 
and which may not be repeated (Conrad and Blair, 2004). 
The main limitation of the research is that which is common to all qualitative research; that the 
results are based on detailed analysis of a relatively small number of subjects when compared 
with the numbers of respondents involved in quantitative studies. The question of the number 
of interviewees is determined by the research question; there should be access to enough 
relevant data so that the research question may be addressed and to develop theory and 
descriptions that take into account specific contexts (Berg and Lune, 2004).  It is stated that 
‘interviews with 15-30 carefully selected respondents is usually enough to identify most of the 
beliefs and representations that will be found in the whole population’(Leathwood et al., 2007).  
3.8 Reflexivity and the role of the researcher 
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The responses of the subjects in qualitative studies, in this case, the enforcers, may be specific 
to their own cultural context, therefore it is necessary to avoid preconceptions and prejudicial 
judgements about the data (Creswell et al., 2007). Interviewing in a qualitative study involves 
the interviewer in an active and reflexive role. The researcher is the instrument in qualitative 
enquiry. It is important to analyse the data and draw conclusions from it rather than to be 
influenced by the prejudices of the researcher. It is not possible to eliminate entirely the 
researcher’s influence but a high level of self-awareness is required in respect of that influence 
and its impact on the data collection, analysis and interpretation which serves to enhance the 
understanding of the discussion (Maxwell, 2005). For this reason, it is important to outline the 
experience and training the experience that the researcher brings to the field.  
The researcher has a strong legal background of having spent 15 years in legal practice as a 
solicitor specialising in consumer and business law. This legal perspective brings a deep 
understanding of the substantial and procedural legal issues and the benefit of an analytical 
approach. It also brings with it some preconceptions about the nature of postgraduate 
research. The researcher finds himself at the intersection between research in law and the 
social sciences and there are sufficient differences between these worlds to hamper 
communication and for each to regard the other with a little suspicion. While this did not 
materially affect the research, it was helpful for the researcher to be aware of such differences 
between disciplines.  
Since 2006, the researcher has been employed as a senior lecturer at Manchester 
Metropolitan University. In this post, the researcher has taught on the BSc and postgraduate 
Trading Standards and Environmental Health programmes. This experience has provided an 
insight into the work of enforcers and it also provided a starting point for access to 
respondents. Indeed the University is known among the profession as a key source of 
undergraduate recruits and a significant number of the respondents are graduates from the 
programmes. In the interests of transparency, the researcher should make clear that two of 
the respondents were graduates from the University and were taught by researcher while 
working at the University. It is not felt however that this has made any difference to their 
responses.  
A standard interview guide was prepared in advance to reduce variation arising from the 
circumstances of the individual interviews and to enhance legitimacy and credibility by 
collecting the same information from all respondents. The topics and issues to be covered 
were notified to the respondent in advance and this increased the comprehensiveness of the 
data and made the data collection systematic and allowed for improved analysis and 
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comparison between responses. However, comparisons were not at the level of quantification 
of responses to particular questions or contrasting the differences in enforcers’ answers to the 
same questions. The points of comparison were conceptual; drawing on and identifying 
themes in the data and determined by the research questions. At the same time, the semi 
structured approach of interviews allowed for more flexibility and exploration of issues which 
were not set out in the guide. The data were derived from the interaction between the 
researcher and the interviewee in the interview process. The analysis seeks to understand the 
complexities of the interaction rather than to minimise bias by standardisation. 
The questions posed to enforcers were about their behaviour and experience and their 
opinions of the past present and future for enforcement of nutrition and health claims. To place 
those answers in context there are further questions about background and demographics 
e.g. age and the length of time working in an enforcement role. 
Asking questions is an art as Payne (1951) observed. ‘The way a question is worded is one 
of the most important elements determining how the interviewee will respond’ (Patton, 1990). 
The wording of the questions has been considered so that they are open-ended, neutral, 
singular and clear (Fontana and Frey, 1994). Dichotomous and leading questions that suggest 
answers were avoided however, the presuppositions are used to enhance the quality of the 
descriptions responses particularly where such a response may be critical of the regulation or 
the infrastructure for enforcement, and, by implication of employers. In all of the interviews the 
researcher was unaware of any reason to question the honesty or integrity of the respondents’ 
answers and felt that the responses provided were genuine.    
3.9 Sampling 
 
The recruitment of participants and sites is purposeful in that they are chosen because they 
can inform an understanding of the research problem and the central phenomenon in the 
study. The participants will be those who are best placed to provide meaningful answers to 
the research question based on their knowledge and expertise. There are 353 local authorities 
in England (HM Government) most of whom have a trading standards or regulatory 
department within them. There are several thousand trading standards officers. The sample 
of interviewees here has a regional bias towards the North West of England. It is opportunistic 
in that it is influenced by the constraints of resources such as time and travel costs. It is also 
determined by who was available and willing to be interviewed; a self-selection process is at 
work where those who come forward and provide substantial responses are those who are 
involved in the enforcement of nutrition and health claims rather than other trading standards 
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work. This may result in a bias towards enforcement action and such positive bias along with 
geographical factors  must be considered in reviewing the results (Williams Jr, 1964). 
Trading standards officers are from a wide range of backgrounds, varying in age and 
education and both male and female.  The specific personal characteristics of enforcers for 
example, their age or sex, were not deemed to be relevant factors in influencing the responses 
relevant to the research question. However, the experience of officers, and in particular their 
involvement in challenging food claims may be expected to determine the data collected. 
There are thousands of trading standards officers, some of whom who may be at any one 
point in time, involved in the enforcement of nutrition and health claims. It is not practical to 
interview them all. Nor is it desirable to do so if the study is to be focussed, seeking depth and 
complexity. In the words of Mason (2002) ‘the concept of sampling from a wider universe 
implies that selections other than the ones you have made would have been possible, and this 
means you need to have and to demonstrate a clear sense of the rationale for your choices’. 
As this is qualitative work, the logic of probability and empirical representation of a wider group 
is substituted by a strategic approach to sampling. The sample captures the relevant range of 
constituent who might provide data that addresses the research questions or intellectual 
puzzle of how a social process works, here the enforcement of the regulations, rather than 
seeking to represent the wider universe. The sample was selected because it developed and 
tested the theory and the argument of the thesis and enable comparisons to be made to test 
the argument. In this respect interviewees who are known for their expertise and experience 
in enforcement of the regulations or in food standards were chosen. The purpose of the 
sample here was to illustrate or evoke the relationship between the contexts and the 
phenomena that were sampled rather than to seek to represent the wider population. 
3.10 Sample size, selection and choice of subjects 
 
Unlike with quantitative research methods where a power calculation based on the total 
number of potential respondents may provide a way of deciding the sufficiency of a sample 
size, with qualitative research there is no such equivalent and precise way of determining the 
sample size (Morse, 1991).  
In the course of this research, twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
respondents.  According to Morse the sample size depends on; ‘the quality of data, the scope 
of the study, the nature of the topic, the amount of useful information obtained from each 
participant…’ 
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In the light of the clearly defined and narrow scope of the research as an investigation into the 
practices and norms applied in the enforcement of the Regulations, the number of respondents 
was felt to be sufficient. A non-probability purposive sample was chosen to capture those who 
are most likely to provide useful insights to the practice of enforcement in the relevant area. In 
addition, the interviews were intended to maximize the quality, richness and usefulness of the 
interviews. The questions were direct rather than aimed at probing at a phenomena beneath 
the surface intention was to optimize the efficacy of the interaction and this requires fewer 
interviews. 
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Table 3 showing names, roles and level of seniority of respondents 
 
Name  Area of regulation Officer, team leader or management 
responsibility 
Chloe Trading Standards Supervisor 
Millie Trading Standards Manager 
William Trading Standards Supervisor 
Ethan Trading Standards Officer 
Jessica Environmental Health Supervisor 
Julie Trading Standards Officer 
Sophie Environmental Health  Manager  
Scarlett Trading Standards  Officer 
James Trading Standards  Officer 
Charlotte Environmental Health Officer  
Jacob Environmental Health Officer 
Dexter and 
Theo 
Environmental Health, Trading 
Standards  
Director, Manager 
Isaac  Trading Standards  Officer 
Mia and Cate Trading Standards, Trading 
Standards 
Officer, Supervisor 
Ruby Trading Standards  Supervisor 
Sienna Trading Standards   Officer 
Samuel Environmental Health  Manager 
Amelia Trading Standards Supervisor 
 
 Table showing names, areas of responsibility for regulation and level for interviewees 
 Total number of interviews:18 
 Total number of respondents: 20 
 Of whom employed in Trading Standards: 14 
 Of whom employed in Environmental Health: 6 
 Number of respondents employed at officer level: 9 
 Number of respondents employed in supervisory positions or above: 11 
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NB real names have been substituted with fictional names 
3.11 Data saturation 
 
The most important determinant of sample size in qualitative research is that of data 
saturation; ‘when the collection of new data does not shed any further light on the issue under 
investigation’ (Glaser & Strauss 1967). The point at which saturation is reached depends to a 
large extent on the aim of the study and that a study with broader general aims might require 
a larger sample than one with more precisely defined aims. A small study with ‘modest claims’ 
would achieve saturation more quickly than a more ambitious project (Charmaz, 2011). 
In the study by Condon-Paoloni et al (2015) which involved a qualitative analysis of interviews 
with environmental health officers in Australia, the authors described how interviews ceased 
when ‘no new themes and ideas were being reported’ (Patton, 1990). In both cases, the 
interviews were restricted to practising food law enforcement specialists only. It is posited that 
the deliberate and highly selective process applied so that only the most knowledgeable 
candidates were interviewed, has the effect of reducing the required number of participants in 
the study.  
From a professional point of view, and in other respects such as education, training, 
experience and social background the participants are a reasonably homogeneous group, 
which also reduced the requirement for a larger group of participants. In addition, the 
researcher’s expertise in the field of consumer law enforcement and therefore ability to direct 
the interview process  to provide the most relevant and high quality information have the effect 
of reducing the number of participants needed in the study (Jette et al., 2003). 
Given the importance of saturation as the key determinant of sample size in qualitative 
research the concept is worthy of closer examination. In applying the concept in this study of 
the enforcement of nutrition and health claims, it is possible to claim saturation early, 
particularly, in the light of the factors described above. However, it may also be possible to 
explore the context of the practice of enforcement in more detail and what it means to each of 
the participants.  In this respect, it may be that the longer that data are examined there will 
always be the potential for the ‘new to emerge’. (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Therefore a 
‘tighter’ approach to the concept of saturation is needed and this is proffered as the idea that 
saturation is reached when ‘the new’ may emerge but which does not necessarily add anything 
to the overall story, model or framework (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
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The approach adopted in this study was that of saturation and therefore it was not possible at 
the outset to decide on a sample size prior to data collection. It was found in the literature 
review that similar qualitative studies ranged from 15-30 interviews with subjects and this 
finding is corroborated by the findings of Mason in ‘Sample Size and Saturation in PhD Studies 
Using Qualitative Interviews’ (Mason, 2010). From this, it was possible to envisage the range 
but not the precise number of interviews that would be required. Data saturation is easily 
claimed but difficult to prove. This researcher’s experience was that there was a steeply 
diminishing return after each interview and that new information that was relevant to the study 
had been reduced to the very occasional idea around the mid-point of 10 interviews. The 
researcher was confident that data saturation was reached by the twelfth interview. This view 
is based on the fact that coding the data was well underway by this stage and it was not 
necessary to create any new categories for classification when analysing the data.  In fact, no 
new codes were returned after the analysis of the twelfth interview.  According to Guest et al 
(2006) a study with a high level of homogeneity among its population ‘a sample of six 
interviews may be sufficient to enable development of meaningful themes and useful 
interpretations’ (Guest et al., 2006). This finding is consistent with the statement that; ‘the 
experience of most qualitative researchers is that in interview studies little that is ‘new’ comes 
out of transcripts after you have interviewed 20 or so people’ (Green and Thorogood, 2009). 
At the time of the interviews, the respondents were all employed as either trading standards 
or environmental health officers within the regulatory services of local authorities located 
predominantly, but not exclusively, in North West England.  
The work of trading standards and environmental health covers a broad range of areas and 
regulatory services departments are organized so that staff will specialize in a particular type 
of work. For example, some officers might work on food whereas others will work on housing 
or counterfeit goods. However, the duties of individual officers would be reflected only in the 
internal organization of the department and would not be apparent to anyone outside of it. The 
challenge for this research was to ensure that the interviews were conducted with respondents 
who would have a sufficiently detailed knowledge of food law enforcement and, in particular, 
of the Regulations to be able to provide informed and detailed answers to the questions raised 
and thus ensuring the quality and richness of the data required. In this respect all of the 
respondents were specialists in food law enforcement and were qualified to carry our food law 
enforcement under the regulatory requirements of their professional bodies; either the Trading 
Standards Institute or Chartered Institute of Environmental Health. Each of the respondents 
had high exposure to the task of the enforcement of the Regulations as part of their everyday 
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duties. In addition, 11 of the 20 had responsibility for the supervision of others in their teams 
who were also charged with the enforcement of the Regulations.  
3.12 Access 
 
The researcher had some access to the sample frame by their position as an experienced 
consumer lawyer who has worked in the field for some years. More specifically, since 2006 
the researcher has been employed as a lecturer on the BSc Trading Standards and BSc 
Environmental Health programmes run at Manchester Metropolitan University, one of the key 
providers of training to the enforcement professions. Therefore, when corresponding with the 
subjects the researcher’s identity and that of their workplace was recognized and this allowed 
the subjects to trust the researcher and to grant the interview.  The researcher is of the opinion 
that, in most cases, access would not have been granted to someone without similar 
credentials. 
The researcher approached known contacts within the professions who held senior 
management positions within local authorities and their professional statutory and regulatory 
bodies for advice about how to identify the key specialists in the enforcement of the 
Regulations. In following this advice the researcher was able to identify the leading specialists. 
Some of the respondents are formally recognized as leading authorities in food law 
enforcement. The initial subjects were identified by this method of selection. Many of the 
subjects were involved with the work of a specialist food law enforcement forum aimed at 
developing approaches to enforcement and sharing best practice and influencing the 
development of enforcement policy at a national level. 
Once the key individuals were identified, the researcher approached them individually by 
email. The email is reproduced at Appendix x. It will be noted that the area of the research is 
identified and that assurances regarding confidentiality are provided in that email as well and 
a request for the recipient to contact the researcher is made. There were few responses to the 
email. This is consistent with the experience of most researchers where the response rate to 
requests for an interview is generally low. However, the approach did allow for the initial 
access to the key individuals.  
3.12.1 Snowballing or chain referral of interviewees 
The interviewees were selected by a system of referral. On identifying an officer specializing 
in food law enforcement at the time of interview and at the subsequent correspondence the 
interviewee was asked for suggestions for names of other enforcers who might be in a position 
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to provide similar data. This ‘snowballing’ or chain referral is an established and widely used 
method of sampling in qualitative interviews, particularly when the interviewees are difficult to 
identify and there are difficulties in gaining access to them (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). 
Finding respondents presented no difficulty, in that, as enforcement officers employed by local 
authorities, they were a clearly visible group. However access to the group was more difficult 
due to the political and sensitive nature of their duties and the scrutiny and criticism to which 
they are subjected, as described below. Each interviewee was asked to nominate one or more 
other officer specialising in similar work who they felt would be able to provide answers to the 
questions under investigation. It turned out that many of the respondents were members of a 
specialist food law enforcement forum and who therefore got to know each other through this 
shared interest in their specialism.  
The referrals made were predominately to other enforcers based in North West England and 
this was due to networks which operated across the region. The interviews were carried out 
face to face at the respondents’ offices and therefore it was valuable for the researcher to be 
able to travel to and back from the interview within a reasonable time, usually within 2-3 hours 
in total. Had the respondents been located in more distant locations, the costs in time and 
travel expenses of attending the interviews would have been prohibitive.  
That said, there were key individuals who were based in other parts of the UK who were 
interviewed because of their status as known experts. The locations of those experts are not 
provided to safeguard their anonymity.  
While the researcher relied upon the referrer to nominate a person whom they thought to be 
suitably qualified, the verification of the respondent’s qualifications and eligibility to provide 
useable data was carried out by setting out the purpose of the research in the email request 
and asking questions about their work by telephone when arranging interviews. Furthermore, 
at the start of the interview process, the respondents were asked about their current work and 
their past experience of food law enforcement and particularly about the enforcement of 
nutrition and health claims. In this way, several potential respondents were excluded at an 
early stage as having insufficient relevant knowledge and experience of the area under 
investigation.   
3.12.2 Difficulties in obtaining interviews - the effect of horsemeat 2013? 
During the period of the data gathering the work of enforcers was under intense scrutiny in the 
media which reached a peak with what is generally known as the ‘horsemeat’ scandal. This 
coincided with severe austerity measures at local authorities and the swinging cuts to their 
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budgets were most keenly felt among regulatory services. One respondent reported that the 
service was reduced to 25% of its pre-2007 capacity. At the same time, the political 
environment changed from 2010 with the election of a coalition government with a clear 
deregulatory agenda and a view perpetuated at ministerial level of local authorities as a barrier 
to business (Government, 2013). In the light of this, there was some trepidation and suspicion 
among interviewees and this presented problems of access notwithstanding the high levels of 
trust and familiarity enjoyed by the researcher. 
At the start of the interview process in July 2012 the interviews with the subjects were 
organized and conducted quickly and without obstructions. However within six months the 
researcher began to experience serious difficulties in obtaining the agreement of subjects to 
take part in interviews. The subjects were found to be reluctant to take part and would often 
not respond to repeated attempts to contact them by telephone or by email. 
It is suspected that the reason for this apparent reluctance to be interviewed arose from 
reasons connected with the meat adulteration scandal, which was first reported on 16 January 
2013. The Food Safety Authority of Ireland announced that it had discovered the presence of 
equine DNA at varying levels in a number of the products, which it had tested in particular in 
ready meals, and burgers, which were being sold in large supermarket chains across Britain 
and Ireland. The revelation resulted in an enormous amount of media coverage and 
subsequent enquiries and investigations. Of course, food standards enforcement officers were 
at the forefront of such investigations and amongst other things, questions were raised about 
the efficacy of the methods and system of enforcement of food law in the UK and Ireland.  
The researcher suspects that at this stage, trading standards and environmental health 
officers were required to ensure that their operations would stand up to the intense scrutiny 
that they were put under and in the light of this attention the media relations and 
communications departments of the local authorities in which they worked sought to control 
communications which might in any way be seen as potentially harmful to the reputation of 
the organization and which may lead to criticism of their work.  
It is the view of the researcher that the horsemeat scandal led to a feeling of distrust among 
subjects who were advised against speaking with anyone who might seek to probe into their 
work. Of course, it is not possible to attribute the lack of responses to requests for interviews 
directly to the horsemeat scandal, it may have been a coincidence. But there was certainly a 
period from January 2013 to May 2014 when there was a froideur in response to requests for 
interviews. Notwithstanding efforts to provide assurances about the differences between 
providing assistance with academic research and speaking with media it was impossible to 
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arrange an interview during that time. The daily onslaught of media stories about food 
adulteration meant that enforcement professions had become acutely sensitive of the scrutiny 
which they had come under, and it was proving impossible to coax them into providing any 
sort of assistance. It seemed that the trust, which had previously existed between the 
regulatory services and media, had dissipated. At the start of that period, the researcher 
transcribed the interviews which had been conducted and began the process of entering the 
data into the qualitative data analysis software, Nvivo. 
However, as far as gathering new data was concerned the research had come to a halt at that 
stage and discussions were held with the supervisory team about the possible alternative 
approaches that might be applied and how the lack of response to requests for interviews 
might be managed. 
A breakthrough came in May 2014 when the interviewer received a recommendation to 
interview a particular person who by virtue of their position was widely perceived to be a 
leading figure in food law enforcement. (The researcher is unable to describe the basis of this 
assessment without disturbing the assurances of confidentiality that were provided to all 
subjects. It would not be possible to provide more information about this person without the 
risk of revealing their identity and therefore compromising the ethical standards under which 
the research was carried out). 
The interview with this subject was carried out and during the meeting the researcher 
explained the difficulties that were faced in obtaining interviews. The subject offered to assist 
and in doing so sent a request to their counterparts in other local authorities. The request 
elicited the sort of positive response that the researcher had been unable to secure without 
their assistance. The interviewee acted as a de facto research assistant who was able to use 
their position to make contacts with respondents more effectively than the researchers could 
(Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). The subject acted as a locator or significant informer who by 
reason of their experience was able to act as a reliable source of referral to 6 of the 
interviewees. In considering the risk of this one subject influencing the sample, there were no 
observable differences between this sector and others in the whole sample.  
As a result the researcher was able to carry out a series of subsequent interviews. The 
researcher is of the view that without such assistance it would have been impossible to 
complete the project in the way it was planned.  In addition, that it was the highly trusted status 
of the individual subject and the high regard in which they were held as professionals that 
facilitated the subsequent interviews to be held and the data to be gathered. The particular 
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methodological problems that are encountered and resolved reflect the singularity of the 
phenomena being investigated (Becker, 1996).  
3.13 Transcription 
 
The researcher has personally transcribed 13 of the 18 interviews. The transcription afforded 
the opportunity to become close to the data and as the transcription was carried out 
immediately after the interview, it consolidated the researcher’s understanding of what was 
said. The transcription would take place in the intervals between interviews. This allowed the 
researcher the opportunity to understand the nature of the dialogue and which questions 
worked best and therefore to hone in the interview to make it more effective. However, the 
process of transcribing is extremely time consuming and the researcher was fortunate to be 
able to sub contract the later interviews to an experienced transcriber employed at the 
University. 
The transcripts were checked by the researcher and it was interesting to note the difference 
in the transcripts. On comparison of the transcripts it was found that the researcher’s 
transcripts took a more interventionist editorial approach by omitting words and phrases which 
were considered to be irrelevant to the overall research questions. Also, where there were 
words and phrases that were effectively pauses for thought or represented the breaks and 
flow between sentences, and were therefore fillers, in that they were not purposeful or contain 
any meaning, these were readily removed by the researcher when transcribing but they would 
be retained by the contracted transcriber who was more reluctant to take such editorial 
decisions without consultation. These approaches reflect the differences between the ‘two 
dominant modes: naturalism, in which every utterance is transcribed in as much detail as 
possible, and denaturalism, in which idiosyncratic elements of speech (e.g. stutters, pauses, 
non-verbals, involuntary vocalisations) are removed’ (Oliver et al., 2005). The justification for 
a naturalist approach is that it is preserves the integrity of the data and the voice of the 
respondent. The denaturalist approach is focussed on extracting meaning from the speech 
and translating it to the text.  
Most researchers, including this one, use a hybrid of naturalism and denaturalism making 
decisions based on their epistemological position and their assessment of how their research 
objectives are best served. In this research the concepts and questions arising from them are 
explicit and manifest and while there was some sensitivity on the part of some respondents in 
providing detailed answers about their way of working, generally the researcher sensed that 
the respondents felt comfortable and able to provide open answers to the questions raised. 
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As such the researcher was justified in employing a process of condensing, that is, ‘shortening 
while preserving the core’ (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). In the light of this context and 
the fact that there was little latent meaning or interpretation to be read into what was left unsaid 
that would inform the research question the researcher was able to justify the intervention. For 
consistency and for confirmation of the credibility of the approach the researcher carried out 
the editing of the contracted transcriptions at the analysis stage.  
3.14 Thematic analysis 
 
Once the data were collected and transcribed from the interviews the transcripts were 
uploaded into the QSR NVivo data management programme and a thorough process of data 
coding and the identification of themes was then commenced. The coding process involved 
recognition of a significant statement and encoding it (Boyatzis, 1998) and a useful code was 
one that captured the qualitative richness of the phenomenon.  
Thematic analysis involves the search for themes which emerge from the data that are 
relevant to the research question. This was done by the close and repeated reviewing of the 
transcripts to find patterns in the data where emerging themes become the categories for 
coding and analysis. This is the data driven inductive approach of Boyatzis (1998). Examples 
of the codes that were generated in this way are; the use of risk assessment in determining 
enforcement action; the influence of the central government organisation and support and 
references to resources. Such codes were then further split into ‘child nodes’ and, from there, 
further grandchild nodes might emerge. By encoding the data it was possible to organise it to 
identify and develop themes.  
As each interview transcript was encoded, further interviews were being undertaken and more 
data were gathered. As the data collection and analysis were carried out concurrently it was 
possible to review the interview process in the light of the analysis in order to ensure that the 
themes did emerge from the data. 
3.15 Limitations 
 
The interviews were carried out during the period from June 2012 to May 2014. Therefore, 
strictly speaking, the interviews provide a snapshot of enforcers’ experience during that period. 
When interviewed respondents are most influenced by their most recent experiences which 
are still vivid in their recollections. In addition, people, including enforcers tend to attach most 
significance to matters that are reported and which receive most attention and that may not 
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actually reflect actual risk of detriment to consumers.  Even though it is hoped that this study 
accurately reflects the present position, circumstances may change, even at the time of 
writing. There will be new cases of commercial communications which potentially infringe the 
Regulation on nutrition and health claims which enforcement officers are responding to that 
might be reshaping enforcement practice. A single event, for example, a court ruling on the 
application of the Regulation or a media focus on nutrition and health claims may change the 
enforcement landscape. In particular, it may push nutrition and health claims higher up the 
regulatory agenda when compared to other areas such as food safety. However many of the 
most important theories of regulation underpinning this study were first promulgated in the 
1970s and 80s and they are clearly relevant now. 
Qualitative research aims to obtain evidence about attitudes, opinions, beliefs and behaviour 
but these are subject to change over time. The research presents a picture of those officers 
who participated in it. The study does not claim to be representative of the hundreds of councils 
or thousands of enforcement officers throughout the UK so it cannot be assumed that the 
conclusions of the study will apply to all local authorities.  
3.16 Ethics 
 
The study received ethical approval on acceptance of the research proposal in 2009. Since 
then the highly experienced supervisory team and the researcher have maintained a watching 
brief over ethical issues and there have been no unanticipated concerns regarding the ethics 
of the study. Also since the initial approval there have been no changes to the study which 
required a reconsideration of the ethical issues by the University Academic Board Ethics 
Committee. The code applied to the research is the University’s Academic Ethical Framework 
2011 (Manchester Metropolitan University, 2011).  
The participants were all employed as enforcement professionals working as trading 
standards and environmental health officers within the regulatory services department of a 
local authority. As such they are public servants who are accountable in their work, in the first 
instance to their employers and managers but also in a wider sense to the communities they 
serve. The interview was concerned with their professional life as opposed to their private life 
and as such it was not ‘sensitive’ in the usual sense. Nevertheless there were sensitivities that 
arose from a concern about identification. The most serious concern for participants was as 
employees who might face negative consequences as a result of speaking openly about 
issues which are not ordinarily discussed publicly. 
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The interviews were carried out on the understanding that the identities of the participants and 
of anyone else who was identified in the interview would remain confidential and would not 
appear in the final published work.  By providing the assurance of confidentiality the 
participants were able to speak openly about their practice without fear of exposure and 
criticism and it was felt that this provided greater credibility to the data.  
To this end, the participants were emailed with an assurance of confidentiality when the initial 
request for an interview was made. An oral assurance of confidentiality was provided again at 
the start of the interview. Many of the participants expressed their concern for the 
confidentiality of the businesses with whom they had had dealings as these were ongoing 
relationships which required mutual trust and professional dealing. 
It was made clear to the participants that their participation was entirely voluntary, that they 
were free to discontinue the interview at any time, that they could decline to answer any of the 
questions and that they could withdraw their data at a later stage as long as the final work had 
not been published. The final condition allowed for a long ‘cooling off’ period as there was at 
least one year between the final interview and the first draft thesis. The participants were 
asked for their consent to record the interview and they were assured that only the researcher, 
the transcriber, the supervisory team and examiners would listen to the interview. All but one 
of the participants agreed for the interview to be recorded. Where the participant objected to 
the recording, a contemporaneous note was made of that interview to substitute for the 
recording.  
It was felt that in the light of the fact that the interviewees had agreed by email to a meeting 
with the researcher at their place of work, that there was no need to request a signed consent 
form as well. This was a deliberate choice because requiring a consent form would potentially 
create a greater formality and inhibit the interviewee from speaking as freely as they might 
and raise concerns where in fact none existed. 
A particular concern in this study is the risk of deductive disclosure where insiders within a 
group may recognise each other from the identifying information provided in an interview 
specified as  confidential (Tolich, 2004). The group here is enforcement officers employed by 
local authorities. By identifying the region, where most of the participants work as North West 
England, it might be possible for someone with knowledge of the profession to identify 
individuals from their characteristics such as age or gender and their account of their practice. 
As the information provided in this study contains rich descriptions of the work of participants 
it was not difficult to envisage that there was a risk of a breach of confidentiality. This was 
limited to some extent by the fact of participation being known at the outset as a result of the 
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chain referral or snowballing sampling method. Therefore, during the interview, it was not 
uncommon for an interviewee to mention their counterpart in a different local authority, 
particularly if that person had made the referral. As a result of participation in knowledge 
sharing groups, it was also common for an interviewee to speak about the experience of 
another colleague. In these circumstances it was not possible for the researcher to disguise 
the identity of the other participant, nevertheless it was still important avoid disclosure of the 
substance of the interview to the later participant. The researcher was conscious of the risk of 
the breach of confidentiality and therefore was deliberately circumspect where the interviewee 
would touch upon the experiences or views of others. 
In respect of the confidentiality of participants, the identifying information such as names and 
addresses were removed after transcribing the interviews from audio recording to writing. The 
removal of identifiers allowed the creation of a ‘clean’ data set (Kaiser, 2009). This was done 
by using the ‘find and replace’ feature in word to ensure that all references to real names were 
removed and replaced by pseudonyms. However, the transcripts also were checked manually 
as well to remove third party names such as those of businesses which could not have been 
anticipated and therefore removed automatically. 
Data cleaning can remove personal identifiers such as names but individuals remain at risk of 
identification where their story is in some way unique. As such it was important to consider 
whether the quotations or examples presented might lead to participants’ identification by 
deductive disclosure. Where this was possible, details in the data were changed. Of course 
the decision about which identifying features of a person’s account needed to be removed for 
fear of disclosure was taken by the researcher and this carries with it a responsibility for ethical 
decision making in rendering the respondent unidentifiable without changing or losing the 
meaning of the data. This gives rise to the question of how participants would feel about having 
their data altered. As Corden and Sainsbury found, respondents may have strong views about 
how their words or their personal characteristics are altered in research reports (Corden and 
Sainsbury, 2006). It was felt that on balance protecting the identity of the participants should 
take precedence over fears about changing the authenticity of their voices. Therefore, where 
there was a risk of identification then that material was changed but if that could not be done 
without significantly altering its meaning then it was removed altogether. The disadvantage of 
this approach is that the responsibility for deciding what to change or remove lies with the 
researcher and the reader cannot see what has been changed or removed and assess the 
significance of the amendment for themselves. 
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In considering the issue of confidentiality it is worth determining the plans for dissemination 
and the likely audience for the research. The research is undertaken as part of a PhD so that 
the immediate audience will be supervisors and examiners. The final thesis will be published 
and a hard copy will be held in the library for a limited time. It will also be available online at 
the British Library Electronic Theses Online Service (Ethos) which provides a free download 
for a registered user. It is intended that the work will form the basis of a follow up to the article 
Nutrition and Health Claims: An enforcement perspective published in Trends in Food Science 
and Technology in 2012 (Patel et al., 2012). The work may also form the basis of a conference 
presentation. In this respect, the work will be publicly available but the audience is likely to be 
limited to other academics, policy makers and enforcement professionals including the 
respondents themselves.  
It was not felt necessary to seek approval of the drafts from the respondents prior to 
publication. The respondents were professionals and impervious rather than vulnerable and 
they came across as confident and safe in the interviews. They were not exposing their inner 
vulnerabilities and therefore seeking approval for drafts would serve only to raise alarm when 
in fact there was no cause to do so.  
The researcher is aware of obligations on those who hold personal information about others 
as set out in the Data Protection Act 1998. Of the eight principles in the Act the most relevant 
ones to this study are: the data is processed only for the purpose for which it was provided; 
that it is relevant; not retained for longer than is necessary and that it is secure. In this respect, 
the questions raised in interviews were limited to information about enforcement practice. The 
data are not to be processed beyond the purposes of research and care has been taken to 
ensure that audio and document files are retained within the secure encrypted University 
information technology systems and they are not copied or moved to any other computers. 
Finally, the most important issue here is that the participants have taken part voluntarily and 
have freely given their informed consent. It is worth reiterating that they are professionals who 
are being interviewed about their work and not their personal lives. 
3.17 Conclusion 
 
This chapter describes how the research was carried out and it explains why it was conducted 
in that way. In doing so, it demonstrates the appropriateness of the method to the aims of the 
project by reference to the research questions. It justifies the use of semi-structured interviews 
as part of a qualitative methodology which were analysed by applying codes using a thematic 
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approach. The limitations and the ethical considerations raised by the research are considered 
at the end of the chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Findings 
 
 
4.1 Summary 
 
This chapter analyses the enforcement of the Regulation on Nutrition and Health Claims 
following interviews with enforcers about their practice. The questions raised in the interviews 
were informed by the literature relating to a binary approach to enforcement of accommodation 
and deterrence and about the strategies adopted by enforcers in the face of the challenges 
posed by such a strategy.  
 
4.2 Introduction 
 
Local authorities may choose whether and how to enforce the Regulation and this discretion 
allows enforcers to selectively enforce or not to take action at all, even where regulatory 
enforcement might be considered apt (Davis, 1969). Officers enjoy a high level of autonomy 
in their work only rarely being given specific direction by a supervisor. This is consistent with 
the findings of a recent study of environmental health officers in Australia which shares a 
similar organisational model for enforcement to that of the UK (Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015). 
 
The importance of the role of officers is derived in part from their role as  the ‘first stop’ for 
enquiries, concerns and complaints from the local population (Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015). 
Not all cases that come to the attention of the enforcer result in enforcement action and there 
are cases where it is appropriate for there to be no action taken. The discretion allows 
authorities valuable flexibility but the result is greater unpredictability for those businesses who 
are subjected to such regulation (Cranston, 1979). That enforcers enjoy a large level of 
discretion be able to choose whether to issue proceedings where there appears to be a prima 
facie case, is supported by judicial authority in the judgement of Viscount Dilhorne in Smedleys 
Limited  v Breed (1974). In this, and in other cases, judges were keen to support actions which 
were justified to be in the consumer interest and were prepared to countenance the decision 
not to take action in cases where the consumer interest appeared unclear. The way in which 
the discretion is applied represents the operational policy of the authority affecting those who 
are subject to the regulation allowing them to be able to gauge what is expected of them by 
regulators and the efficacy of the Regulation (Dearlove, 2011). Condon-Paoloni found that 
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‘environmental health officers, through their work practices and especially their enforcement 
role, have the capacity to affect the implementation of policy at community level and to 
optimize or lessen the benefits to consumers of policy and food regulations, such as nutrition 
and health claims’ (Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015). The findings of this study appear to support 
the application of this conclusion to trading standards and environmental health officers in the 
UK. As such this may risk undermining the behavioural changes which are sought by the 
implementation of new food labelling law and policy. 
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Table 4  illustrating the options for regulatory enforcement and their levels 
 
 
 
 
Pre action stage
Warning Written or oral
Intermediate level
Information and education
Reference to generic leaflet or web site
Bespoke face to face contact
Practical measures
Low level of enforcement intervention
No action
Doing nothing
Punitive measures
Direct action
Public enforcement and monitoriing
Civil action or criminal prosecution
Sanctions or penalties
Action
Licence conditions Restrictions on or withdrawal of licence to trade
High level of enforcement intervention
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It is difficult to assess the success of a particular regulation and the enforcement measures 
associated with it (Hutter, 1988). There are numerous factors involved: for example, consumer 
trends in shopping, changes to the way in which products are marketed and the price of a 
product. These commercial factors will influence consumer behaviour so that the effect of any 
regulation and enforcement are difficult to isolate. However, the stated aim of the Regulation 
is consumer protection and making markets work and it is against these benchmarks that the 
efficacy of the Regulation may be judged. 
 
It was clear from speaking with the respondents and from a review of available local authority 
guides and other documentary evidence that, notwithstanding the importance of enforcement, 
no formal policy specific to food law enforcement exists within councils. Therefore, each local 
authority is able to apply its own policy and practice and this research aims to uncover insights 
from the data into how this function is fulfilled.  
 
4.3 Data analysis - emergent themes 
 
A number of themes emerged as a result of the analysis of the interview data. Some of the 
themes are explored in detail, based on their relevance to the research question of how 
enforcers enforce the Regulation on Nutrition and Health and their use of discretionary powers 
in taking enforcement action.  
A striking theme which emerged from the data is the enforcement officers’ identification of 
themselves as prosecutors with sole and direct responsibility to the public: a view consistent 
with the deterrence model presented by Reiss (Reiss, 1984) and developed by Hawkins and 
Hutter (Hawkins and Hutter, 1993). A further related theme was a view of enforcers as advisors 
to business. Such an approach is rooted firmly in the accommodative model of Braithwaite et 
al where officers seek to ‘educate, persuade and cajole’ (Braithwaite et al., 1987). In this 
capacity, the enforcer adopted techniques such as education, persuasion and negotiation to 
deal with cases. In this role, enforcers’ tactics were more informal. 
 
Further themes emerged from the data such as the influence of elected councillors on local 
authority enforcement policy and the effect of enforcement action on the rights of those subject 
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to enforcement. These are discussed but they are corollary themes relevant to the matters in 
issue rather than the actual matters in issue. 
4.4 Enforcer or advisor? 
 
Ethan captures the duality of his position as an enforcer and how he reconciles the functions: 
We always have to play two roles. Supporting businesses and the 
enforcement but they do tend to blend together quite well I find.  And most 
businesses want to be compliant, and they know that, so if you can help 
them be compliant then they’ll you know, go with you. 
 
Traditionally enforcers have had an arm’s length relationship with business. However, Ethan, 
like his contemporaries, is not uncomfortable with modern enforcement practice where 
enforcers play a role in supporting businesses in their efforts to ensure compliance with the 
law.  This would support the notion that ‘an advisory approach to regulatory enforcement may 
be a necessary component of an effective enforcement strategy’ (Law, 2006).  
Similarly, at the start of the interview where the enforcement officer is invited to describe their 
role and main duties, Chloe describes her view of her role primarily in terms of enforcement 
as her main purpose: 
Well, enforcement is our main, we are regulators, enforcement is our main 
business advice and primary authority advice is probably secondary to that. 
 
From Chloe’s initial answer, it appears that she views her role as that of an enforcer and that 
even primary authority advice, where she is contracted to provide advice to a business, is 
secondary to that role. (Under a primary authority relationship, a firm will pay the local authority 
to meet the costs of providing advice in order to assist with compliance.) 
It is notable how Chloe distinguishes between the roles of enforcer and advisor. She sees 
herself as an advisor but able to switch from that to regulator. This is at odds with the theory 
that advice is an integral part of the compliance strategy as described by Law (Law, 2006) but 
compatible with the regulatory pyramid of Ayres and Braithwaite (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; 
Braithwaite, 2002; Healy and Braithwaite, 2006) actions where enforcers move up and down 
the range of possible regulatory measures.  
However, later within the same interview, Chloe seemed to shift her position to say that in fact 
her primary duty was to business. She described this more nuanced view of her role: 
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What business advice, especially what businesses need; always put 
businesses advice as the top, consumers tend to put that at the bottom, but 
they don’t see that link in with food standards.  The business advice 
improves the food standards.  We use the questionnaire to get a full idea of 
businesses advice, some consumers will say, what are you helping them 
for?  They don’t understand that the business advice will prevent the problem 
with all the other areas. 
 
Chloe’s comments now appear to provide evidence of the business advice aspect of her role 
as integral to her enforcement activity. That for ex post enforcement, compliance with 
regulation is more readily achieved when the enforcer is engaged in an advisory capacity. 
Analysing this enforcement perspective is important because Chloe’s beliefs about achieving 
compliance will determine policy making at her local authority and beyond (Chloe holds a 
supervisory position and hers is an influential voice in the food law enforcement community.) 
It will also directly influence agency and her own enforcement practice.  
Chloe appears frustrated at the public perception of the relationship of enforcer and business 
as necessarily adversarial and her providing assistance to business with compliance as rather 
disloyal. The implication was that individual consumers would seek to use reporting to 
environmental health or trading standards as part of a strategy to settle private disputes with 
traders. In a similar vein, consumers might threaten to report matters to the local press:  
Consumers would threaten companies by saying that they would report 
cases to us or that they would call the xxx News [the local newspaper]. 
Environmental health stories would often be front-page news. And if we 
didn’t take the action they wanted, they would report us to the paper 
In her view, there is a public perception that she should be taking a deterrence-based 
approach as described by Reiss. It is not clear why Chloe feels that public expectations would 
require that she does not provide advice to business. This may be due to a failure by the public 
to appreciate the nature of the enforcer’s role and in turn, this may be attributed to the lack of 
communication by enforcers about their duties. Certainly, Chloe’s remark regarding 
consumers indicates that she faces some resistance to the idea of helping business and that 
she ought to police and prosecute non-compliant business. However, in her practice Chloe 
actually adopts an advisory role. In fact Chloe goes much further when she actually speaks of 
promoting economic growth as an objective in itself and part of her work rather than as a 
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means of securing compliance: ‘we’d give assistance with small businesses because we’ve 
got obviously priorities to promote prosperity and business growth in xxxx.’  
The role of economic regulators to deliver a competitive marketplace in order to provide an 
environment for business growth is well established (Beesley and Littlechild, 1989; Helm, 
1994). The literature on enforcement practice does not however document the role played by 
a consumer protection enforcement agency in delivering business growth. To a degree, this 
may arise from the unique nature of local authority work where the authority has a duty to 
promote the welfare of its local residents including job creation. The political dimension where 
elected councillors influence enforcement practice and who seek election on a mandate to 
promote local jobs will enhance this aspect.  
 
Whereas there has been a general move towards the deregulation of markets marked by the 
dismantling of the apparatus of government controls, beneath this picture, social regulation 
aimed at consumer protection has grown while economic regulation has been pared back 
(Hamilton and Viscusi, 1999). The Regulation may be justified as a consumer protection 
measure on the one hand and on the other, one aimed at delivering economic efficiency, ‘a 
long standing rallying point in economic deregulation’ (Hamilton and Viscusi, 1999). In this 
way, the goals of efficient allocation of resources and a strong level of consumer welfare can 
be reconciled via the paradigm of the informed and self-interested consumer. 
 
Charlotte revealed that the provision of advice can provide the initial engagement between 
enforcer and a firm on the subject of the application of nutrition and health claims. When asked 
what experience, if any, she had of nutrition and health claims, she responded: 
Some of the food manufacturers based in this area or other food businesses 
will ring up saying I want to make a claim on my label and I’ll give advice. 
Amelia went on to provide specific instances of the cases of such advice: 
We have provided advice to a sports supplements importer…We have also 
been involved in giving advice to an internet trader for vitamins. 
The reference here is to advice provided in response to a request for assistance from a firm. 
In their paper Really Responsive Regulation Baldwin and Black stress the case for regulators 
to be responsive to not only the attitude of the firm but also the ‘operating and cognitive 
frameworks of firms’ (Black and Baldwin, 2010). In responding to the specific request for 
advice, enforcers or regulators avoid the ‘expensive process of shooting in the dark’ (Black 
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and Baldwin, 2010) as the advice is targeting to meet an expressed need. 
Health supplements and functional foods are, of course, the products where nutrition and 
health claims are most critical, as the product has no intrinsic value and without the claim and 
there is no reason for consumers to purchase such products in its absence. Unsurprisingly, it 
was in the promotion of health supplements where claims for health and nutrition were most 
commonly found and most strongly contested.  
In both deterrence and accommodative approaches, the enforcer sought to achieve the same 
goal: compliance with the regulation and therefore to stop the offending behaviour in the case 
in hand and to deter such behaviour in other cases. The roles of enforcer and advisor were 
not mutually exclusive; in fact, it was common for the enforcer to move from the position of 
advisor to prosecutor in the same case as lower level action failed and the case escalated to 
stronger measures. ‘Initially advise them, yes.  I mean if they don’t listen to advice then you 
can take more formal sanctions but most of them will comply’ Ethan. This confirms the notion 
of  escalation up the regulatory pyramid of Ayres and Braithwaite et al (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992).  
4.5 The enforcer as advisor: the nature of the relationship and its defining 
characteristics 
 
This section describes the advisory function of an enforcement officer as revealed by the data.  
Mia alludes to an established relationship between the enforcer as advisor and the business 
as client: ‘Because we do have a number of manufacturers that we do advise generally on 
labelling.’ 
When asked about the significance of nutrition and health claims as part of the day-to-day 
work, Jessica, perhaps surprisingly, accords the claims real importance: 
Right, I would say now that they [nutrition and health claims] are usually at 
the forefront of a lot of complaints and enquiries that we have because we 
record how many new businesses that contact us and for last year we had 
30 odd start up, what we call start-up businesses, brand new businesses.  
And the thing is with when people start up a new business we say right, what 
are you looking to sell and they’ll tell us, it’s a muffin, and it’s absolutely 
fantastic and it’s going be low fat, it’s going to be high in fibre, it’s going to 
blah blah blah,  
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In their study of the Irish market for food, Lalor et al found that a significant number of products 
had nutrition and health claims (Lalor et al., 2010) and Jessica’s comment appears to confirm 
the popularity of such claims for marketing.  
Jessica refers to small businesses who may not yet appreciate the controls applied to the 
making of such claims and who may subsequently decide not to make the claims or act in 
breach of the law. This is supported by the fact that Jessica then goes on to describe the 
attraction as well as the misunderstanding surrounding a claim such as ‘gluten free’: 
Well how are you going to market it? What claims are you going to make?  
And they’ll say, well, it’s got, it’s going to have oats in, so it’s going, we can 
say it’s gluten free.  Well, can you say it’s gluten free, because it’s got oats, 
because there’s a debate at the moment as to whether gluten free, low 
gluten, coeliac information, so we say you can’t just go ad hoc and make 
these claims. 
 
Kagan and Scholz, in their work The Criminology of the Corporation, theorise about the 
reasons for non-compliance with the law by small business but conclude that there is no single 
theory which will adequately explain such behaviour (Kagan and Scholz, 1984).  More 
specifically, following an empirical study of small business compliance, Yapp and Fairman find 
that:  
Whilst some of the barriers identified within other research were present within food 
businesses (specifically time and money), there were also a number of complex, underlying 
issues that prevented compliance with regulatory requirements and which have implications 
for regulatory and enforcement policy. These barriers included the lack of trust in food safety 
legislation and enforcement officers; a lack of motivation in dealing with food safety legislation; 
and a lack of knowledge and understanding (Yapp and Fairman, 2006).  
Similarly, Harrison et al found that educative function ‘is increasingly focused upon the lower 
tier of food retail establishments, such as a butcher’s shop or a bakery’ (Hutter, 1989). There 
are now very few independent butchers and bakers on high streets. In the light of the change 
in this composition of the high street the current independent food businesses which are most 
prevalent are fast food takeaways and it was apparent from the data that these are now the 
focus of educative efforts of officers.  
As with retained advisors like lawyers or consultants, the enforcer may be involved at an early 
stage in the life cycle of the product and be asked to advise about the label design: 
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Some of the food manufacturers based in this area or other food businesses 
will ring up saying I want to make a claim on my label and I’ll give advice. 
Charlotte 
We’ve had it with a company XXLtd who came to us before the products 
were launched and asked for our advice. It’s a bit like a cereal bar and it’s 
got loads of claims on it like it’s gluten free, and it’s suitable for everyone and 
it has all these different properties in it and its quite difficult because you 
have to say you can’t have this but you can say that. But they wanted to 
keep everything. But we were involved from the start so that helped reach 
an agreement.  
Mia 
 
The act of seeking advice is not an artless activity and food businesses may approach the 
topic armed with their arguments, and with a view to obtaining advice that best suits them. 
They may, for example have seen what they consider to be a similar claim being used by 
another firm. As a result they have reached the view that they can do the same. The outcome 
as described by Mia is positive and the supplier accepts the advice. Where suppliers are very 
attached to the claims to the extent that they have even designed a product around a claim, it 
can be difficult to provide helpful and constructive advice in such cases. In cases where advice 
is sought on label wording and design the role of the regulator is significantly different to the 
policing role which is traditionally invoked.  
 
Amelia describes how she is faced with a proposed claim based on what the firm has 
witnessed in the market: 
 
Sometimes we get an enquiry which says they want advice about labelling 
which refers to [the practice of] xxx [major supermarket chain] or yyy [another 
major supermarket chain] and they ask which they can follow, and we know 
that they know that xxx or yyy are not doing it right. 
This is an obvious challenge to the regulator, impliedly saying that, ‘if you are prepared to 
tolerate the claim from another which we both know to be unlawful, I will do the same.’ Such 
a challenge may force the officer’s hand and require that action is taken against the business 
who already use the claim. Alternatively, it may, in the interests of consistency, require that 
the regulator ignore a claim by the firm seeking advice. In either case, it represents a defiant 
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challenge to the regulator’s operational working. 
One response to the challenge might be to say that fairness or consistency of treatment is not 
the measure of effective regulation and that the enforcement action is best assessed by 
judging the total harm prevented and the benefits to society overall. Notions of fairness are 
secondary in this model of the economic analysis of regulation (Hahn, 2004). Such an 
approach may also be justified on consumer protection grounds to ensure the maximum 
welfare to the maximum number of consumers.  
Charlotte provides an example related to the attempt by a manufacturer to use the term 
‘healthy’: 
 One of the manufacturers wanted to launch a healthy range so they were 
going to put the word ‘healthy’ in the label so I had to advise on that. I just 
needed to see why they thought the products were healthy and advise them 
accordingly. ‘Healthy’ is a general claim which will need to be accompanied 
by a specific claim. And all the other things which have to appear on the 
label. It was the marketing department which wanted to do it. 
Charlotte distinguishes between the circumstances in which the Regulations will apply and 
where they will not. Using the term healthy as a general claim is not covered by the 
Regulations unless there is a specific claim which accompanies it. In her account, Charlotte 
also demonstrates an appreciation of the commercial imperative applied by the organisational 
structures within a business. A single definition of the term ‘healthy’ is impossible to agree. An 
example to illustrate this would be cheese: it may be rich in a desirable nutrient such as 
calcium but contain high levels of fat. Nutritional profiling provides a clear way to communicate 
the nutritional qualities of a food by translating this information into colour coding where a 
quantity and proportion of a single nutrient within a food is clearly signalled.  In their study of 
the effects of nutrient profiling as a way of categorising foods according to their nutritional 
quality, Lobstein and Davies found that this information might be a practical way to 
communicate complex dietary information to consumers (Lobstein and Davies, 2009). This is 
the underpinning of the traffic light or colour coding systems in place on food labels and the 
basis of the restriction of advertising of unhealthy foods to children.   
Dexter describes the challenges of providing practical advice based on complex legislation, 
which might be translated into action by the recipient: 
I think understanding the accuracy of the health claims is complex. It’s not 
as easy as just looking and seeing oh that label needs to have a best before 
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date or the use by date is wrong, it’s looking at the whole thing, and (a) it’s 
a health claim and (b) I need to go and check that to see if it’s correct so I 
need to go back onto the website so it’s not immediate.  You need to go back 
and double check, the local website is (a) it’s a valid health claim and (b) it’s 
authorised and then go back to the business and say well we need to make 
some changes.  
 
Any corporate lawyer will be familiar with the problem of translating complex legal rules into 
helpful advice for a business client and then to go on to make recommendations. Often the 
position is unclear and, at best, advisors provide an assessment of the risk rather than a 
definitive answer. When retained advisors give advice, which, when things go wrong, may 
lead to a financial loss, they are potentially liable to pay damages for breach of contract or 
negligence. Solicitors are obliged to take professional indemnity insurance to deal with any 
potential claims under the Solicitors’ Regulatory Authority Indemnity Insurance Rules 2013 
Rule 4 (Solicitors Regulatory Authority, 2013). The provision of advice, albeit without charge, 
would potentially give rise to liability to the local authority for which it may be prudent to obtain 
such indemnity insurance or ensure that it is protected under the terms of its existing cover. 
This raises the question of whether this might have the effect of formalising the relationship 
between enforcers and the regulated firm and inhibit the provision of advice. It would certainly 
put to the test the circumstances in which liability might arise.  
 
The issue is most acute where the regulated firm is an SME which does not have the 
knowledge or awareness of the laws which apply to it and therefore are unlikely to have in 
place the resources such as financial commitment and management systems in place to 
ensure compliance. They are also unlikely to be able to afford hire such expertise. SMEs do 
not have the personnel or time or availability to be able to monitor compliance and to interpret 
law (Hillary, 1995). In such cases, the firm is reliant on the free advice provided by the local 
authority. If such a service is stopped or restricted to avoid liability for negligent advice than 
this may lead to more non-conformity in a sector where there is already significant breach.  
 
We can see from below that Jessica appreciates the importance of consistent advice for 
businesses, particularly where they operate across local authority boundaries. Yapp and 
Fairman found that where there was a follow up visit to the same premises and there was an 
inconsistency between the advice provided on each occasion that this would lead to a lack of 
trust: 
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EHPs were seen to act inconsistently, both within the individual 
business and between businesses. SMEs complained that diﬀerent 
food safety requirements were made each time the premises was 
inspected, despite conditions remaining the same and the same EHP 
visiting. SMEs also believed that EHPs would forget or fail to enforce 
requirements made previously and therefore failed to take action… 
 
(Yapp and Fairman, 2006) 
 
Yapp and Fairman were concerned with inconsistency between repeat visits to the same 
business. A similar concern was also raised by Cranston in 1979 at the general level of the 
exercise of unconfined discretion in Regulating Business: Law and Consumer Agencies 
(Cranston, 1979). The risk of inconsistency between different officers operating in different 
local authorities is significantly greater. 
 
One of the mechanisms that was used to ensure consistency of enforcement practice between 
different businesses is by the issue of guidance from the Local Authority Coordination of 
Regulatory Services (LACORS). The role of LACORS was to issue guidance aimed at 
coordinating enforcement practice. However LACORS was replaced by the Local Government 
Association in 2010. The coordination role has been replaced with a web site for users to 
share practice known as the knowledgehub (TKH, 2014). 
 
Providing advice to business entails a responsibility, which is not borne easily without the 
assistance of LACORS the central coordinating body, as Jessica explains: 
 
That’s what that’s all that the manufacturers want, a consistent approach.  
We do our best, we try to, that’s why we go through home authority and 
primary authority but it would be better, you know it’s different me, I feel that 
the responsibility is too much on local authorities because most primary 
authority and going and speaking to a multi-million pound business and they 
are relying on my advice, that’s a massive responsibility for me.  I would 
rather have checked it out with LACORS and LACORS had come out with 
the advice, and for me to say this is what LACORS have said, this is what 
you should follow. 
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There are formal processes in place to ensure that the local authority advice across 
boundaries is consistent. A recurring theme was how businesses feel an acute sense of 
unfairness where it appeared that a competitor was able to make claim which they are advised 
not to, ‘They will say, x, y and z are doing this and we want to do it as well.  How come they 
can do it, and we can’t?’  Jessica. By having advice and following guidance from LACORS an 
enforcer was able to provide authority for their action. Now that LACORS or its equivalent is 
not available to provide such assistance, enforcers risk being exposed and having to respond 
in a defensive manner. 
 
One of the methods used by local authorities to ensure consistency is the setting up of a 
primary authority relationship which provides notice to other authorities that advice has already 
been given. Interestingly, here Chloe also speaks of being a burden on business; not a position 
that one might ordinarily associate with an enforcement official: 
 
There’s a section just for regulators on the BRDO [Better Regulation Delivery 
Office] website so I can go on that register and look for like a national 
supermarket and see if they’ve been advised on health claims. If I was to go 
and visit that supermarket, I have to look at the primary authority register to 
see if they’ve got a primary authority and I have to have regard to advice 
that’s already been given.  We do burden a business, so like at xxx (major 
supermarket), if they’ve got 422 local authorities all going in, taking up the 
time of store manager, their primary authority could say, ‘no need to look at 
this area, we’ve audited it and we’re happy with it. All the primary authority 
partnerships across the country are listed on this website and regulators 
have a special log in to check what advice has been given.  So if I was to 
do, say a xxx [name of major supermarket] inspection, I’d have to go and 
look at their inspection plan, any advice that had been given, to know where 
to direct my resources when I go into my local store. 
 
 
Chloe seems concerned that the regulation is not optimal rather than that there is any at all. 
The research points to inefficiencies in command and control systems of regulation and a 
preference for market based regulation. Therefore, the questions are around when and how 
to regulate and how to avoid problems of regulatory capture (Helm, 2006). Chloe’s suggestion 
is aimed at avoiding the inefficiencies of the regulation of individual outposts of a business 
with multiple branches. 
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The primary authority relationship where business receives advice in return for payment, may 
provide a level of indemnity which commercial advisors cannot provide, as Chloe explains: 
 
And as much as we wanted to be able to say, yes, we couldn’t so we’ve not 
heard from them since. And the primary authority has gone, because that 
was, to be fair, I did say to them, if we can’t approve and give primary 
authority advice to say that you can use that, there’s very little point in us 
actually being the primary authority. 
 
Where enforcers can provide an indemnity against action from either their own authority or 
from another authority, this provides a valuable benefit and assurance to business. This goes 
beyond the benefit that might be provided by an independent professional advisor such as a 
lawyer while raising the issue of liability for advice provided and the provision of a benefit 
which cannot be matched by any other provider. It also raises questions of the conflict of 
interest between the provision of advice and assistance on the one hand and the duty to 
enforce on the other. 
 
Enforcers can demonstrate a surprising level of involvement with the commercial aims of the 
business as Scarlett shows: 
 
I’m trying for them not to change their trademark, I know they want to keep 
their trademark. How can we go round – not circumvent the legislation 
obviously, but get to a point where they can continue to use it  
 
There are specific provisions in the Regulation which make it clear that a claim contained 
within a trademark is subject to the same control as if it were made without the trademark. In 
other words, that the registration of a trademark does not provide immunity to a claim made 
within it. Local authority enforcers do have experience and knowledge of law for business. 
However, it would be unusual for that to extend to providing advice relating to intellectual 
property issues arising from the protection of trademarks and to provide advice about how the 
trademark might be protected. 
 
4.6 The limits of the advisory function 
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At times, there was an expectation from a business that enforcers would be on hand to provide 
advice whenever it was required. James describes that expectation: 
certain companies would be phoning you all the time so you felt like you 
were doing their work for them which is ok but when we are stretched it’s not 
possible to do that as much so it’s something that’s in formation at the 
moment with primary authority, so we’ll see how it works out. 
Enforcers would need to adopt strategies to manage the expectations of businesses because 
they were unable to deliver the service levels which business would have liked and possibly 
had become accustomed to from other providers. There is no fixed service level agreement in 
the provision of advice from the enforcer to the business. There are general turnaround times 
for responses used by local authorities to deal with enquiries from the public. In the absence 
of specific response times for business enquiries, these are likely to be applied. However, this 
is speculation and the issue was not explored with interviewees. The problem of managing 
business expectations was most acutely felt following the severe cuts to budgets imposed 
from 2009 onwards. James described the circumstances: 
We’re short staffed now but we used to have a chap who was office based 
and people would send their labels for approval and raise issues they have 
and he could spend quite a lot of time doing it. We don’t provide that service 
any more.  
It will be instructive to see whether the withdrawal of a label copy clearance service will lead 
to more ex post liability breach and with enforcers playing a lesser role in the provision of ex 
ante advice. The effect of withdrawing ‘free’ advice may implement a cost structure and more 
efficient distribution of resources and avoid the waste associated with services provided free 
at the point of use.  Alternatively, it may result in greater non-compliance and problems of 
consumer detriment that might have been avoided more cheaply by providing advice. This 
was raised as a concern by more than one of the interviewees. 
The number of products which might potentially contain claims and therefore may be caught 
by the Regulation is vast and it is impossible for an enforcer to review each one individually. 
As Charlotte explains, ‘we can only advise on what the law says rather than each specific 
claim.’ This is a reasonable, as well as necessary, way to limit the volume of requests for 
advice. It also provides a method of limiting liability for any advice proffered by framing it in 
terms of general rather than specific guidance. 
Charlotte refers to another means of limiting the amount of time spent on enquiries by 
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signposting enquiries to publicly available resources: 
You do refer them to the guidance so you wouldn’t necessarily have to deal 
with each potential claim. Every time they want to make it in relation to every 
product line. Which potentially could be a lot of claims. 
Charlotte is referring to the general guidance available from the Food Standards Agency web 
site and the Guidance to compliance with Regulation 1924/2006 EC on nutrition and health 
claims made on foods (Department of Health, 2011). Millie makes reference to her obligation 
to provide advice and the limitation on that obligation and how that might be extended in the 
case of a primary advice relationship: 
Following the regulator’s code, we are required to provide basic advice.  I do 
not think intricate labelling of products is basic advice, it would require my 
officers to carry out additional work and that additional work would not be 
covered unless they had formed a primary authority relationship with us, 
therefore we wouldn’t get involved.  It’s the responsibility of the company. 
 
The lack of time was found to be a barrier to compliance by 54% of SMEs in the study by Yapp 
and Fairman and businesses did not see the identification and interpretation of regulations as 
part of their business operation. Instead, they preferred to rely on assistance from the 
environmental health officer during inspections (Yapp and Fairman, 2006). Therefore, by 
fulfilling the advisory function there is a risk that small business in particular will rely on advice 
from enforcers in order to achieve compliance. Where there a lack of time or resources to 
deliver such advice, businesses may feel that they are not obliged to take proactive measures 
to seek compliance. 
 
4.7 Advice as a preliminary step to enforcement action 
 
It was clear from all of the data that advice represents the first step in the ‘enforcement ladder’ 
with further steps becoming more formalised as Ethan says, ‘Initially advise them, yes.  I mean 
if they don’t listen to advice then you can take more formal sanctions but most of them will 
comply.’ 
 
In the majority of cases, matters will not proceed any further than the advice, ‘most businesses 
are reasonable. We advise them ‘you must get rid of this’ and they do or are in the process of 
doing so’ Ethan. 
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Ethan explains the broader position: 
All enforcement tends to be a hierarchy of actions, we decide the proportion 
as best we can.  And it ranges from just, you know, simple verbal advice up 
to a full prosecution.  It sort of increases in more formality if you will, as you 
need to,  if somebody doesn’t listen to written advice you give them, sorry 
verbal advice, then you tend to give written advice, then formal written 
advice…prosecution is the final resort. 
 
Attempts to capture and illuminate the negotiation between enforcers and regulated firms have 
found this hierarchy of actions (Braithwaite et al., 1987; Hawkins, 2002; Hutter, 1997) . The 
theory of the ‘regulatory pyramid’ of a hierarchy of actions from negotiation to prosecution 
provides strategic level guidance on how enforcers should carry out their duties. This is 
consistent with the way in which enforcement is implemented as described by Ethan. Such a 
responsive approach to regulation is commonplace and involves regulators who enforce ‘in 
the first instance by compliance strategies, such as persuasion and education [but] apply more 
punitive deterrent responses (escalating up a pyramid of such responses) when the regulated 
firm fails to behave as desired’ (Black and Baldwin, 2010).  
 
In the pyramid of responses, as one regulatory intervention fails, the regulator moves upward 
to the next more serious level and as the risk subsides, the regulator should move back down 
to a lower level. In this way, the pyramid provides an inherently proportionate and reasonable 
exercise of power the justification of which is based on the failure of the less serious previous 
action. 
The commercial response to the advice demonstrates the level of reliance placed on the 
officer’s judgement as shown by Charlotte: 
The first step would be advisory. Then you would ask them to change the 
label. And most of the time they do. Sometimes they stop making the product 
altogether. 
It is unclear whether the advice to change a label resulting in the withdrawal of the claim, and 
finally to stop making the product altogether, is wholly dependent on the opinion of the 
enforcement officer or whether the opinions of others have been sought. It is clear however, 
that business can place great reliance on the opinion of the officer and it plays a significant 
role in influencing the decision. 
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4.8 The decision to prosecute 
 
The alternative to advice, or where advice has failed to realise compliance, is prosecution. 
The interviews made clear that the decision to prosecute is not taken easily and that it 
represents the last resort in relation to all regulations, when all other options have failed as 
Scarlett says, ‘prosecution is the last resort right across the board, not just with NHCRs.’ 
 
The fact that there are very few reported prosecutions for breaches of the Regulation is 
unlikely to be the result of there being few breaches. In fact, the ASA casebook of adjudications 
shows that cases of breach do exist. It may be that trading standards and environmental health 
officers do not view prosecution as an efficient means of securing compliance. While 
prosecution does represent the strongest sanction in the regulator’s toolkit it is viewed as a 
means to the end of compliance as set out in the regulator’s code rather than being a goal in 
itself: 
 
Generally, now as well it’s about compliance.  The regulators’ code, since 
that’s come in, and I think here and a lot of good places anyway, it was about 
compliance, it wasn’t about just going in and just slapping on a prosecution, 
 
Millie 
 
The decision to prosecute here does not provide evidence of a preference for the use of the 
deterrence model over an accommodative approach, rather it highlights the role of prosecution 
within the latter (Reiss, 1984). In the deterrence approach the methods of enforcement are 
penal and adversarial and prosecution plays an important role and there is greater reliance on 
imposing sanctions (Hutter, 1989). The emphasis here however is on seeking compliance 
rather than punishing wrongdoing. This way, prosecution is less a means of retribution for 
actions carried out in the past or notions of justice found in the punishment of ‘mainstream’ 
criminal offences of violence and dishonesty and more aimed at ensuring compliance and 
minimising consumer detriment. 
 
In explaining the lack of prosecutions, Jacob refers to the political climate as an influence: 
 
There are fewer prosecutions now for a number of factors. Cuts is an obvious 
one. But also the direction from central government away from prosecution. 
Those who deliberately flaunt rules can still be dealt with but at the same 
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time some companies may see infringement as a commercial risk and they 
may factor in the cost of dealing with a prosecution against the benefits. 
Hutter found that political factors have not played a significant role in food law enforcement 
with the political complexion of any council providing no indication of the enforcement action 
which might be taken in that authority (Hutter, 1988). As Jacob indicates, the politics of 
prosecution are more likely to be internal to the organisation where there may be tendency to 
vie for control of food law enforcement between trading standards and environmental health. 
This is likely to be intensified under the climate of severe cuts in local authority spending. 
There is also a pressure felt by enforcers that they must act in a way that is consistent with 
the wider government deregulatory agenda; ‘There are strident demands…for the ‘regulatory 
burden’ to be reduced. National governments and the European Commission have responded 
with large scale commitments to reduce the regulatory burden’ (Helm, 2006). 
Jacob refers to how some businesses may view legal action as a ‘commercial risk’. This is 
consistent with the idea of business as ‘amoral calculators’ motivated entirely by profit-
seeking, and non-compliance stems from economic calculations of costs and benefits of 
compliance.’ (Yapp and Fairman, 2006). Under the economic approach to regulation actors 
will comply with regulation if, and only if, the costs of compliance with regulation are exceeded 
by the benefits (Law, 2006). This means that the size of the sanction and the risk of being 
caught must be such that together they amount to a sufficient deterrent to make a rational 
business comply with the regulation (Becker, 1974; Stigler, 1974; Polinsky and Shavell, 1999).  
Jacob’s statement appears to support this theory but it would be unwise to infer a widespread 
practice of economic calculation from the comment.  
In contrast to food safety, when it comes to the compliance with the Regulation, Amelia goes 
so far as to claim that in her authority; ‘food labelling generally isn’t something we prosecute 
on’. Notwithstanding that, it remains a real possibility and it cannot be dismissed: 
So we don’t prosecute very often and it’s not a resource, and I absolutely 
fundamentally will stand by that, I’ve never turned down a prosecution 
because I thought it would cost the authority money.  That does not come 
into it.  I have to be pretty damn sure if I put it forward!  But it would never, 
ever be spiked for lack of money 
 
Amelia 
 
When asked if he would receive the necessary support to bring an action, William is 
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unequivocal: 
 
And if you had to take that one to court, would you get the support and 
resources that you need to take it all the way? 
 
Oh yes, I mean if it meets the evidential and the public interest test. 
 
Both Amelia and William provide assurance that where necessary, prosecution will be pursued 
and that resources will be made available for important actions. There is something of a 
mismatch between the costs and benefits of a prosecution. The costs are borne by one local 
authority but as a result of the deterrent effect of the legal action, the potential beneficiaries 
are the entire population who benefit from compliance by other suppliers and as a result are 
not mislead into buying products bearing false claims. As with ‘public’ goods generally, ‘no 
‘market type’ solution exists to determine the level of expenditure on public goods’ (Tiebout, 
1956). This is a familiar problem when considering public goods as memorably illustrated by 
Ronald Coase in describing how a good such as a lighthouse needs to be provided by the 
government rather than through markets (Coase, 1974). Similarly, the benefits of food law 
enforcement are allocated in a non-optimal way when compared to other goods. The example 
of the mismatch between costs and benefits of the enforcement of the Regulation here is 
instructive. 
 
In addition, when considering the benefits it is unlikely that the authority will consider the wider 
effect of action or engage in a comparison between ex post and ex ante costs. This is 
described by Innes albeit in relation to accidents, but the principle of the wider good remains 
the same: 
 
‘the direct ex-ante regulation of care can be more efficient than imposing ex-
post liability for harm even when the government’s cost of monitoring care 
(as required under ex-ante regulation) is significantly higher than the cost of 
monitoring accidents (as needed under ex-post liability).’ 
(Innes, 2004) 
 
In the one case where a prosecution had actually been taken under the nutrition and health 
claims regulations, the enforcers, Mia and Cate were asked; ‘So when did you decide to take 
legal proceedings?’ They replied; ‘We tried everything else. We tried to contact her by phone, 
email and hand delivered letters. It got to such a point when we had no alternative.’  
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4.9 Factors involved in the decision to prosecute- the evidential and public 
interest test 
 
A number of the interviewees refer to the evidential and public interest tests as applied by the 
Crown Prosecution Service as factors involved in deciding whether to prosecute a case: 
We would go through the process and ask do we have the evidence and can 
we prove it? We put it to our legal team, we make a decision based on the 
code for crown prosecutors so we apply the evidential and the public interest 
tests.  
Jacob 
We have our enforcement prosecution policy so that there’s things that we 
have to go through, public interest, likelihood to reoffend, likelihood of 
penalty, if they’ve had previous advice, what groups of people are affected, 
if it was premeditated… 
 
Chloe 
We have an enforcement policy. The policy mirrors Home Office guidelines 
so we look towards public interest, likelihood to reoffend etc. everything 
that’s in that. So we’d always consider all of those aspects of a case. 
Mia and Cate 
Under the Code for Crown Prosecutors, the Full Code Test, specifies in relation to the 
evidence in a case that: 
Prosecutors must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to provide a 
realistic prospect of conviction against each suspect on each charge. They 
must consider what the defence case may be, and how it is likely to affect 
the prospects of conviction. A case which does not pass the evidential stage 
must not proceed, no matter how serious or sensitive it may be. The finding 
that there is a realistic prospect of conviction is based on the prosecutor's 
objective assessment of the evidence, including the impact of any defence, 
and any other information that the suspect has put forward or on which he 
or she might rely. It means that an objective, impartial and reasonable jury 
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or bench of magistrates or judge hearing a case alone, properly directed and 
acting in accordance with the law, is more likely than not to convict the 
defendant of the charge alleged. 
 (Service, 2014) 
This does not mean that the prosecutor needs to be satisfied that the case will succeed. It is 
for the court to decide whether the criminal burden of proof of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ is 
satisfied. The evidential test appears to require that the court is ‘more likely than not to convict 
the defendant’. A standard more akin to the civil burden of proof of a ‘balance of probabilities’ 
and that this would provide evidence of a realistic prospect of conviction.  
Whereas the application of the evidential test maybe a relatively straightforward legal technical 
matter based on ensuring that there is prima facie evidence of each of the elements of the 
offence, the public interest element is a more complex matter: 
Yes, that’s all clear it needs to meet that criteria, and evidentially with this 
particular one, it’s there. The claims we’ve got, the analyst report we’ve had 
done ourselves and what the claims are, downloads of the pages and the 
dates they were up there with the claims.  So we’ve got all of that evidence, 
that’s not the question.  It’s then: ”is it in the public interest” 
 
William 
 
William then goes on to describe how ensuring a level playing field for competition might be a 
determinant of public interest: 
 
The kind of things we look at for the public interest are in our enforcement 
policy.  And one of them is that they are trying to gain a competitive 
advantage.  Well, they are because if all the other suppliers of that product 
are having to comply, this person is making these additional claims, then 
clearly he’s trying to put himself at a competitive advantage , my products 
do this, so that’s the kind of thing you’re looking at in terms of public interest. 
 
Once the evidential test the code makes clear that, ‘it has never been the rule that a 
prosecution will automatically take place once the evidential stage is met.’  
 
A prosecution will usually take place unless the prosecutor is satisfied that 
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there are public interest factors tending against prosecution which outweigh 
those tending in favour. In some cases the prosecutor may be satisfied that 
the public interest can be properly served by offering the offender the 
opportunity to have the matter dealt with by an out-of-court disposal rather 
than bringing a prosecution. 
 
(Service, 2014) 
 
The public interest is determined by a utilitarian approach that requires balancing the harm 
and the benefit. The Code goes on to describe the factors to be taken into account when 
deciding if a prosecution is in the public interest. The factors include; the seriousness of the 
offence, the culpability of the offender, the harm to the victim etc. They appear to be markedly 
different to William’s interpretation of public interest as ensuring fair competition. The factors 
in the Code are more suited to the types of crimes for which the CPS, rather than the local 
authority, is responsible. It is noteworthy that the ‘culpability of the offender’ brings with it a 
moral framework and judgement that may assist the CPS in dealing with the crime but, which, 
one might argue, has no place in consumer protection. 
 
4.10 Enforcement policy or code 
 
Prosecution represents just one of many tools in the regulator’s armoury and one that is, of 
course, rarely used. In determining the correct course of action in individual cases, enforcers 
are guided by their own employer’s enforcement policy or code and this is based on the 
Regulators’ Compliance Code and Enforcement Concordat as issued by the Local Better 
Regulation Office.  
The Regulators’ Code came into statutory effect on 6 April 2014 under the Legislative and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2006. As such, local authorities have a statutory duty to adhere to its 
principles to guide their regulatory activities. It replaces the Regulators’ Compliance Code and 
Enforcement Concordat. It provides a clear, flexible and principles based framework for ‘how 
regulators should engage with those they regulate’ (BIS, 2014). The code says that Regulators 
should carry out their activities in a way that ‘supports those they regulate to comply and grow’ 
(Section 1). This is a clear statement that regulators should assist those whom they regulate. 
This is a positive obligation which represents a recalibration of the relationship between the 
enforcer and firm in the context of local authority food law enforcement.  
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The code goes on at Section 2: ‘In responding to non-compliance that they identify, regulators 
should clearly explain what the non-compliant item or activity is, the advice being given, 
actions required or decisions taken, and the reasons for these’ (BIS, 2014). 
As well as the code itself, each local authority publishes its implementation of its enforcement 
policy based on the Regulators’ Code. Local authorities have such guidance in place, as 
William describes: 
I guess like all local authorities we have a food enforcement policy, a written 
policy, and that’s on our website.  With this as well as all enforcements, I do 
a graduated approach which is expected from us both morally and politically, 
that that’s the approach that you take. 
 
It is notable from William’s description that the local authority provides this information upfront 
on its website for transparency and his reference to ‘morally’ may be interpreted to mean 
fairness and ‘politically’ that the approach should be ethically and sensitively applied. These 
matters combine to provide greater accountability in regulatory services’ decision-making. 
 
Scarlett describes the way in which a ‘tick list’ scoring sheet is used to determine the 
appropriate course of action: 
 
We follow an enforcement policy, there’s a tick list scoring sheet that we go 
through.  We then have a choice of no action, formal caution or prosecution.  
 
Scarlett 
 
The phrase ‘tick list’ has taken on a pejorative meaning to signify a bureaucratic approach to 
decision making however here it is used by Scarlett without guile to denote the application of 
a systematic method. 
In applying such a systematic approach, William describes the stages, each marked by 
increasingly serious actions: 
So if you come across a breach of the legislation, based on obviously the 
severity and the risk that you deal with it informally in the first instance.  You 
may write to them and give them an opportunity to put things right, if they 
have been told about it before and they don’t do that, then you would go to 
improvement notices.  I mean you do have prohibition power if something is 
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an imminent risk to health then you could actually prohibit it, either close the 
place down or prohibit it. 
 
Of course, in relation to nutrition and health claims the closure of a business is a highly unlikely 
outcome whereas the prohibition of the use of a claim would be quite feasible. 
Millie refers to some businesses who are going to be recalcitrant and how she has something 
of an enforcer’s nose for identifying them; ‘let’s face it there are, there are some that are just 
never going to comply, and you know that pretty much from the start I think.’  
 
The idea of regulators acting on instinct is not discussed in the literature. The phenomenon 
exists in relation to law enforcement by police where police refer anecdotally to acting on their 
instinct to apprehend crime rather than in relation to the work involved in investigation of a 
crime and gathering of evidence. 
4.11 Risk 
 
Risk plays a large role in influencing food law enforcement determining the level of scrutiny 
on a particular activity, for example, meat production or independent businesses run by an 
individual or small group are generally considered to be high risk and will invite closer 
examination. The significant role played by risk is reflected in other studies of how 
environmental health officers prioritise their tasks: ‘[a]ll officers, regardless of position, 
reported that the most important factor influencing their work practice was the assessment of 
risk to public health and they would respond first to incidents posing the highest danger’ 
(Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015).  
Risk may be subject to economic analysis and in doing so, it is possible to arrive at an 
‘optimum’ level of risk where the marginal costs and the marginal benefits are equal (Henson 
and Traill, 1993; Antle, 2001).  
In practice, the application of regulatory impact analysis allows for the systematic 
quantification of the costs and benefits of the enforcement of a regulation. Such an approach 
is endorsed by the OECD and its members apply regulatory impact analysis in some shape 
or form (OECD, 2015). 
The application of a risk rating to the actions of the enforcer provides a valuable insight into 
their enforcement strategy and how it determines the action which will follow - including the 
frequency of visits: 
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We actually do the scoring ourselves. The businesses will not see this but 
they have knowledge of how it all works. It’s like a list of questions; what 
sorts of products they’re making and that will generate a score and 
depending on what that score is, dictates how often you inspect the 
business. So low risk business is once every five years, and high risk are 
every year, and medium risk in between. 
Charlotte 
Risk based regulation provides a systematic approach that allows regulators to relate their 
enforcement activities to their objectives and the basis for evaluating new risks. Hampton 
advocates targeting resources based on an assessment of risks that a firm presents to the 
objectives of the regulator. In order to do this, the risk needs to be evaluated based on the 
evidence (Hampton, 2005). Risk based regulation has the most impact on inspections which 
move from routine visits to risk rating firms according to the possibility of non-compliance and 
the potential impact of such breach. The frequency of visits is determined by the assessment 
of risk associated with the actions of the firm as described by Charlotte.  
The view of risk, particularly where environmental health is responsible for enforcing food 
standards, is skewed heavily towards hygiene enforcement and food safety: 
none of the environmental health officers had anything to do with food 
standards at all. They couldn’t see the problem and I can understand that 
because safety is the top priority. You don’t want to be dropping dead from 
food poisoning. If you are a little bit mislead it’s not so significant. They are 
low risk as far as EH are concerned.  Because it’s not chilled product it’s low 
risk. 
Amelia 
In a similar study the authors found that the role played by risk had a similar effect when 
officers were faced with the competing demands of safety on the one hand and false claims 
on the other; ‘local government officers placed monitoring health claims below the most highly 
prioritised matters of public health risk.’ (Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015). A respondent from that 
study echoes the views of Amelia: ‘…looking at a label claiming fat free, I just don’t think that 
the risk posed by that particular issue is going to take precedence.’ 
 
Risk based enforcement requires that regulators should prioritise higher risks by allocating 
greater resources to them. Inevitably, this means withdrawing resources from elsewhere. Risk 
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based regulation will tend to ignore lower levels of risk even where the cumulative effect may 
be considerable. In fact, it may lead to persistent non-enforcement in relation to certain 
activities, which once characterised as low risk, will cease to attract regulatory scrutiny. In 
considering the enforcement of the Regulation, given the relatively low risks associated with 
nutrition and health claims one might expect that the attention of enforcers might be drawn 
towards other higher risk areas such as food safety. 
 
Millie explains how a business is categorised according to risk, where in food standards, ‘a 
takeaway is likely to be low risk but a large manufacturer is high risk, which is the other way 
round to food safety.’  As nutrition and health claims are unlikely to present an ‘imminent risk’, 
it unlikely that such a matter will provide the basis for strong action such as closure or a 
prohibition. 
The risks of misleading consumers about nutrition and health claims are latent and long term 
rather than immediate as with food safety. Therefore, such risks are easier to ignore: 
the public have been misled, but they’re not harming their own health unless 
it’s their mental health because they have issues with, and they’re relying on 
that product.  But we won’t know that, will we?  I think that’s where the 
differences are a lot of the time with food, food standards.  With food 
hygiene, we come from a background where you can usually, the 
consequences are immediate. 
 
Julie 
However low risks cannot simply be ignored. The harm they are designed to prevent is latent 
and long term and, in the case of nutrition and health claims, political concerns about public 
health may require that they are attended to in some way or other. Ignoring low risks will 
potentially simply substitute the supervision of many widely spread low risk activities with fewer 
larger risks which may or may not reduce risk overall. When subjected to economic cost 
benefit analysis risk based regulation may not lead to the most efficient use of resources. 
Large risks can lead to fewer very resource intensive actions which also may not lead to the 
greatest overall reduction in risk in return for the expenditure. 
 
There are particular challenges of dealing with low risks, including their identification and 
classification and ultimately the level of failure an enforcer is prepared to accept. There are 
many ways in which to quantify risk, usually by reference to probability and impact (Weber et 
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al., 2002) but there is no single accepted method. Therefore, in practice ‘low risk’ is often 
defined by the relevant regulator itself as meaning low priority. Having identified health and 
nutrition claims as lower risk, the challenge for enforcers is to pick up the ‘accumulations of 
such risks when they become an issue without expending significant amounts of resources’ 
(Black and Baldwin, 2012).  
 
In practice, the difference between a low risk and high risk is in the frequency of inspections 
or the intensity of the monitoring. This is consistent with the study by Condon-Paoloni where 
the authors concluded that notwithstanding that officers had a statutory duty to enforce, ‘they 
applied their discretion to risk analysis to set the frequency of their inspections.’ (Condon-
Paoloni et al., 2015).  In deciding what action regulators should take and how often they should 
take it, enforcers may directly inspect premises or use proxy indicators such as compliance 
history or evidence of deviation by a business from their own systems. 
 
In the event of a low risk where there appears to have been little harm, enforcers are faced 
with the dilemma as to what action to take. For example, if an unauthorised claim is made on 
the label of a product with low sales, should enforcers adopt a more conciliatory approach 
than if it had sold larger quantities? Or should they take a more principled approach where 
they treat contraventions of the law equally regardless of the harm or potential harm that 
ensues.  
 
Intelligence gathering plays a larger role in informing risk and diverting resources than simply 
routine inspection, ‘we try and do intelligence led work…market surveillance where we 
purchase items, for example diet pills, rather than a scattergun approach to everything’ Mia 
and Cate. 
4.12 Proportionality 
An important factor in determining the action or sanction to be applied in a case is the principle 
of proportionality. The Regulators’’ Code refers to proportionality in section 2: ‘Regulators 
should choose proportionate approaches to those they regulate, based on relevant factors 
including, for example, business size and capacity’ (BIS, 2014). 
As James makes clear: ‘a mistake on a label isn’t really a major crime. We have to use 
proportionality and help promote business’. Proportionality tempers the action which might be 
taken and goes further with an eye on commercial considerations as Ethan describes his 
approach to the problem of relabelling old stock: 
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But once we tell them why most, well everybody I’ve talked to has been 
compliant and changed it.  They may ask for some time to change labelling, 
getting rid of old stock or whatever, and again we look at that and the volume 
of stuff they have, if it’s just a small amount you’d probably let them, if it’s a 
large amount, no, they’d have start again with new labels. 
 
Ethan 
 
Sunstein refers to the rise of the principle of proportionality: ‘the last two decades have seen 
an increasing enthusiasm for cost benefit analysis for regulatory problems with a keen interest 
in disciplining regulation by ensuring a kind of proportionality between costs and benefits’ 
(Sunstein, 2002). 
Similarly, in the pyramid of responses, as one regulatory intervention fails, the regulator moves 
upward to the next more serious level and as the risk subsides, the regulator should move 
back down to a lower level. In this way, the pyramid provides an inherently proportionate and 
reasonable exercise of power the justification of which is based on the failure of the less 
serious previous action (Baldwin, 1990). 
4.13 Resources 
 
On the question of whether the authority was adequately resourced to be able to take cases 
enforcers had different views. On the one hand Ruby confirms that in her authority at least, 
they, ‘do have the resources and expertise to be able to take cases.’  Similarly Ruby says 
 
We do not have any real barriers to enforcement. We have the resources, 
the expertise and money if we wanted to take a case to court.  
Ruby 
On the other hand Scarlett says, ‘the single most important factor stopping me from taking 
action is resources.’ 
 
Where resources are tight this might lead enforcers to be more likely to take legal action as 
they lack the time necessary to devote to educating the businesses within their jurisdiction. 
This might seem counterintuitive, as legal action is generally expensive and difficult to justify 
in economic terms by reference to its direct effect. Rather the justification used is in the wider 
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effect on the market. In their study of the Office of Surface Mining in America, Shover et al. 
found this argument which was used to account for greater use of prosecution at the time 
(Shover et al., 1983). 
 
There is some evidence of the opposite view, where constrained resources will deter the issue 
of court proceedings as legal action is also resource intensive and legal costs rules mean that 
it presents a very high level of risk and this may mean that enforcers do not have the appetite 
for the considerable uncertainty involved in the process (Bartrip and Fenn, 1980). The cost of 
prosecution will restrict prosecution in a large proportion of cases but it may not be the prime 
or most significant consideration. Prosecution action even if it appears to be an expensive 
option in a particular case, may be justified by providing a deterrent effect and acting as a 
warning signal to others. Those studies showed that ‘it is not resources alone that determine 
policy’, but the ‘way in which they are used is determined by the interplay between their 
availability and other influences’ (Hutter, 1989). 
 
It appears that the lack of resources leads to action being less likely rather than more likely. 
Charlotte points to the reason why there is little appetite for litigation as one of resources: ‘we 
can’t afford to lose cases.’ She implies that the cost of losing such an action entails expenditure 
of unrecoverable legal fees and staff time. Another interpretation is that the authority cannot 
be seen to lose cases for the public opprobrium such a defeat might incur. This suggests a 
lack of experience among enforcers. 
 
Both Charlotte and Ethan point to the loss of a ‘fighting fund’ provided by the Food Standards 
Authority which might be called upon by an authority to fight a case which had national 
significance. 
 
There appeared to be a general perception that food enforcement had suffered during the 
period from 2009 to 2014 as a result of the coalition government cutbacks in public spending. 
Dexter and Theo explain: 
 
The food team suffered quite a few cut backs over the last few years. When 
I first started at trading standards there would be probably 12 inspectors 
pounding the beat and I was one of them visiting all food premises…[now] 
I’ve got 2 teams one of which is food and that team consists of 2.3 officers. 
That’s all. 
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Dexter and Theo 
The representative body the Trading Standards Institute (TSI) has warned of the risks to 
consumers as a result of the cuts to their service. It says that more than 70% of the trading 
standards services will restrict or stop some services: ‘These cuts threaten consumer rights, 
consumer safety and the health of legitimate businesses’  (Trading Standards Institute, 
2014a). 
As well as the adverse effect on individual consumer rights, the wider effect of poor 
enforcement of consumer rights will be felt by all consumers as a result of their impact on the 
market: 'The trading standards service plays a vital role in safeguarding consumer rights and 
the efficient working of consumer markets - essentials for our recovering economy,' John 
Bridgeman, former director general of Fair Trading. (Trading Standards Institute, 2014a) 
Research carried out in 2014 by the consumer group Which? appears to support the TSI view 
that the number of food inspections carried out by local authority officers had declined 
significantly in recent years. The number of food standards interventions had dropped by 
16.8% compared to the previous year. In addition, there were large variations of between 
authorities in the levels of enforcement carried out (Which?, 2014).  
Millie sees the problems of the lack of resources as common to other authorities and not just 
hers, ‘we’re not the only ones, it’s a resource issue.’ She points to the fact that issues other 
than labelling would attract special funding for projects such as smoking cessation or reviewing 
the options available for staff at a canteen, ‘but not labelling!’ 
Scarlett views the impact of the cuts as nothing less than devastating: 
Firstly, you’ve got resource issues. We’ve lost 40% of food standards staff. 
We’ve lost hundreds of years of experience through redundancy, or natural 
wastage. Standards has fared much worse than hygiene. 
 
Scarlett 
Millie goes even further with the argument that the lack of resources places in doubt the 
authority’s ability to fulfil its statutory obligations, ‘we have a duty to enforce food safety 
legislation and some people might say we’re not compliant with our statutory responsibilities.’ 
 
Effective judicial enforcement is a condition for functioning markets (Stiglitz, 1989). Where the 
lack of resources will lead to the inadequate enforcement of regulations to avoid consumers 
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from being misled then this would result in market failure. The regulation is aimed at correcting 
the information asymmetry between consumers and suppliers in the food market and the 
fulfilment of this aim depends on the effective enforcement by regulators and enforcement 
officers (Ramsay, 1985). 
 
4.14 Focus on matters other than food standards: agenda setting and 
conflicting priorities 
Environmental health officers are responsible for the enforcement of a broad range of areas 
concerning the immediate environment. These include: housing, disease, air pollution, noise, 
working conditions, in addition to food (Chartered Insititute of Environmental Health, 2014). 
Trading standards officers are responsible for matters which involve financial or physical risks 
for consumers. This requires the enforcement of an equally broad range of areas including 
consumer problems, product safety, fair trading and food fraud. Examples of the types of 
cases they deal with are: weights and measures to dealing with underage sales of tobacco 
and alcohol and counterfeit goods, particularly cigarettes and alcohol.  (Trading Standards 
Institute, 2014b). 
The breadth of the scope of the roles means that officers are responsible for the enforcement 
of a long list of legislation. In relation to the range and volume of legislation, one officer refers 
to ‘800 pieces of legislation’, and the number of businesses in their area means that they need 
to make choices about which legislation they enforce and against which businesses. They 
need to prioritise their work to make the most efficient use of their limited resources to deal 
with the problems of the communities they serve.  
Since qualifying in environmental health and from trading standards is that 
you have such an incredibly broad range of legislation and you know areas 
to cover. 
Ethan 
 
My remit includes the food team but it might also involve non-food laws such 
as the CPRs, Estate Agents Act, energy performance certificates, Package 
Travel Regs. The CPRs effectively replaced the TDA so anything and 
everything will come to me. 
Dexter and Theo 
There were varying opinions on how such priorities were established. Chloe describes a 
consultation process using a questionnaire with local consumers and business ‘We use the 
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questionnaire to get a full idea of businesses advice.’ 
In customer satisfaction surveys, food does always come second or third, 
we have categories that we ask complainers to categorise, so the selection 
of questionnaire answers, complainants, businesses and consumers, and 
ask them to rank what do you think important in what we do, food always 
comes high up with underage sales and product safety, they’re always the 
top three.  But we don’t break it down any further than food standards and 
labelling. 
 
Chloe 
However, Dexter and Theo saw priorities set by the local political agenda, which led to food 
standards being a low priority when compared to hygiene: 
Everyday local politicians are making very difficult decisions about what 
essential services they are going to stop providing. And enforcement of food 
standards of which NHCs is a part, just doesn’t get it on to the list. The dodgy 
Echinacea capsule with no Echinacea in it – nobody’s going to die. Even 
with an Echinacea capsule with a very high level of lead in it, nobody’s going 
to die. The emphasis is going to go on the salmonella. Somebody gets ill, 
the next day you can point the finger and say, it was the chicken tikka from 
that place down the road. If you get symptoms of high blood pressure or 
stroke in 20 years’ time it’s not appropriate to say well actually it was those 
takeaways I was having. Well, so what? It’s too late to do anything about it. 
Those longer term things are not on the radar any more. And the 
landscape…the FSA things are changing all the time…things in 2010 that I 
mentioned. FSA Scotland, it’s just going off on its own as of last week. We 
got the review of the official food control going on, but that was very much 
spurred by the eColi 151 incident in Wales. It was very much looking at 
microbiological food safety…I say there’s more to this. It’s not called the 
Food Safety Agency it’s called the Food Standards Agency. These things 
are important for protecting the consumer. Not necessarily stopping the 
consumer from being ill and dying because of food poisoning. But protecting 
their pocket. Food has to be of the nature, substance and quality demanded.  
That’s why we’re here but it’s not a priority… 
When questioned about why less attention is paid to food standards, Julie points to the latent 
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nature of the problem, ‘in terms of food standards, I think it’s the poor relative and it’s hidden’. 
In the event of a choice between safety and standards it appears that safety takes priority at 
the expense of standards: 
My gut feeling having dealt with lots of home authority referrals over the 
years is that food standards is very poorly enforced. Understandably, they 
are more concerned with ensuring that people don’t get salmonella food 
poisoning than they are being ripped off on the Echinacea capsules.  
Dexter and Theo 
 
Samuel spoke of food safety but not food standards being protected: 
Food safety has been thought to be more important. We are fortunate in that 
food safety has been protected but the same isn't true of food standards.  
However, by contrast, Charlotte highlights how standards are in fact enforced: 
I suppose just taking it from the food standards point of view, working with 
xxx (supermarket), anything with safety implications say food past its sell by 
date we respond to immediately and would be top priority and anything else 
comes after that. But I think the rest of it is treated with the same level of 
priority really. At the end of the day if someone thinks a HN claim is wrong it 
is misleading and should be dealt with accordingly. 
It would seem that food law enforcement plays a large part within departments, ‘food is a big 
part of trading standards work…a lot of trade advice is food based’ (Ethan) and in larger 
departments, some officers are dedicated to only food but with generic officers in others. As 
Chloe says: 
Proportion wise, you do quite a bit of food work but it’s not our sole 
responsibility, everybody’s generic here.  So it might be 10% of your day one 
day, 30% of your day the next.  Out of 12 of us, there’s only 4 that aren’t 
qualified for food. 
 
It appears that where officers cover the range of matters, priorities may be set by events rather 
than strategic decision-making: 
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Because we are generic, nothing can really take priority.  It’s a priority of 
literally on a day-to-day basis which is the most essential item to do. 
 
Sophie 
 
Food law enforcement divides further into food standards and food hygiene. Where trading 
standards officers are responsible for food standards enforcement only there is no conflict 
between safety and standards. However, in many cases, environmental health officers were 
given responsibility for food standards and therefore this would need to be reconciled with 
their traditional focus on safety. 
 
I think LA managers are being left to make that judgement for themselves 
individually. So a LA manager will have their own preconceptions of what’s 
important and what’s a priority or not. Food safety is always perceived to be 
important and it’s always been a priority. 
Sophie 
In examining the potential for state influence on food law enforcement Condon-Paoloni found 
a confluence of politics and media where the former would exert its influence on enforcement 
decision making in seeking to avoid criticism by the latter: ‘for the state government it’s more 
the consequences of what the media will do if we don’t respond rather than the health effects.’ 
(Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015). There was no evidence of such an influence from the data in 
this case.  
In some respects, until the turn of this century, the idea of food being political was new and 
even surprising. The first publication of Marion Nestle’s Food Politics How the Food Industry 
Influences Nutrition and Health (Nestle, 2013) in 2002 marked a change in attitude so that 
food related disease such as obesity now ranks high in the consumer consciousness. It is 
difficult to assess the effect of such political sensitisation on regulatory enforcement. Dexter 
and Theo describe how the political process influences the setting of priorities for regulatory 
enforcement. Greater political awareness and concern about nutrition and health may raise 
an expectation that the enforcement of nutrition and health claims will rise up the agenda. 
However, as Dexter and Theo state, nutrition and health claims compete for the limited 
resources of enforcers with food safety and fact that the consequences of the lack of 
enforcement are latent and long term for food standards rather than immediate as with food 
safety appears to indicate that they remain a low priority on the political and regulatory agenda. 
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4.15 Lack of specialist skill and experience 
 
There is a sense that by not focusing on food standards enforcement, that enforcers are not 
gaining the necessary specialist experience required and that this leads to atrophy in skill and 
the lack of enforcement becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy: 
TSOs are not dealing with it day to day. Nutrition is not a regional priority. 
There are very few projects in this area. The informal economy is the 
regional priority, counterfeit goods is a regional priority etc. not nutrition. 
Management experience plays a role. Most TSOs come from a fair trading 
background rather than a food science background. And this affects their 
choice of priority. Whereas years ago, food might have been fundamental 
but that isn’t the case anymore. It’s legislated under food standards but it’s 
not an immediate risk to health so why would it be a priority? 
Isaac 
The lack of involvement, allied to a lack of training may have an effect on the choice of actions 
to take for enforcement by officers. The interests and experience of managers is likely to 
influence the actions which are presented to them for approval for prosecution or other 
enforcement action and those which are likely to receive their support. Where managers are 
from a background that has not involved food and food science in particular, as Issac says, 
this makes it more difficult to obtain support for such cases. 
Enforcement of food standards can seem arduous with little prospect of a satisfactory result: 
you can tell City of xxx that there is a x and y making claims in breach but 
they have other priorities. I think a lot of front line officers would turn a blind 
eye. It’s something that will generate a huge amount of work and you will not 
get a legal case out of it. The prosecuting authority will just look at it and say 
well that’s just not in the public interest. Particularly where it’s not clear-cut 
and there’s a lot of marketing puff too.  
Isaac 
4.16 Environmental health enforcement of food standards 
 
The issue of the lack of expertise is exacerbated by the way in which food standards are 
traditionally enforced by specialist trading standards officers but how that work is increasingly 
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done by environmental health officers. It was clear from the data that following cuts in the 
trading standards services that the responsibility for food standards enforcement was ceded 
to environmental health officers and that respondents felt that food standards enforcement 
was weakened as a result: 
None of the environmental health officers had anything to do with food 
standards at all. They couldn’t see the problem and I can understand that 
because safety is the top priority. You don’t want to be dropping dead from 
food poisoning. If you are a little bit mislead it’s not so significant. They are 
low risk as far as EH are concerned.  
Amelia 
By contrast, Scarlett feels that food standards are given priority in her authority but that this is 
exceptional and the result of the director’s personal interest in this area: 
Food standards is seen as important here because of the interest of this 
director but I don’t think that’s the case everywhere. They have other 
priorities. They have a limited staff and try to keep all the plates in the air. If 
you are in regulatory you’ll have more people concerned about say, dog 
fouling, than NHCRs so politically you’ll have other priorities as well. So 
NHCRs are not a priority area at all.  
 
This lack of experience in food standards was readily admitted by Julie, ‘it was decided, with 
the budget cuts, that in theory as environmental health officers are competent in food 
standards we would take that role.  So, it’s been a bit of a learning curve’. 
 
Scarlett supports this view: 
A lot of EH people who have the qualification actually have only a very 
superficial knowledge of the regs or of food standards generally. They have 
their eye on hygiene. 
 
The cuts in government spending have been most acutely felt by trading standards. While this 
raises a question about the loss of specialist enforcement, some have gone further to say that 
it raises a question of the effectiveness of regulation such as the Consumer Protection from 
Unfair Trading Practices Regulations 2008 arguing that it makes a nonsense of the 
government’s assurances that consumer protection will be maintained (Shears, 2012). 
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It is difficult but not impossible to quantify the impact of the cuts in spending in trading 
standards and local authority services. Those such as Shears who argue that the effect is 
harmful to consumers do not point to evidence that demonstrates a qualitative or quantitative 
difference between before or after the cuts. In the absence of evidence of a causative link 
between the cuts and consumer protection, it is difficult to argue the point. In the light of the 
highly charged political debate surrounding the cuts to public services such claims need to be 
treated with caution. 
4.17 A proactive or reactive approach to the enforcement of nutrition and 
health claims 
 
Enforcers are faced with the choice between a proactive approach to nutrition and health 
claims where they seek out cases from monitoring and or alternatively a reactive approach 
where they respond to complaints as they are made. 
According to Fairman and Yapp: ‘compliance is conceptualized as the negotiated outcome of 
the regulatory encounter. This leads to heavily reactive decision making, in which the enforcer 
becomes the predominant driver, which poses huge challenges for the successful 
implementation of enforced self-regulation, and is an explanation for the lack of empirical 
evidence supporting deterrence theory in business compliance’ (Fairman and Yapp, 2005). 
The data showed evidence of both reactive and proactive approaches being employed but 
with an emphasis on complaints. James refers to his experience of both approaches:  
I know that my previous local authority was one of the only ones which did 
routine inspections and I know now that a lot of people don’t have the skills 
or the budget to do it so they only do reactive work. 
Dexter and Theo support this view while explaining their reactive approach: 
The problem I have is that because I don’t have officers to pound the beat 
we tend to be reactive. We will react to information that comes from other 
trading standards and EH and we will react to complaints and we will react 
to referrals from the FSA or any other government body. 
Scarlett agrees; in her view, ‘you haven’t got the time to be proactive.’ 
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However, Chloe indicates that while adopting a reactive strategy, there are likely to be few 
complaints about nutrition and health claims, obviously we’re responsive to complaints too, 
[but] we don’t get that many about health claims really.  
 
Millie supports this view and indicates that complaints provides intelligence on what she calls 
‘problem’ traders: 
 
We work on problem traders, who’s got the most complaints, obviously you 
don’t get many complaints about food labelling… I’m pretty certain that we’ve 
never had a complaint about a health claim, not since the new legislation. 
 
4.17.1 Proactive work and investigation 
 
The interview data exposed two instances of special projects which had been set up to review 
the use of nutrition and health claims. Chloe describes one: 
a couple of years ago we got some funding to, we did 30 samples, or 29 
samples of take away meals and analysed them for nutritional content. 
 
Chloe then goes on: 
We have a business plan in place which always includes some kind of food 
projects as well as food we would respond to all complaints.  In this year’s 
business plan, there was, as part of Trading Standards North West, there 
was the health claims project 
 
Millie also describes an instance of the funding of a similar (possibly the same) project: 
And coincidentally, last year we got a fund, the North West region got funding 
for sampling and I did the sampling for Rochdale.  So I had to take 2 samples 
for health claims and both were wrong. 
 
In carrying out investigation officers are influenced by the nature and seriousness or otherwise 
of the claim 
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It depends on the seriousness of it. For example a serious claim that says 
this can prevent the build-up of cholesterol but there is no evidence 
according to the complainant. We think we might investigate this. 
Jacob 
An important means of investigation at the early stage is to look at the product and any claims 
made for it online, ‘We make an independent assessment; which these days means you go to 
the web site and have a look.’ 
On investigation, officers would sometimes find that the claims were, according to Chloe, 
mostly compliant: 
I had a look at some claims to do with like, you know, high protein type drinks 
and things like that, and, they seem to be what, from my opinion, what I 
thought, was on some of the claims I think they seem to be complying with, 
mostly.  
 
Where claims require further investigation it was important evidentially as well as for 
investigation to obtain samples: 
We did a test purchase and brought some ourselves. They were being sold 
online. We got both lots sampled. The ladies who bought them had an 
unopened bottle so we got theirs sampled. Did a test purchase ourselves 
and got that sampled as well. And waited for that to come back. We got the 
composition and we had the labelling.  
Mia  
Scarlett describes how at one level an investigation may involve simply checking to see if a 
claim is permitted. This involves checking the list of permitted claims. The other, is where you 
need to carry out the research to establish nutritional content or whether the food has the 
claimed health effect. This is a more involved, expensive and even prohibitive process: 
There are two ways to go about enforcement. One where you ask, it this an 
authorized claim? In which case you check the wording against what’s on 
the list. The other is to ask does this product actually have the nutrient in it 
or does it have the health effect? That’s a much more difficult question. And 
I don’t have a sampling budget.  
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Scarlett 
4.18 Victims: consumers or other business? 
 
From acknowledging that the work is more reactive and that few complaints are made, arises 
the question of who makes the complaints. In relation to the Regulation there is no single 
consumer victim as such, in that there is no one person who bears the substantial cost of the 
breach. The quality of enforcement depends on whether there is a ‘victim’. ‘Enforcement is 
generally more effective against violations with victims because victims have a stake in 
apprehending violators, especially when they receive restitution’ (Becker and Stigler, 1974).  
This theory bodes badly for the enforcement of the Regulation because, in the same way as 
other food and environmental law, there is no single victim who suffers a significant and 
identifiable loss. Therefore, there is less incentive for there to be effective enforcement.  
Scarlett appears to change her position when she says that the work of enforcing nutrition and 
health claims is proactive but that the nature of such claims means, not surprisingly, that 
complaints are restricted to informed consumers: 
The work is proactive so it’s driven by inspection but we do get complaints 
as well. I have some repeat complainers from the public who are interested 
and informed. For example I have a lady who trawls shops and the internet 
for labels and where she thinks they are wrong, she lets me know. 
 
Amelia and Charlotte respectively, ‘I envisage that after the publication of the list we will get a 
huge raft of business complaints’ and ‘we also investigate complaints from possibly other 
businesses but mainly members of the public.’ 
When business complains it is with a view to competitive pressure whereas consumers are 
directly concerned with the misleadingness of the claim and the detriment to purchasers and 
this provides enforcers with the means to deal with cases as Isaac says: ‘complaints from 
other food companies is a good way to deal with cases…using competition, that can be 
effective.’ 
4.19 The outcome of complaints 
 
When enforcers receive complaints, it is apparent that the usual response is to provide the 
necessary advice to correct the misleading statement. This is discussed above. It is possible 
for there to be a range of outcomes including where Millie describes that no further action 
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would be taken: 
if anybody finds anything wrong with the labelling of a product produced in 
xxx [local authority] they would need to refer it directly to the company now, 
we wouldn’t deal with it.  We would potentially take it for information 
purposes only but we wouldn’t proactively do anything with that. 
 
However Ian describes where the complaint was referred to the Advertising Standards 
Authority (ASA) with a successful outcome but possibly a pyrrhic victory:  
in one case they did get their complaint upheld by the ASA. Though that took 
a long time and it was a seasonal product and that season’s sales had been 
made.  
The evidence of other studies found that investigation of health and nutrition claims 
on labels was generally initiated by complaints rather than routine proactive 
inspection (Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015).  
4.20 The differences between the enforcement of nutrition and health 
claims and other food standards legislation 
 
Enforcers were asked whether there were any differences in the way in which they enforced 
the Regulation compared to other food standards legislation. It was an area where Theo and 
Dexter had the most illuminating responses. The first was unequivocal: 
AP: Have you found differences between the enforcement of the HNCs and 
the range of other regulations that you are involved with? 
T&D: No not at all. NHCs are no different to any other area. We just have to 
measure it by the same yardstick of our enforcement policy.  
Jacob agrees: 
The process is exactly the same as we would use in relation to the 
enforcement of any of the food regulations.  
As does Ruby, who confirms enforcement is: ‘no different to enforcement of any other food 
standards.’ 
Samuel further confirms this view but makes the point that claims are high in the consumer 
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consciousness: 
No different to any other types of food standards legislation. The one thing 
might set this apart is its conspicuousness to the consumer.  
However Theo and Dexter make the point that the Regulation uses the term ‘commercial 
communication’ to encompass all promotional messages including those on web sites and not 
only the label. This goes beyond the usual scope of an enforcer’s role: 
Of course, that’s the other big difference between food labelling – it applied 
to anything that’s connected with the product so web sites included, all 
commercial communications not just what’s on the bottle. 
Theo and Dexter 
There are some key differences between the Regulation and other legislation, which might be 
manifested in the way in which the Regulation is enforced. These are: the large number of 
nutrition and health claims in commercial communications which fall within the Regulation 
(Lalor et al., 2010); the way in which the Regulation is structured, in particular with creation of 
the approved list of claims where such a small proportion of the claims submitted are approved 
(Verhagen et al., 2010; Asp and Bryngelsson, 2007; Gilsenan, 2011). The challenges of 
enforcement are discussed by Patel et al.  ‘From the initial proposal on nutrition and health 
claims in 2003, the European Commission acknowledged that such claims “are often not 
properly enforced.’ (Patel, 2012)  
4.21 Summary 
 
The evidence of the data indicates that the enforcement of nutrition and health claims faces 
the same challenges as other legislation enforced by trading standards and environmental 
health officers. These are the limited resources, the adoption of a risk based strategic 
approach and the differences in the styles of enforcement priorities of various local authorities. 
In reference to enforcement of legislation generally it was found that ‘Trading Standards 
Officers enjoy a high level of discretion about how to implement the law in relation to individual 
businesses’ (Patel, 2012). The evidence shows that regulators generally deploy this discretion 
flexibly (Hawkins, 2002) The same maybe said for the approach to the enforcement of the 
Regulation on nutrition and health claims. 
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Findings – structural themes 
 
4.22 Summary 
 
This second part of the Findings Chapter, like the first, analyses the data gathered from 
enforcers. However, it differs from the previous part in an important respect: its focus is on 
what might be termed ‘structural’ or ‘systemic’ issues. There is a critical review of the issues 
arising from the enforcement of EU law by local agencies, inconsistencies in enforcement, the 
application of the home and primary authority principles in practice, the problem of the 
complexity of the legislation and finally the role of central government. 
4.23 Local enforcement of EU law 
 
One of the challenges faced by the enforcers is that of enforcement at a local level of 
legislation issued at EU level. The EU is concerned with strategic policy and harmonisation 
initiatives, whereas, a local authority is typically concerned with the interpretation, application 
and day-to-day enforcement of the law as implemented at the intermediate national level. The 
gap between policy and enforcement poses challenges for governance. In particular, for 
regulators charged with implementation of food policy there is some negotiation between the 
local, national and international interface (Harrison et al., 1997).   
Charlotte describes this as a potential tension: 
I am concerned with the fact that it’s a system originating in EU law and then 
you have the problem of multiple authorities, is there a tension there? 
Between that wide multiple nature and the local nature of enforcement 
This is identified by Scott and Trubek with their broader theory of ‘new governance’ which 
‘accepts the necessity for coordination of action and actors at many levels of government, as 
well between government and private actors and…it accepts the possibility of coordinated 
diversity and the advantages of leaving final policy making to the lowest level when this is 
feasible’ (Scott and Trubek, 2002).  
According to John, ‘[B]y engaging with transnational economic and political organisations, 
local decision-makers become part of a world that is more complex, changeable and 
interdependent than national politics’ (John, 2000).  
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There appears to be agreement in the literature with the theory that local enforcement allows 
the authority to calibrate its response while taking into account the character of the area over 
which it has jurisdiction (John, 2000; Harrison et al., 1997). This is supported by James with 
reference to his experience of practice:    
The thing with local enforcement is that you can respond to local needs. 
We’re in an affluent area with a foodie reputation. There will be other 
problems in other areas. 
In a concept that is not inconsistent with the individual character of local enforcement, John 
refers to the ‘uneven’ nature of localised and delegated government. While this may allow for 
positive outcomes such as the ability to respond to local needs, it will necessarily lead to 
variation in practice. As James states, ‘I think that there is an inconsistency in regulation, as 
we all know’. Such inconsistency will be most keenly felt at the individual firm level where it is 
bound to be perceived as unfairness. At the EU level, this will result in varying levels of service 
and protection for consumers. For business it may provide a means of being able to use the 
variations in enforcement to permit a choice of forum and jurisdiction that would have 
undesirable consequences for consumers. 
James describes this risk: 
Things are European based and there will be interpretation in that as well. 
You sometimes hear that certain manufacturers will go to certain countries 
because they know it can get passed they believe it’s a lower standard and 
get to the market that way. 
The position is summed up by John: ‘Whereas the apex of political systems was formerly the 
nation-state, whose leaders could authoritatively resolve most political decisions, now many 
decisions lie elsewhere in the institutional mechanisms of the EU with its competencies in 
specified policy sectors.’ (John, 2000) The position is intractable and represents a fault line in 
European, and particularly British, policy and politics that extends into enforcement practice. 
The ambitions of the international forum with its goals of removing barriers to trade that seeks 
simultaneously to take advantage of local mechanisms faces the challenges of consistency 
and the charge of legal pluralism. 
4.24 Differences in enforcement policy and practice – a postcode lottery? 
 
Where powers are awarded to local authorities who operate independently in a particular area 
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of decision making, in this case, the enforcement of nutrition and health claims, differences in 
the experiences of sections of the population who are subject to the regulation, are inevitable. 
Critically, this will have an impact on the experience of the service received of those 
consumers who the regulation seeks to protect. Sometimes, this is referred to as a ‘postcode 
lottery’, a term usually used to refer to the uneven provision of public services in areas such 
as healthcare (Cummins et al., 2007). 
The suggestion of a postcode lottery has become a sensitive issue in respect of public service 
provision. In fact the phrase has emerged from the media when highlighting differences in 
health services dependent on location. The phrase carries with it an implication of injustice. 
Therefore, it was with some delicacy that the question was raised with enforcers when 
conducting the research. When asked if the experience of a business might differ from another 
depending on where they are located, Samuel responds with surprising directness: ‘Absolutely 
yes. Without a doubt. It will do. Yes.’ Samuel does go on to provide a further reason for this 
based on the way in which food businesses are structured; ‘Because of the contracting for 
manufacture model, the local authority might not even know that they are there.’ It’s not clear 
how the model where the manufacturer and the licensor of a product are distinct entities should 
influence the uneven enforcement of law. However, it does provide a sense of the complexity 
in identifying the responsible party with the obvious deleterious effect on enforcement. 
The idea of a postcode lottery appears to be supported by research carried out by the 
consumer group Which?. The research discovered ‘a huge variation’ between levels of food 
law enforcement by local authorities. It found: ‘[w]ork to check food standards, such as the 
accuracy of food labels, is particularly patchy.’ 
4.25 Relevant authority: home authority and primary authority 
 
The issue of a single organisation operating across local authority borders raises questions of 
which authority or authorities should exercise jurisdiction over that business. The established 
position, in the absence of alternative arrangements, is that the authority where the business 
is based or ‘where the relevant decision making base of a business is located’ i.e. the ‘home 
authority’ is the relevant authority. The home authority will prioritise monitoring and 
enforcement over businesses based in its area and it will act as the principal link on regulatory 
enforcement matters on behalf of other authorities. The home authority may be determined by 
the location of the head office or main place of business of the directors or the registered 
address of a business. The home authority principle is aimed at offering a degree of clarity for 
businesses and local authorities and reducing the burden of compliance costs. It does not 
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however remove the responsibility of enforcement from the authority in which an infringement 
is found to have occurred.  
There are differences between attitudes to the home authority principle. Here Dexter and Theo 
appear to rely on it: 
We tend to concentrate on [this area] and what food we are responsible for. 
Our attention is turned to them. If we can make sure that everything in our 
patch is being enforced correctly and everyone else sticks to ensuring that 
everything within their patch is being enforced then the theory is that 
everything should be ok. 
Their confidence in the principle is supported by Ethan: ‘It [home authority] works reasonably 
well, you need to backtrack really as to how European legislation really works.’ And further by 
Charlotte: 
 
In terms of the trading standards element to it, it’s sort of, it has worked well, 
because people when we were trading standards they were never afraid to 
pick the phone up and speak to somebody and say, I’ve just found this, and 
it’s made by your company, can I just have a chat with you about it.  And that 
worked pretty well.   
       
Jacob explains how the principle may bestow the authority with an alternative to issuing legal 
proceedings and how it can also provide a database of intelligence to the home authority to 
inform further action: 
 
If we find a case we investigate we can refer it to their home authority this 
might be an alternative to prosecution.  If they have other complaints the HA 
can build evidence with which to approach the company to say ‘we have had 
these complaints we need to take action.’  
James credits the home authority principle as an element of the framework of food law 
enforcement that delivers a high level of food safety and trust in the accuracy of the label. 
However, problems may arise with differences in enforcement attitudes to labelling practice. 
James illustrates this with the example of the compliance with the regulation relating to the 
use of the cheese substitute ‘analogue’: 
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Overall, we probably enjoy an exceptional level of food safety, accuracy in 
composition in the UK. But there are problems too. For example, synthetic 
cheese called analogue which may be on the label but most consumers will 
not appreciate what it actually is. It’s made from vegetable oils rather than 
cow’s milk and I’ve found instances of breaches. It’s cheaper than real 
cheese and some companies use it in pizza but call it something else, like 
an Italian sounding name but you must actually call it by its real name.  So 
when challenged they say, well that other company they do the same. And 
there is some validity to that because they expect consistency in 
enforcement which seems reasonable. But there’s a proper way to do it. The 
substance isn’t banned, you can use it but you just need to play by the rules.  
 
The home authority principle may be applied in informing an authority’s choice of enforcement 
action. Ethan describes how the procedures work in conjunction with each other in determining 
where on the scale of potential responses the appropriate action should lie:  
 
That would depend on the severity of the matter in question and whether it’s 
a case of: here’s a referral, deal with it as you wish, don’t tell us.  Here’s a 
referral: we’re a bit concerned to know what the outcome was and what the 
dialogue with the business.  Here’s a referral: we want to take action anyway. 
 
The fact that a business falls within the jurisdiction of a local authority may accommodate the 
use of referrals for advice and guidance on the basis of ease of access: 
 
If it’s a home authority company, it tends to be dealt with by advice.  I would 
go along and speak to them and say, because a lot of the complaints I get 
specifically about health claims would be from other trading standards 
authorities.  So they’d be a referral to me. 
Jessica 
 
Therefore, the home authority principle appears to work in conjunction with the 
accommodative approach to enforcement. In the light of the apparent success in the operation 
of the home authority principle, it may be surprising that there is now a shift away from the 
principle and towards the promotion of primary authority relationships (see next section). This 
may be accompanied by the adoption of Hutter’s ‘insistent’ approach or even the sanctioning 
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strategy identified by Hawkins. 
 
In each of the interviews, it became clear that respondents were drawing from their general 
experience of enforcement when answering questions rather than restricting their answers to 
the context of the enforcement of health and nutrition claims. For clarification, respondents 
were asked if there were any differences between the enforcement of health and nutrition 
claims compared with other legislation. It was clear from the responses that there were no 
such differences; ‘No. It’s the same as food safety’ (Charlotte) was a typical answer. 
4.25.1 Primary authority – definition 
The concept of primary authority was created in 2009 as a means of mitigating some of the 
disadvantages of the home authority principle. Primary authority involves creating a statutory 
partnership between a business and a single local authority where that authority will be 
responsible for providing definitive advice to the business in exchange for payment. Primary 
authorities provide ‘assured advice’ which is described as ‘robust’ and ‘bespoke’ and which 
‘must be respected by all local regulators.’(BIS, 2015b)  
4.25.2 Primary authority in practice 
Charlotte claimed that there were several primary authority relationships between businesses 
and her authority. When asked what precisely this meant in practice she explained that:  
 
It gives them [the business] consistency.  If your primary authority say we 
agree this label, other regulators have to consult that, and obviously you can 
challenge it, but it’s not easily challenged by another authority. 
 
The value of primary authority relationships are therefore obvious for business; as James 
describes: ‘Primary authority gives protection to companies in that they can outlay money and 
finances knowing that it’s not going to be challenged about the way they do things.’ For local 
authorities faced with harsh spending cuts, they provide a valuable source of income and 
enable them to continue essential work. 
 
Notwithstanding that primary authorities were created in 2009, the first ever  primary authority 
determination came in 2015 when The Better Regulation Delivery Office made the following 
statement: 
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A dispute over different local authority interpretations of the law has been 
resolved in the first ever Primary Authority determination. The Business 
Department’s regulatory delivery directorate, BRDO, has upheld advice from 
primary authority Newcastle City Council to high street baker Greggs Plc. 
about provision of toilets in its retail premises. 
 
         (BRDO, 2015a) 
 
The important point here is not the substance of the decision but the principle that when the 
primary authority advice was challenged, the BRDO upheld the advice from Newcastle City 
Council. The decision upholds the original ruling by the council and therefore provides positive 
support for the concept. It is instructive to consider the rationale in this quasi-judicial role on 
the part of the BRDO:  
1. The advice was soundly based upon the purpose and content of the disputed provision, 
and represented an informed and professional view of the law; 
2. It was consistent with relevant case-law; and 
3. Evidence demonstrated that since June 2011 the advice issued by Newcastle City Council 
has been accepted by other local authorities as reflecting a reasonable and proportionate 
interpretation of section 20 of the 1976 Act. 
The direction of the Primary Authority was therefore confirmed. It is highly unusual to find the 
terms ‘informed’ and ‘professional’ applied when considering the reasonableness of a 
decision. In cases of challenges of delegated authority decision making it is more common to 
find the principles of administrative law, namely judicial review and natural justice applied with 
the focus on the way in which a decision is made rather than its substance (Bradley and Ewing, 
2007).  
The terms ‘reasonable’ and ‘proportionate’ used in the third paragraph are more familiar 
concepts in legal decision-making. They allow of differences in interpretation and it would not 
be inconceivable for a court or quasi-judicial authority to determine the same case by 
upholding the challenge and yet apply the same principles. 
That the determination upheld the verisimilitude of the Council’s decision and therefore 
providing support for both the original local authority and the business (Greggs the baker is a 
multiple based across the UK) is notable. It might have been more interesting to note the 
outcome if the BRDO had determined to uphold the challenge and therefore undermined the 
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decision of the local authority. This would, one suspects, somewhat undermine the 
expectations of certainty from business. 
It is instructive to review the enforcer’s understanding of the primary authority principle (made 
prior to the BRDO determination). 
we haven’t issued any assured advice for people for primary authority, and 
assured advice is something that the primary authority would rely upon and 
that another authority couldn’t really challenge, to a certain degree, it’s 
published advice and then if somebody comes along and says well we don’t 
agree with that, we’re going to have to seek permission.  The trader would 
rely upon that advice.  And if another authority wanted to challenge it, they 
would have to speak to us and for us to either rescind that advice or to make 
a change in some other way, or for us to concede, you know, we’ll pull it or 
something like that.  
          Jessica 
 
The primary authority principle may be viewed as the logical conclusion of the accommodative 
approach identified by Hawkins (2002). Assured advice occupies a unique position in one 
important respect. It goes beyond the benefit of advice from a retained professional such as a 
solicitor or consultant where, if such advice turned out to be incorrect the client would need to 
prove that the advice was negligent and that a reasonable professional exercising due care 
and skill would not have provided such advice. Primary authority advice goes further by 
providing an (albeit limited) indemnity to the business. That there is a payment made for the 
advice which represents a revenue stream for the local authority risks undermining the 
independence of the authority as a prosecutor and as such represents the strongest objection 
to the advice. Councils are under pressure to seek such revenue as Chloe describes: ‘We do 
a lot of business advice. We don’t have any home authority any more, from 2012 we stopped 
home authority’. 
The provision of services by an enforcer in return for payment and how revenue generation 
might influence the setting of priorities is not necessarily unique to this study. Condone-Paoloni 
et al found that ‘management and budget considerations affected work practice, so that the 
government policy for ‘cost recovery’ of (audit and other) services may have resulted in 
skewing of work activities to generate funds to provide the service’ (Condon-Paoloni et al., 
2015).   
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From a business point of view, there are also disadvantages; most profoundly in having to pay 
for a service that was previously provided free. Moreover, in this particular case where the 
businesses in question decide, eventually, to pay:  
Because we haven’t got resources to do it, so a lot of our home authority 
companies from April 2012 transferred over to primary authorities.  Not all of 
them, initially because they said why should I pay for something that I’ve 
always had for free, or then we don’t need it, we’ll go to xxx. And then a few 
of them have come back, and said oh actually can you help with this? 
          Chloe 
 
Sophie points to the problem of the primary authority principle where this results in a close 
relationship between the regulator and the regulated firm: ‘It’s very difficult. There are very few 
home authorities or primary authorities ready or willing to prosecute their own.’ 
However, Samuel dismisses the risk of a conflict of interest and the potential for bias in favour 
of a business solely because they have a primary authority relationship: 
We have PA relationships here. For example, we have one with a German 
company but I’ve made it very clear that I was going to report on their labels.  
They didn’t get any better treatment because they have a PA relationship. 
They changed their labels as a result of the report. They have a primary 
relationship for which they pay but there’s no question of different treatment.  
 
4.26 Technical barriers and complexity of the Regulation 
 
At first sight the Regulation draws in questions of health and nutrition into the sphere of local 
authority enforcers who are more used to dealing with food hygiene issues and misleading 
claims on food standards. Other studies have shown that this can present a challenge for 
inspectors where they found they were uncomfortable in this area while admitting that this is 
an area where ‘my skills aren’t 100% up to scratch’ and struggling when faced with the 
question, ‘will it improve heart health?’ and unable to respond with more than; ‘I don’t know. 
I’m not a doctor.’ (Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015). 
As Charlotte says:  
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when you start reading something in the nutrition and health regulations and 
it’s going on about psychological [physiological?] functions and things, you 
do start thinking ‘do I need to be a doctor?’, ‘do I need to be a scientist? 
Ruby reiterates this by highlighting the impact of the Regulation’s complexity on the task of  
enforcement, ‘It’s the most technical piece of legislation and that is what makes it difficult to 
enforce.’   
The Regulation distinguishes between nutrition and health claims by creating a distinct regime 
for each. The distinction is borne through to enforcement where the substantiation of a nutrition 
claim is a matter of compositional analysis and for health claims it is a matter of scientific 
evidence resulting in an authorised claim following a recommendation by EFSA. The EU 
publishes authorised claims on its web site http://ec.europa.eu/nuhclaims/. This is explained 
by Amelia: 
With the nutrition claims because that is so clear cut we send them off to the 
analyst to check that what it says on there is what is in there. They are not 
complex in that we can get the analysis done.  
But with health claims in some respects they are more straightforward. Once 
the list is published if it’s not on the list it is not permitted. I don’t feel we are 
at that stage yet because there are still huge amounts of decisions pending. 
This is echoed by James when considering the evidential burden of proof: ‘previously we had 
to prove that it was false beyond all reasonable doubt. Now it’s a question of whether it is on 
that list.’  
Such comments regarding the structure of the legislation and the removal of the requirement 
of having to make a judgement or the requirement to seek expert evidence for the prosecution 
of a misleading health claim might lead one to consider that the task of the enforcer had 
become more straightforward. That, according to Charlotte, would be a mistake. She was 
asked to consider the position before and after the regulation came into force: 
You’ve been involved since before these regulations came into force. Have 
they made a difference? 
It’s a lot more complicated. The fact that the guidance is over 100 pages. 
Previously the claim just had to be correct. Now you have all these additional 
categories. Some can be used awaiting authorisation and some cant 
depending on the type of claim. So it’s definitely more complicated now. The 
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legislation was brought in because a lot of claims were being made but 
business accepted the regs because they thought it was going to be 
simplified but I don’t think we realised how long the approvals process would 
take and that’s causing a lot of issues I think. And because the wording is 
set in stone, as it were, that’s causing a problem. You don’t have to use that 
exact wording but there are not a lot of other words you can use. I think it’s 
categories as well where a claim might be approved for one product but can’t 
be used for a different type. It’s all getting complicated. 
Charlotte 
The Regulations sets out the scope of their application by reference to ‘commercial 
communications’ about foods to be delivered as such to the final consumer (Article 1). There 
is guidance on what precisely the term commercial communication means and how it applies. 
However, in practice there are questions that arise particularly with internet communications 
in social media and with consumer testimonials where the difference between editorial content 
and reporting and advertising are unclear: 
 
The internet presents a further problem. For example a direct or indirect link 
to a survivor of an illness endorsing a product and saying that they got better 
from consuming that product. That might be 5 clicks away but the effect is 
just the same. If it is a testimonial does it fall within the NHCRs? Is it made 
by the company?... How do testimonials fit with the regs and what about 
where it is published by another? Is it a commercial communication? 
 
         Jacob 
 
In relation to claims within the context of social media, Jacob raises the familiar problem: ‘The 
NHCRs will require a scientific evidence base but what companies will do is raise the question 
of is it us or is it someone who we have no control over? For example through social 
networking.’  
 
4.27 Central government involvement 
 
In the period between the drafting, implementation and coming into force of the Regulation, 
there have been fundamental structural changes to the government affecting the ministerial 
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and non-ministerial responsibility and involvement with the Regulation. The most significant of 
these has been the reorganisation of the FSA into a single smaller organisation with the 
responsibilities relating to the food industry such as labelling passed to the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and matters of health now ceded to the Department of 
Health. The reorganisation took place as a part of the reforms of the new coalition 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat government in 2010 (Defra, 2010). For enforcers this 
meant that where there was previously a single point of reference for food within central 
government, there are now three; with the Department of Health responsible for nutrition and 
health claims. The aim according to government was to protect public confidence in food with 
a renewed focus on safety for the FSA. 
However, in Amelia’s view, ‘The whole split between Department of Health, Defra and FSA is 
just a nightmare for us. It’s not helpful to us and it’s not helpful for business.’ And Charlotte 
adds a similar view, ‘instead of just the FSA, you’ll have the Department of Health and Defra 
there. And then there’s FSA Wales and FSA Scotland with different remits.’ The more 
restricted remit of the FSA is felt by Dexter and Theo who say: 
I find in my dealings with the FSA is that they are focussed on food safety 
from a microbiological view and they do tend to overlook the rest of the remit 
which hasn’t been helped since the divisions made since the 2010 election 
with nutrition functions and labelling functions going off to other government 
departments. Which makes our life difficult. 
Theo and Dexter go on to describe the complexity involved when a product gives rise to 
multiple issues which fall within the remit of all three bodies: 
We need to throw into the pot the fact that the ultimate body that is 
responsible for enforcement is the UK Department of Health and that has 
certainly not helped. The fact that food has been split three ways. Between 
Health, Defra and the Agency. So if you have one product and three different 
issues. Each of which could go to a different body.  
         Dexter 
Ethan provides a ready example of this lack of coordination by raising a question with 
reference to the remits of the bodies and applying the case of allergens; ‘composition is now 
Defra, safety is FSA, and health claims are the Department of Health. So, you know, what 
should be included in the new consultation response about allergens?’  
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The issue affects enforcers when concerned with trying to obtain help and guidance in 
enforcement issues, ‘you don’t know whether to call the Department of Health, Defra or FSA.’ 
The problems are not just organisational but also problems of substance and what is regarded 
as a lack of responsibility, knowledge and skill in the ministerial departments. In her experience 
Scarlett finds that, ‘you can email DoH and Defra and you’d be very lucky to get a reply. I 
emailed three days ago and I haven’t even got a response to say we’ve received it.’ Jessica 
confirms this experience: 
The Food Standards Agency local liaison officers are great and, as I say, 
they attend the meetings and if we’ve got an issue we ring them up and we 
speak to them, and we do about other issues, so we ring them up for that.  
So the FSA, great.  Other departments, we’ve not heard a thing from them. 
 
Dexter and Theo describe the nature of the support from central government since the 
reorganisation in vivid detail: 
I know of one incident. I’ve heard this from the horse’s mouth at the agency. 
That a call comes into the FSA, the person on the switchboard say oh that’s 
a Defra function now, this person rings Defra. The person at Defra doesn’t 
have a clue. So they say I’ll get back to you on that. So they ring somebody 
at the FSA. I have been very critical of the Agency but at least before 2010, 
you could generally get to speak to someone who didn’t necessarily know 
all about the subject but had the responsibility. With Whitehall you just get to 
know somebody and they move off to another job, and educating about who 
you are and what you do. 
The sense of disappointment and frustration is palpable. 
Table 5 
Application of Lipsky’s model of street level bureaucrats to the data from trading 
standards and environmental health officers based on Condon-Paoloni et al. 
Lipsky’s theory Findings  
Heavy workload Multiple duties across a broad range of 
areas 
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Unpredictable demand for services Difficulty in planning for uncertain demand 
Direct interaction with clients High degree of interaction with public and 
industry 
Limited resources Limited resources 
Conflict between client needs and 
organisational goals 
Conflicting role of enforcer or advisor 
Rationing of services Prioritisation, particularly with reference to 
risk 
 
The table shows significant correlation between the results of the research and Lipsky’s 
theory. To sum up, they are: high workload with demands from clients including from 
consumers and industry, a need to prioritise workload and the result being a struggle to 
understand and apply complex legislation. 
4.28 Conclusion 
 
This section examined the challenges of enforcement that arise from the structural issues of 
the legislation. The key challenges lie in the enforcement of international law (which is what 
the EU is in the final analysis) at a local level. The price of devolved power and local 
responsiveness appears to be lack of consistency of implementation and inevitable charges 
of unfairness. The reorganisation of responsibility for food between three areas of government 
has caused difficultly for enforcers who are faced with the prospect of multiple ministries and 
agencies becoming involved in the enforcement of various issues arising from a single 
product.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter draws together the specific conclusions and findings from the earlier work in the 
literature review and findings into a conclusion of the study as a whole with reference to its 
original aims. The conclusion will connect with the earlier work detailed in the literature review 
by applying the theory to the practice found as a result of the data analysis. The conclusions 
highlight the significance of the study and its implications for regulatory enforcement.  
5.2 The original aim of the study 
 
This study explores the ways in which local enforcement officers apply their discretion to 
enforce the law relating to nutrition and health claims. It is one small but important part of the 
broader debate around the regulation of the food supply. The aim of the study was to 
investigate the practice of trading standards and environmental health officers in the 
enforcement of nutrition and health claims for food in the UK. In doing so, it is worth revisiting 
the original objectives:  
1. To review the theoretical basis and rationale for the implementation of the regulation 
on nutrition and health claims;  
2. To establish the practices and normative values of trading standards and 
environmental health officers in the enforcement of the regulation; 
3. To identify the operating and cognitive frameworks of enforcers affecting the 
application of their discretionary powers; 
4. To explore the variations in regulatory enforcement styles in the enforcement of the 
regulation; 
5. To establish the nature of any constraints and limitations that exist on the enforcement 
of the regulation; 
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5.3 The rationale for the regulation of nutrition and health claims 
 
The literature review investigates and explains the theoretical basis of the regulation.  This 
regulation aspires to move towards the goal of perfect markets to ensure the efficient 
distribution of resources, provide optimal conditions for business, promote a high level of 
competition and therefore provide optimum value for consumers (Sharpe, 1964). In a perfect 
market, consumer sovereignty is the natural result of competition between suppliers. 
Therefore, well-informed and rational consumers will benefit from the strong consumer 
protection which results from the Regulation.  The justification for intervention is sometimes 
framed in terms of consumer protection rather than to correct recognised market failure, in 
relation to nutrition and health properties of food, this is to put right information gaps between 
buyers and sellers (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). In this case, regulatory intervention 
directed towards the provision of information will aim to correct such distortions and alleviate 
their effect by allowing accurate market information signals to be transmitted (Caswell and 
Mojduszka, 1996). 
 
Information is provided in two ways: first, by the requirement for disclosure of specified 
information, for example nutritional values of food; and second, by the control of promotional 
claims, for example health effect claims. Both of these forms of control are evident in the 
Regulation. 
 
5.4 The enforcer’s toolkit 
 
Enforcement of the Regulation allows enforcers a largely unfettered  (except for financial 
constraints and resulting pressures to prioritise) discretion to choose between various 
enforcement tools. As such, ‘enforcers have the capacity to affect the implementation of policy’ 
(Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015). The data appear to support the paradigm of the regulatory 
pyramid in regulatory risk differentiation where firms are treated differently in accordance with 
the enforcer’s assessment of the risks of non-compliance. As one regulatory intervention fails, 
the regulator moves upward to the next more serious level and, as the risk subsides, the 
regulator should move back down to a lower level. In this way, the pyramid provides an 
inherently proportionate and reasonable exercise of power the justification of which is based 
on the failure of the less serious previous action. It is instructive to see that the Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 to a large degree implements the Ayres and Braithwaite 
model with the influence of the intervening Hampton and Macrory reviews. The enforcement 
tools that were described by Ayres and Braithwaite ranged from the provision of advice to 
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prosecution with all that sits in between these two extremes.  In relation to the enforcement of 
the Regulation the tools have changed little since that time. The innovation and creation of 
novel sanctions has taken place in other spheres, for example in relation to the implementation 
of stop now orders under the Stop Now Orders (EC Directive) Regulations 2001. 
5.5 Enforcement practice – deterrence or accommodation 
 
In relation to the enforcement of the Regulation, Hawkins and Hutter capture the central 
difficulty thus; ‘the task of a regulatory bureaucracy is, by various means, to induce a 
potentially unwilling business organisation to bear costs which it would in many circumstances 
not wish to assume’ (Hawkins and Hutter, 1993). The costs of compliance will not be incurred 
in the absence of coercion by enforcement officers. Such officers play a significant role in 
influencing the business to incur compliance costs and to do so in a way which provides the 
optimal level of protection for consumers.  
 
The literature suggests a linear paradigm of enforcement that exists between the deterrence 
model (Reiss, 1984) and the accommodative model. In the deterrence model the methods of 
enforcement are penal and adversarial and prosecution plays an important role and there is 
greater reliance on imposing sanctions (Hutter, 1989). By contrast, the accommodative model 
of enforcement seeks to secure compliance by the remedying of existing problems and the 
prevention of others. In the accommodative model, compliance is achieved by cooperation 
and negotiation. The methods used to ensure compliance are persuasion, negotiation and 
education. The use of legal action, particularly prosecution, is regarded as a last resort to be 
used only in the event that everything else has failed (Hawkins, 1984). In this model; ‘the 
importance of legal methods lies in the mystique surrounding their threatened or possible use 
rather than their actual use’ (Hawkins, 1984). 
 
This study found evidence for both the deterrence and accommodative approaches of 
enforcement. When interviewed, enforcers identified themselves primarily as enforcers whose 
first duty was to the public. A further related theme, which is not found in the literature, but 
which has more recently emerged is the view of enforcers as advisors to business. Such an 
approach is rooted firmly in the accommodative model of Braithwaite et al where officers seek 
to ‘educate, persuade and cajole’ (Braithwaite et al., 1987). In this capacity, the enforcer 
adopted techniques such as education, persuasion and negotiation to deal with cases. In this 
role, enforcers’ tactics were more informal. Such a step may be seen a further step along the 
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accommodative path where enforcement officers are less enforcers in the traditional sense 
and they begin to take on the characteristics of advisors and consultants. 
 
5.6 Enforcers as advisors 
 
Marc Law raises the notion that ‘an advisory approach to regulatory enforcement may be a 
necessary component of an effective enforcement strategy’ (Law, 2006). The data in this study 
showed evidence of the engagement in advice as part of enforcement. One might have 
expected there to be some angst about fulfilling what appear to be conflicting roles, however 
respondents appeared to be able to switch between the two without any apparent difficulty.  
In examining this advisory function, the communication between the firm and the regulator is 
found  to demonstrate an awareness of the responses required to both the needs and attitudes 
of firms and the ‘operating and cognitive frameworks of firms’ (Black and Baldwin, 2010). 
Examples of this are evident in the commercial nature of the advice on claims for sports 
supplements made by internet-based businesses. 
The data from the sample interviews of enforcers in this study shows how the roles of advisor 
and enforcer are taken on and adapted to suit the circumstances. This supports the notion of  
escalation up the regulatory pyramid of Ayres and Braithwaite et al (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992). Sometimes, even in the same case, enforcers would move up but less easily down the 
pyramid of regulatory responses.  
The study found the relationship of advisor and firm differed from that of the retained 
consultant and firm in some important respects. There was a willingness to challenge the 
advisor based on observations of what appeared to be inconsistent practice and the tolerance 
of non-compliant claims in circulation. This raises questions of fairness to which there appears 
to be no wholly satisfactory answer from enforcers. The conflict between the role of advisor 
and prosecutor is felt most keenly when faced with the prospect of action from another 
authority which challenges or undermines the advice provided to the firm. The overriding 
concern from firms however is for consistency and certainty for the advice which they receive. 
This places great pressure on enforcers to provide independent, bespoke, complex and 
commercially aware advice that will face up to scrutiny and possible challenge by experienced 
advisors. Not surprisingly, the data showed some faltering of confidence among officers 
particularly when faced with the absence of the coordination previously provided by LACORS.  
Under such strained circumstances, the question of liability for negligent advice arises. The 
precise nature of the liability for incorrect advice leading to an economic loss is unclear. In 
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theory the application of the principles of duty of care, breach and causation and remoteness 
of loss will lead to liability in the same way as for paid advice save for the absence of a contract 
for service (Shavell, 2009). 
Many of the officers interviewed reported being subjected to increasing demands from 
business for advice with expectations of service levels resembling those within commercial 
practice. Against a background of cuts in local authority services, this represents a further 
strain on resources. The difficulties to which it gives rise are underscored by the fact that the 
advice is provided without charge in the absence of a primary authority agreement.  There is 
a danger of overreliance by firms on the advice provided by officers and this may lead to the 
failure to take proactive steps to deal with regulatory risk. 
5.7 Enforcement by prosecution 
 
The data showed that prosecution was rare across trading standards and environmental 
health enforcement in general. Save for the case of Wigan BC v Bodyscoop 2012 (unreported) 
there are no cases of prosecution under the Regulation. In the light of the fact of many 
thousands of claims that are actually made, it might be tempting to attribute this entirely to the 
lack of resources or aptitude or skill of enforcers. In fact, the explanation is more complex. The 
data tells a more nuanced story of securing compliance with the goal of minimising consumer 
detriment with prosecution as the last resort. In spite of the fact that the forum for this is the 
criminal justice system, there is little emphasis on retribution or justice rather on efficiency and 
a utilitarian assessment of the consequences of the outcome. In this respect, the enforcement 
of the Regulation bears little resemblance to the prosecution of most criminal offences sharing 
only the procedural system. This provides further evidence, if it were needed at this stage, of 
prosecution being firmly rooted in the accommodative rather than the deterrence model of 
enforcement. In accordance with Hutter’s findings there was little evidence of clear political 
influence in regulatory enforcement notwithstanding the explicit central government 
deregulatory agenda. Similarly, there was only the odd voice in support for the notion of the 
business viewing compliance in terms of commercial risk and acting as an amoral actor 
prepared to breach the Regulation whenever it may be more financially beneficial do so. 
While prosecution was a last resort, rarely undertaken, officers were keen to stress that it is 
still available and that they would be able to summon the resources of the authority and look 
to the support of their departments if it was felt to be necessary. In fact, there was a sense of 
professional pride in the ability to able to exercise power even if it was rarely called upon. The 
decision of whether to prosecute raises the difficulty of applying the public interest test and 
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how beneficiaries are widespread even although the costs are borne by a single authority. 
Such benefits as enforcement are therefore provided by the government rather than through 
markets (Coase, 1974). 
5.8 Deciding to prosecute – evidence and public interest 
 
The decision to prosecute generally involved the application of the evidential and public 
interest elements of the CPS test. In doing so, the evidential test was a matter of legal 
judgement but the public interest test might involve a balance of the costs and benefits of 
taking action and considering matters such as competition or the moral culpability of the 
defendant.  
Enforcers made reference to their enforcement policy to justify and guide their decision making 
when considering what action to take. Such policy provided transparency and accountability 
in the exercise of their powers avoiding the accusation of acting like ‘little Hitlers’ as described 
by one officer in Hutter’s work ‘Variations in enforcement style’ (Hutter, 1989). Of course, the 
opposite of rational, open decision-making would be an ‘intuitive’ approach that relies on a gut 
instinct for cases. This is often referred to by detectives or police in criminal law enforcement 
(Wilson, 1978). While there is passing reference by enforcers in the data to having a feel or 
instinct for enforcement, usually based on a view of the moral turpitude of the business 
manager, this is not found in the literature but it may, however, represent an interesting area 
for further research.  
5.9 The roles of risk and proportionality 
 
The data shows how enforcers’ assessment of risk plays an important role in determining the 
action that is taken in food law enforcement. The attitudes of enforcers confirms the influence 
of risk based regulation as endorsed by Hampton (Hampton, 2005). Where the enforcer is an 
environmental health officer, whose duties involve food safety and hygiene enforcement, the 
data shows that they are much more likely to be focussed on those traditional areas of 
environmental health work i.e. food safety, at the expense of food standards. This confirms 
the findings of Condon-Paoloni that environmental health officers would give monitoring 
nutrition and health claims, a lower priority than their food safety responsibilities: ‘[t]hey did 
not believe that it was really their role to undertake such monitoring and if they did, that they 
were ill equipped to do so.’ (Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015) 
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Trading standards officers on the other hand were found to have a stronger appreciation of 
the risks associated with food standards and they would, therefore, consequently be more 
alive to the enforcement of nutrition and health claims. Therefore where regulatory services 
departments of local authorities were reorganised with the result that responsibility for food 
standards was passed to environmental health officers without adequate training, the result 
may well be a decline in the quality of monitoring of labels. 
In their paper ‘When risk based regulation aims low: Approaches and challenges’, Black and 
Baldwin consider the problem of enforcement of low risk and therefore low priority cases 
(Black and Baldwin, 2012). The data indicate how such risks at a case level are not individually 
concerning but their cumulative effect represents a challenge for enforcement. Individual 
officers may be inclined to treat breaches of the Regulation as minor infractions and respond 
with conciliatory measures for fear of appearing to ‘break a butterfly on a wheel.’ At worst, the 
enforcer’s response is to ignore or dismiss the risk altogether.  
Closely related to risk based regulation is the application of the principle of proportionality. In 
advocating proportionality the Regulator’s Code highlights factors such as ‘business size’ and 
‘capacity’. The interviewed officers referred to practical and commercial considerations such 
as the cost of relabelling stock or the loss incurred by wastage. Such factors are uncommon 
in the calculations made by enforcers; although Sunstein appears to equate proportionality 
with cost benefit analysis which is less unusual. The interaction between the Ayres and 
Braithwaite pyramid of responses takes into account the proportionality of the response to the 
infraction (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992).  
5.10 The limitation of resources 
 
The impact of resources on the regulatory response was not easy to assess. Some enforcers 
claim that resource constraints had no effect and that they would be able to take whatever 
action the circumstances required without regard to the marginal cost of such action. Others 
cited it as the single most important barrier to taking action. It appears from the interview data 
that most viewed the risks of litigation worth taking in only exceptional circumstances. Some 
of the literature suggests, surprisingly, that limits on resources may actually direct enforcers 
to take legal action as the more cost effective alternative to education (Shover et al., 1983). 
However other studies indicate that the level of risk and costs involved in taking legal action 
is a deterrent to prosecution (Bartrip and Fenn, 1980). Recent cuts in local authority spending 
have had a disproportionate impact on regulatory services which may in turn have further 
ramifications on consumer protection and the efficient functioning of consumer markets 
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although this is difficult to quantify. The extent of the cuts have called some to call into question 
the authority’s ability to meet its statutory obligations (BIS, 2015a). Shears has gone so far as 
to conclude that the cuts to services undermine assurances that consumer protection will be 
maintained (Shears, 2012). There is however no evidence to support the claim that levels of 
protection have suffered directly as a result of cuts.  
5.11 The breadth of officers’ duties and the setting of priorities 
 
Environmental health and trading standards officers are faced with the responsibility for 
enforcement of a broad range of legislation which is as varied as it is numerous. They cannot 
enforce all the legislation equally in all cases. Therefore in exercising this responsibility 
enforcers must set priorities for enforcement. Condon-Paoloni found that the resulting 
necessary prioritisation was ‘employed because officers believed it most effective in ensuring 
protection of the community’s health.’(Condon-Paoloni et al., 2015)  
Here it was found that food law enforcement forms a large part of the workload for trading 
standards and environmental health officers. The data showed enforcers’ willingness to set 
their priorities by reference to direct public consultation with residents and businesses and 
with their political representatives, local councillors. In doing so enforcers are able to claim a 
mandate for their actions, justify their choices and enable transparency and accountability. 
Unfortunately, such consultation would result in nutrition and health claims receiving little 
public support because of low awareness. When set against food hygiene, the risks associated 
with unsafe food will invariably trump the latent and long-term harm suffered by misleading 
consumers about the nutrition and health properties of their food.  
With the exception of special projects focussed on nutrition and health claims, it was found 
that most work on nutrition and health claims was reactive and specifically driven by 
complaints. Officers emphasised their commitment to responding to all complaints but as there 
were likely to be few complaints relating to nutrition and health claims this was an unlikely call 
for action.  
According to economic theory, enforcement is most effective when there is a victim who claims 
restitution (Becker and Stigler, 1974). This is problematic in relation to nutrition and health 
claims as the Regulation is a criminal statute and does not in itself create the possibility for 
civil claims, which in any case would be difficult to prove. Therefore, enforcers are more likely 
to receive complaints about false claims from competing businesses rather than consumers.  
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5.12 Local enforcement of EU law 
 
The devolution of enforcement responsibility of law and policy formulated at EU level to a local 
level involves ‘some negotiation’ between the local and international interface (Harrison et al., 
1997). Allowing final policy making to be made at the lowest level accepts the possibility of 
‘coordinated diversity’ (Scott and Trubek, 2002). The study affirms the individual character of 
local enforcement and the variations in enforcement that flow from its local nature and this is 
most acute at the individual firm level where it is inevitably perceived as unfairness. This may 
have a knock on effect on consumers who will experience differing levels of protection 
depending on where they reside. 
The home authority principle was applied to local enforcement to suggest to enforcers a clear 
direction as to jurisdiction and responsibility for matters where more than one authority might 
be concerned. The principle was found to be satisfactory and workable by enforcers. There 
was some indication that it would promulgate an accommodative approach to enforcement.  
The creation of primary authorities since 2009 does ameliorate the problem of inconsistency 
in advice by assigning the relevant authority. However, it goes further than determining which 
advice takes precedence in the event of a conflict by providing ‘assured’ advice. It goes 
beyond advice that may be purchased in the market by conferring indemnity against action by 
another authority. Where the original decision is upheld this will be straightforward. Where it 
turns out that the advice was incorrect, the BRDO will need to make the difficult choice 
between maintaining the certainty of the original advice or accepting that the original advice 
was incorrect and therefore undermining the basis of the principal authority scheme. It will be 
instructive to see what the outcome of such a case will be. The data indicate that enforcers 
appear sanguine about the risk of a conflict of interest when the firm pays for advice.  
The establishment of primary authority brings a high level of certainty and even indemnity not 
previously found in the commercial model of advice provision. It is intended to allow business 
to make operational and investment decisions in the absence of the ambiguity and risk usually 
associated with commercial activity. However, in doing so, it changes the allocation of risk 
significantly away from business and places it with consumers who will face lower levels of 
protection. For local authorities it provides a boost to revenue. 
5.13 Officers’ experience and expertise in enforcing the Regulation 
 
195 
 
The sample for interviews was purposively selected for the respondents’ expertise in food 
standards. It was evident even among such experts however, that where enforcers did not 
have the experience of taking action for nutrition and health claims, that there was a lack of 
expertise, particularly among environmental health officers. The structure of the Regulation 
into nutrition and health claims with the creation of a list of approved claims should make the 
enforcement straightforward. However, some respondents appeared overwhelmed by the 
Regulation. It is suggested that such a reaction is due to the lack of familiarity and a confusion 
between enforcement by reference to the approved list or by analysis and the review of 
evidence for claims which is carried out by the EFSA; not a task for enforcers.  
The internet and social media in particular presented challenges for enforcers when faced with 
the task of determining what constitutes a ‘commercial communication’ under the Regulation. 
Consumer endorsements or testimonials or blog posts which may be commercially sponsored 
may be indistinguishable from content. This is a widespread issue affecting all online content 
and one which extends beyond nutrition and health claims. 
5.14 Enforcement of the regulation and food law in general compared 
 
The data revealed no significant differences between the enforcement of nutrition and health 
claims and the enforcement of other food law notwithstanding the differences in risks 
presented by health claims and food safety. They face the same challenges of limited 
resources, variations in the styles of enforcement. The evidence concurs with Hawkins’ finding 
that regulators deploy their wide discretionary powers ‘flexibly’. The European Commission 
avers that such claims are ‘not properly enforced’. The study did not find unequivocal support 
for this assertion. Rather that enforcement was uneven and dependent on a range of complex 
factors and decision making by enforcers was a multifactorial process.  
5.15 Conclusion 
 
The Regulation is enforced by criminal sanctions. The use of criminal law in consumer 
protection is a contested area (Cartwright, 2003). This may be responsible for what may have 
been an adversarial attitude on the part of enforcers in the past. When examining current 
practice, there is little evidence of such methods by enforcers. In fact, food law enforcers have 
moved further down the regulatory pyramid towards an almost exclusively accommodative 
approach in the enforcement of nutrition and health claims.   There has been a shift from the 
adversarial relationship between the regulator and firm to one that resembles more closely 
that of advisor and client. This is consistent with the findings by Yapp and Fairman away from 
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policing and towards facilitation (Yapp and Fairman, 2006). Therefore, such a change appears 
to be part of a progressive and enlightened attitude among enforcers.  
However, this brings its own challenges and raises questions of what happens when things 
go wrong. For example, where the advice turns out to be incorrect. In this scenario advice and 
negotiation rather than litigation become the stock in trade of enforcers and while this 
pragmatic approach is generally welcome, it raises the question of whether ‘there are certain 
principled and ethical limits that inform and circumscribe the limits of legitimate enforcement 
practice’ (Yeung, 2004).  
As well as enforcement practice, the study also raises further questions about the regulatory 
infrastructure of the use of magistrates for determining cases and the extent to which laws 
made European law can be effectively enforced at a local level and the potential for variations 
in enforcement as experienced by firms.  
Too often questions of regulatory enforcement are bound up in political dogma around 
demands for cutting red tape on the one hand, or, an unshakable faith in solving problems 
with more regulation on the other. Some regulation and enforcement is needed for the efficient 
operation of markets. However, crude regulatory reform which does not examine the operation 
of the specific effects on a particular market are unlikely to lead to improvements. There is a 
much more subtle task of designing regulation on what Helm describes as a ‘disaggregated’ 
basis involving a detailed analysis of the effect of a regulation and its enforcement which is 
much more likely to yield greater efficiency (Helm, 2006). By considering the case of enforcing 
the regulation of nutrition and health claims, this study contributes to the evidence base of this 
debate.  
5.16 Limitations of the research 
 
A general limitation of this work is that its scope is restricted the enforcement of nutrition and 
health claims. One of the limitations of the research are those that are common to the use of 
interviews which rely on the uncorroborated accounts of interviewees. Ideally the data would 
be corroborated by review of officers’ casework files. This would be further triangulated by 
observational research which would involve shadowing officers. An obvious problem with such 
an approach is the compromise of confidentiality which attaches to regulatory enforcement 
work. Unsurprisingly, businesses are very sensitive to the risk of their exposure and regulators 
are similarly reluctant to allow their ongoing investigation to be placed under scrutiny.  
197 
 
In this study, there were 18 interviews carried out with 20 officers. While the point of data 
saturation was clear within the qualitative framework of this investigation, it may prove 
instructive to adopt a mixed methods approach to provide a quantitative approach to inform 
questions around the extent and depth of officers working knowledge of the Regulation. This 
would seek to provide a representative picture of the role of nutrition and health claims in the 
range of enforcement duties of officers. This might be achieved by a widely distributed 
questionnaire with statistical analysis of the results.  
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